South Sudan News Agency

Sunday, Nov 23rd, 2014

Last update11:14:10 PM GMT

You are here: News Press Releases

Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Clarification about Reductions in Housing and Job Specific Allowances

Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning
The Republic of South Sudan
For Immediate Release

Juba, October 24, 2012 (SSNA) -- This is to inform the public in general and the civil servants in particular all over the Republic of South Sudan that the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning has not directed any cut in the basic salaries of government employees whether at the State or National level. Any State authority that cuts the salaries/wages of its workers is not implementing the policy of the National Government. It has nothing to do with the austerity measures undertaken by the National Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. Of course States have competence to determine their salary and staffing levels.

The following are some facts about State and National Government employee salaries during the current period of austerity:

  • The National Government policy is to reduce housing allowances by 50%. At the State civil servants do not receive housing allowances; hence even if a State opts to follow National Government policy there could not be any reduction since there is no housing allowance to deduct.
  • Conditional salary transfers to the States were not reduced except for the elimination of job specific allowances.
  • Block grants to States were reduced by 25%.  This was significantly less than the reduction in the National Government budget of 35%.
  • States are free to use their block grants in the way they want.
Contact Person: Abraham Diing Akoi
Economic Policy and Media Relations
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, RSS
This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it
+211 955 933 648

The Position of the SPLM-DC on Sudan-South Sudan Cooperation Agreement

Juba, October 22, 2012 (SSNA) -- 1. Commission before secession. It is mind-boggling how during the entire interim period there was no formalized participation of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) in the upstream and downstream oil operations (e.g. quality procedures, metering, cross border reservoirs, etc.).

2. The financial arrangements for the transportation, transit and processing fees of South Sudan oil in the Sudan shall be as follows: US $ 9.10 per barrel for the oil produced by Petrodar, US $11.00 per barrel for the oil produced by GNPOC and a transitional financial arrangement sum of US $ 3.028 billion to be paid at a rate of US $15.00 per barrel. This means that, the Government of South Sudan shall pay per barrel: US $ 24.10 and 26.00, respectively, for the Petrodar and GNPOC oil productions; an average of about US $ 25.00 per barrel.

3. Each Party agrees ‘to unconditionally and irrevocably cancel and forgive any claims of oil related arrears and other oil related financial claims outstanding to the other Party up to the date of this Agreement, including the claims of arrears and other financial claims filed by each Party with the African Union High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan in February 2012.’

4. The issue of SUDAPET is postponed to be discussed within a period of two (2) months from the signature of this Agreement.

5. The Government of South Sudan ‘shall take the necessary measures to resume the oil production from all fields in the territory of RSS, and shall within fourteen (14) days of the signature of this Agreement issue an instruction to the oil companies operating in the RSS to re-establish the oil production…’. The Government of Sudan shall within the same period issue instructions to the oil companies to re-establish processing and transportation facilities for oil produced in South Sudan.

6. A joint ‘Petroleum Monitoring Committee shall be established within twenty-one (21) days of the signing of this Agreement’ to oversee its implementation.

7. The agreement shall remain in force for a period of three (3) years and six (6) months as of the date when the first South Sudan oil is delivered at the marine terminal and a bill of lading issued.

From the foregoing, it is clear that:

(1)- This agreement admits that the Government of Southern Sudan has failed its duty during the whole interim period to monitor the oil production, exploitation and transport arrangements. This is a right granted to it by the CPA.

(2)- the final figure agreed upon as fees for the exportation of South Sudan oil through Sudan and using its facilities (US $ 25/bbl) is not much  further from that the Government of Sudan had asked for (US $ 36/bbl) during the negotiations.

(3)- The cancellation of all ‘claims of oil related arrears and other oil related  financial claims outstanding to the other Party’ makes nonsense of the much publicized Government claim that oil of South Sudan has been stolen by Khartoum.

(4)- The issue of SUDAPET is an intricate matter and not just a ‘detail’ to be  left to the joint committee.

A- Agreement on the Status of Nationals of the other State and Related Matters

This is essentially an agreement on the Four Freedoms (residence, movement, undertaking economic activity and ownership of property) and a standing Joint High Level Committee shall be established to “oversee the adoption and implementation of joint measures relating to the status and treatment of the nationals of each State in the territory of the other State”. The committee shall hold its first meeting within two (2) weeks of the entry into force of this Agreement. There is no further elaboration on the matter.

B- Agreement on Border Issues

1. The Parties shall establish a Joint Border Commission within two weeks of the ratification of this agreement to “oversee the management and demarcation of the border”.

