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Aerial Attacks on Civilian Agriculture and Food Supplies: 'Starving' the Nuba" (Part Two of "Looking Directly into the Heart of Darkness)

By Eric Reeves

September 27, 2014 (SSNA) -- On 24 September 2014 I presented and offered preliminary analysis of a document I had received on 22 September 2014, from a source within Sudan whom I trust implicitly. It was an explosive document, containing the "Minutes of the Military and Security Committee Meeting held in the National Defense College [Khartoum]"; the meeting referred to took place on August 31, 2014; the date of the minutes for the document is September 1, 2014 (Sunday).

What makes the document so extraordinary is the participation of the regime's most senior military and security officials, expressing themselves freely, and in the process disclosing numerous highly consequential policy decisions, internal and external. I discussed at some length issues of authenticity, and concluded the evidence was simply overwhelming that this was an authentic document, recording the words of men of immense power speaking without restraint about their goals, their fears, their policies. Subsequently I have received a good deal of additional evidence of the authenticity of the document, with no meaningful or substantial challenge offered to my assertion of that authenticity.

The words I am reporting are indeed the words of the men who control power, especially military and security power in Sudan, and have overseen 25 years of savage, self-enriching tyranny. The 30 pages of minutes are dense with revelations—some small, some large, some not so much revelations as shocking confirmation of what has been evident but never publicly confirmed by the National Congress Party/National Islamic Front regime.

In attendance were fourteen of the very most powerful men in the increasingly militarized regime (only two were not senior military officers). These included First Lt. General and Vice President Bakri Hassan Saleh, who will become the most powerful man within the regime if President (and Field Marshal) Omar al-Bashir dies from his health problems, or is medically unable to run again for president in the elections of 2015.

The destruction of agricultural production and food supplies in South Kordofan and Blue Nile

In the present brief analysis I will concentrate on the military tactics of the Sudan Armed Forces in South Kordofan, focusing particularly on the effort to destroy agricultural production in this region and thus starve people into submission (a similar campaign is underway in rebel-controlled areas of Blue Nile State to the east). That this is the military goal is made quite clear at several points in the minutes. Indeed, "starve" is a word explicitly used to describe the goal of this ongoing campaign, now of more than three years:

"This year the Sudan People’s Army (SPLA-N) managed to cultivate large areas in South Kordofan State. We must not allow them to harvest these crops. We should prevent them. Good harvest means supplies to the war effort. We must starve them, so that, commanders and civilians desert them and we recruit the deserters to use them in the war to defeat the rebels," Lt. General Siddiig Aamir, Director of M.I. [Military Intelligence] and Security (page 10).

This savage, ruthless assessment neglects to point out that the vast majority of agricultural production is a civilian undertaking, and that it will be civilians—primarily children, women, and the elderly—who will suffer most from this destruction of food supplies.

Declaring that negotiations with the rebels in South Kordofan and Blue Nile are a "waste of time," a senior general, Chief of Joint Operations, indicates that the military option is the only one to be considered:

"We should attack them before the harvest and bombard their food stores and block them completely," Lt. General Imadadiin Adaw, Chief of Joint Operations (page 14).

Other moments and comments in the minutes comport fully with this assessment.

[For my comments on use of the English translation of the Arabic original, see ¶ 5 of my previous analysis, 24 September 2014; see also several additional pages of the Arabic original here in .JPG format; previous pages of the text may be found here)]

Let us be very clear about what is being said here: the goal of aerial bombing attacks is to destroy the ability of people in rebel-controlled areas of the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile to harvest a bountiful sorghum crop, a harvest that should continue into December. There is of course no conceivable way in which only the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-N) can be denied the food harvested; the widespread destruction will work to deny all the people of the Nuba Mountains food.

The Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNet) has given us a dramatically clear picture of what will follow from Khartoum's assault on food in the Nuba: Chart 1 of "FEWSNet Projected food security outcomes, July to September 2014" indicates that most of the people in of the Nuba Mountains (as well as people in other parts of South Kordofan) fall within "food insecurity" Category 4, "Emergency"; this is one step short of the final Category (5): "Catastrophe/Famine." While the FEWSNet predictions suggest that the sorghum crop, if harvested, could bring most people down to Category 3 ("Crisis"), it is precisely this crop that has been targeted. The effect will be to push people into Category 5 in large numbers.