2. There will also be established within the same period a Joint Demarcation Committee under the Joint Border Commission to “manage and supervise the demarcation and the maintenance of the boundary pillars and beacons”. This committee will in turn establish joint technical teams composed of forty (40) persons from each State.

3. The two States shall confirm the completion of the demarcation process through a written formal agreement a copy of which shall be deposited with the African Union Commission.

4. The provision of protection for the demarcation teams, as well as the movement of members of border communities across the international boundary is outlined.

This is a framework agreement short of details and there is little or nothing to be said about it.

C- Agreement for Cooperation on Central Banking Issues

The Parties shall establish a Joint Central Banks Committee within thirty (30) days of the ratification of this agreement with “the principal purpose of supporting financial stability and sound banking policies in the two States in order to enhance cooperation and to promote trade and the mutual economic viability of the two States.”

The terms of reference of the joint committee as well as the other matters related to commercial banks are technicalities which only time will tell whether or not they will be adhered to.

D- Agreement on Trade and Trade Related Issues

1. The Parties agreed to establish a Joint Ministerial Committee on Trade Relations within thirty (30) days from the ratification of this Agreement which “shall have the primary responsibility for all policy on trade and trade-related matters between the two States and shall oversee and approve the programme of the work of the Joint Technical Committee on Trade Relations.”

2. The Joint Technical Committee on Trade Relations shall be established within thirty (30) days of the establishment of the Joint Ministerial Committee on Trade Relations, to “coordinate and promote technical cooperation and the implementation of trade and trade-related issues.”

Again, this is a framework agreement and the details of what it can achieve for the benefit of the two countries are left to the two committees.

E- Agreement on Certain Economic Matters

1. The issues dealt with are: the assets and liabilities, including external debt and balance of payments support; state archives; cultural heritage property; non-oil arrears and other claims.

2. The Parties agreed that Sudan shall retain all external debt liabilities and external assets of the Republic of Sudan. At the same time the two Parties shall work together to “secure from international creditors a firm commitment to provide comprehensive relief of the external debt of the Republic of Sudan”.

3. If the international creditors do not give a firm commitment as in point 2 above, the two Parties shall enter into negotiations on the apportionment of the external debt of the Republic of Sudan and its assets.

4. Each Party agrees ‘to unconditionally and irrevocably cancel and forgive any claims of non-oil related arrears and other non-oil related financial claims outstanding to the other Party up to the date of this Agreement, including the claims of arrears and other financial claims filed by each Party with the African Union High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan in February 2012.’

5. The Parties and the AUHIP shall seek international assistance from the international community with respect to:

(a) contributions of monies to provide for the one third of the aggregate amount required to fill the financial gap to the Sudan resulting from the loss of oil revenue from South Sudan (amounting to US $3.028 billion);

(b) funding to support South Sudan in carrying out programmes and projects to meet its urgent developmental challenges;

(c) direct debt relief of Sudan’s external debt within two years; and

(d) assistance in the lifting of all economic sanctions imposed on Sudan.

From the foregoing, it is to be observed that:

(i)- The Sudan retained external debt liabilities in exchange of South Sudan forgoing external assets. It is obvious that external assets, including embassies buildings, have monetary value far more than all the external debt of Sudan which was estimated at the end of December 2010 at US $37.7 billion.

(ii)- Even after this concession, both parties will strive to get from the creditors a firm commitment to cancel Sudan’s debt. Since South Sudan was going to be involved in working to get debt relief, why not from the outset divide both the external debts and assets?

(iii)- In addition, South Sudan will help get financial support to Sudan to cover Its oil-revenue gap and assist in securing the lifting of economic sanctions imposed on Sudan since 1997. In return, Sudan will ‘help’ South Sudan to get funding from the international community for its developmental programmes; which funding it was getting already without external help.

(iv)- The cancellation of all ‘claims of non-oil related arrears and other non-oil related financial claims outstanding to the other Party’ puts South Sudan  at a disadvantage since it has more claims to the non-oil arrears than the Sudan.

F- Agreement to Facilitate Payment of Post-Service Benefits

1. The Republic of Sudan, as the continuing state, has acknowledged its duty and agreed to pay all post-service benefits to all South Sudanese who were working for the government of the Sudan.

2. A Joint Ministerial Committee on Pensions shall be established within thirty (30) days of the signing of this Agreement with “primary responsibility for discussing and reaching agreement on all issues related to pensions administration of relevance to the two States.”

3. Another Joint Technical Committee on Pensions shall be established within the same period.

The resolution of the vital matter of post-service benefits is overdue. This is a framework agreement which, it is hoped, will solve the problems of the many South Sudanese who have not got their post-service benefits up to now. Like the other agreements, the details of the actual solution of the problem are left to committees.

G- Agreement on Security Arrangements

1. The Parties renewed “their commitment to the cessation of harbouring of, or support to rebel groups against the other State.”

2. The Parties renewed “their commitment to immediately cease all hostile propaganda and inflammatory statements in the media”.

3. The Parties reiterated that they “shall immediately issue instructions to their forces to withdraw unconditionally to their side of the border.”

4. The ’14 mile’ area shall be completely demilitarized and “the status quo of the joint tribal mechanisms for the resolution of disputes” maintained.

5. The ‘Safe Demilitarized Border Zone’ is agreed and shall be immediately operationalized.

6. The Parties agree to immediately open the 10 agreed border-crossing corridors. The modalities of this process shall be agreed by the Joint Political Security Mechanism.

It is clear from this Agreement that:

(i)- The SPLA is to withdraw from ’14 mile’ area. As is well known, Sudan has insisted on rejecting the map for the demilitarized zone that puts ’14 mile’ on the side of South Sudan. It has now got its way. This seems to be the move that opened the way for the agreement on the ‘Safe Demilitarized Border Zone’.

(ii)- The government of South Sudan has consistently denied harbouring and supporting rebels of the Sudan in its territory. Now, not only has it admitted that, but has agreed to cease harbouring of and support to these rebels.

(iii)- The insistence of the government of the Sudan for a security agreement before signing other agreements has now paid off.


The analysis of the agreements signed in Addis Ababa on the 27th of September 2012, between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan has shown that for the first time the issues have been dealt with one-by-one on their merits rather than sticking to the condition always imposed by the SPLM side that no agreement would be signed without the conclusion of all the outstanding issues, especially the one relating to Abyei area. Now this agreement has been signed without agreement on the disputed and claimed border areas; conclusion of the status of Abyei area; and finalizing the other matters on which agreement has been reached. The remaining points in these agreements, or what the Parties call ’details’, were left to be settled by joint committees to be formed at a later date. These agreements were made possible by concessions made by the delegation of South Sudan on oil fees, non-oil arrears, cessation of support to Sudan’s rebels, and demilitarization of ’14 mile’ area.

The big concessions were in the areas of oil fees and security arrangements. The correct reading of this situation is that the South Sudanese side was desperate to get the oil flowing again and this was exploited by the Sudanese side to push for concessions in the security area the conclusion of which has always been its condition for signing any agreement with South Sudan. The celebrations in Khartoum for the signing of these agreements attest to that conclusion.

The SPLM-DC pointed out in January this year, when the oil production was shut down, that the decision to do so was a hurried one that did not study the consequences of the shut-down, nor put forward alternative sources of revenue to replace the 98% dependence of the national budget on oil. Exactly, as the World Bank predicted, the economic crunch which followed that shut-down is now biting the government in Juba. Hence, their hurry to get the oil on stream again. Therefore, the agreements in Addis Ababa were meant to serve the short-term interest of the SPLM and its stalwarts who are running out of money as a result of closing down oil production facilities. What goes round comes round.

South Sudan has little to gain from these agreements, except may be in improved security if the two governments of Sudan and South Sudan will live up to their commitments to live as two good independent and sovereign neighbouring states in peace and economic interdependence.

Department of Information,
Juba, South Sudan.

Agreements Reached in Addis Ababa Failed to Address Major Problems: Panaruu Community in Juba

Date: October, 14, 2012
To: 1st Lt Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit
President of Republic of South Sudan
Chairman of the SPLM Party
C-in-C of the SPLA Army
CC: Hon. Dr. Riek Machar Teny, VP of the Republic of South Sudan
CC: Hon. James Wani Igga, Speaker of the South Sudan National Parliament
CC: Council of States
CC: H.EPagan Amum Okiech, SPLM SG & Chief Negotiator
CC: Hilde Johnson, Head of the UNMISS
CC: Gov. Taban Deng Gai, Governor of Unity State
CC: Miabek Lang Bilkuei, Commissioner of Panrieng County
CC: Deng Athuai, Head of Civil Society, South Sudan

Sub: Panaruu Community in Juba have rejected the security arrangements and border agreement recently signed in Addis Ababa

Juba, October 15, 2012 (SSNA) -- October, 14/ 2012. Panaruu Community of Panrieng County, Unity State in Juba have rejected the recent security and border agreement signed in Addis Ababa between the republic of south Sudan and North Sudan. This comes after the Sunday community meeting at South Sudan Hotel One. The meeting comes before one day of Presidential address of the parliament to ratify the agreement signed on September 27, 2012 after marathon summit between the two Presidents of South Sudan and North Sudan.

Panaruu Community seconded other agreements even if we have some reservations about the overall context and their future applications with the exception of security arrangements and Soft border agreement. Panaruu Community was first equally affected in numerous ways during the war, equally contributed during the war, and will be first affected if any eventuality takes place between South-North areas as it recently happened during the 10 days war of Panthou.

And because of these reasons, we strongly believe that Panaruu Community is equal stake holder like other border communities and they should not be ignored, but be included in any process so that workable, lasting and durable solutions be reached. Exclusive and discriminatory policies of the past should be avoided so that we live in a country that belongs to all of us, not theoretically, but in practicality. We therefore want the government of South Sudan under the leadership of Gen. President Salva Kiir Mayardit to be a government of people, by the people, and for the people. A government that listens to its citizens was a cause for the war that claimed millions of lives during the civil war. We cannot afford to live under political, economic, social, and cultural deprivation as it happened under former successive regimes of Khartoum before South Sudan become independent in July 2011.

Panaruu Community meeting resolved the followings:

1. Formation of border follow-up committee with the national government and its Chief Negotiator and the team;
2. Panaruu Community is in solidarity with the Northern Bhar El Ghazall State position on mile 14 area;
3. Seconded all the agreements with the exception of border and security arrangements
4. Requested that border communities be represented during the next round of disputed/contested and claimed areas that will takes place soon or later in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
5. That all border communities be represented at all level of border and other technical committees;
6. That the post-succession delegation headed by H.E. Pagan Amum Okiech brief Panaruu Community;  
7. That consultation be made before next round of border talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
8. That all 4 freedoms be reviewed and regulated before they become a law;
9. That we must not give away our rights to North Sudan because of worsening economic situation and the political pressures from the international community;
10. That all border communities not be excluded from the all processes like before during the CPA negotiation and implementation processes;
11. That all deals must not be done at the expense of others as it is always the case;
12. That any deal must be win-win solution;
13. That Panthou and Jau Payams are part and parcel of the Panrieng County and not be put of the proposed Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ);
14. That Panaruu Community rejected AUHIP Map which delineated some crucial border areas that belong to our farming communities;
15. That AUHIP must accept tribal maps for next round of talks on disputed/contested and claimed areas to forge the way forward so that a fair settlement is reached;
16.  That AUHIP should be fair to South Sudan and North Sudan when it comes to mediation, facilitation, and resolutions.

Panaruu Community recommended the following:

1. That President Salva Kiir Mayardit must listen to Panaruu Community in regards to border and security arrangements because this is a very sensitive issue, which will always jeopardize the peaceful existence of the community at the border;
2. That President evaluates the negotiating team before next round of talks because some of the team members are weak to talk tougher with North Sudan when discussing issues;
3. That negotiating team under leadership of H.E Pagan Amum briefs the border communities, including Panaruu Community, otherwise ignoring border communities must be out of touch and deliberate discriminate/exclusivity as it has been always the case. H.E Pagan Amum was wrong when he said that “those who criticize the deal are out of ignorance,” [source: Sudantribune);
4. That zero point must be at Kolek (Kelek), not at Koloch (Teshwin) as proposed;
5. That Panthou Payam has been a disputed area, not a claimed area as it seems to be misunderstood or mystified by many in the South and beyond because it has been a point of recent disagreement and war;
6. That Jau Payam is part and parcel of Panrieng County and must not be mystified politically as disputed/contested or claim area during any deal;
7. We recommend that Panaruu Community be included in border and security arrangement talk and implementation processes;
8. That Government of Republic of South Sudan negotiating team must negotiate faithfully, not out fear or under pressure from any source.


Signed by:

William Deng Ayai Thuc, Community Chairman
Dominic Dau Anyang, Youth Chairman
Mary Abui, Women Chairperson
Simon Achut Kueth, Acting Chairperson of Youth

More Articles...

Page 91 of 151

Our Mission Statement

To bring the latest, most relevant news and opinions on issues relating to the South Sudan and surrounding regions.

To provide key information to those interested in the South Sudan and its people.