Watching Catastrophe Unfold

A great many have already perished, although we can't know how many: Khartoum refuses all humanitarian access to rebel-held areas, including assessment missions. There have been, nonetheless, many surreptitious hit-and-run assessments, but not the kind of sustained assessments of the full range of humanitarian indicators that should be measured. In early 2012, the feckless African Union belatedly submitted a proposal for humanitarian access. The SPLM-N leadership immediately accepted the conditions proposed by the AU mediators; Khartoum refused. And although the regime has at various times made disingenuous noises about allowing humanitarian access, the pressure from the African Union has entirely dissipated and Khartoum is predictably and resolutely obdurate in continuing the humanitarian embargo. This denial of relief aid to acutely distressed civilians is reminiscent of the humanitarian embargo that accompanied the genocidal military campaign of the 1990s, a campaign designed to exterminate the Nuba people. It also meets the international legal standard for "crimes against humanity." The campaign of the 1990s came perilously close to success.

And now again, there is a complete humanitarian embargo on a large part of South Kordofan State and a relentless aerial campaign to destroy agricultural production and food availability. This campaign has forced hundreds of thousands to flee and brought many hundreds of thousand more to the brink of starvation—Khartoum's resumed ambition. Many tens of thousands have fled to Unity State in South Sudan, most to the Yida refugee camp that has, in turn, been bombed by Khartoum's aircraft. Ground attacks also focused on villages with no military presence, on food supplies, and the destruction of homes, markets, churches, mosques, and all that might assist in agricultural production. Hospitals have been repeatedly, deliberately targeted—by advanced military jet aircraft with full knowledge of their targets.

The most common weapon in this campaign is the Antonov "bomber," a Russian-built cargo plane retrofitted to permit the highly imprecise dropping of shrapnel-loaded barrel bombs on civilian targets, including villages and fields. The effect has been to bring people to such a state of fear that they cannot work their lands, but rather flee villages for caves and ravines (see photographs here). At this critical moment in the agricultural cycle, Khartoum's campaign of aerial destruction and terror has been ordered to re-commence, precisely because there has been a relatively successful sorghum crop (sorghum is the food staple of most people in both South Kordofan and Blue Nile states).

Crimes Against Humanity

This campaign of deliberately denying food to civilians for more than three years violates international human rights and humanitarian law on numerous counts. Moreover, the international community has known full well that these crimes are occurring, but refuses to confront the Khartoum regime over its campaign of ethnically-targeted civilian destruction. The world has been provided with numerous first-hand accounts over the past three years—by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Enough Project, as well as many intrepid journalists (a short bibliography appears below, followed by excerpts from several reports). But no action has been taken, no threats have been made, even as the repeated, systematic attacks on civilian food supplies, in aggregate, clearly constitute crimes against humanity as specified in the Rome Statute that serves as the basis for the International Criminal Court.

[ See pp. 19 – 20 of "'They Bombed Everything that Moved': Aerial Military Attacks on Civilians and Humanitarians in Sudan, 1999 – 2013" | |


"On the Obstruction of Humanitarian Aid," African Studies Review, Volume 54, Number 3 (December 2011) pp. 165 - 74 | ]

But attention has drifted from the Nuba and Blue Nile, as it had previously drifted from ongoing genocide in Darfur. Unless Khartoum's (now publicly) avowed commitment to "starve" the people of the Nuba is met with swift and forceful international condemnation and pressure, we may be sure that people, in great numbers, will in fact die. 

What we have known about the assault on the people of South Kordofan: A brief bibliography

Further reports, including key excerpts:

  • The Enough Project, "Rapid Food Security And Nutrition Assessment: South Kordofan," 18 October 2012


Experts in health assessments in humanitarian crises at The John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health vetted the assessment and found its research and methodology to be sound and its findings to be credible. The assessment was comprised of Mid-Upper Arm Circumference, or MUAC, screenings that were conducted on children 6-59 months old and standard food security questionnaires that were administered to heads of households.

The assessment is significant because it is the first international, third-party, on-the-ground assessment of food security and nutrition in South Kordofan since June 2011, when the government of Sudan banned all international humanitarian aid organizations from operating in the state. No similar assessment has been carried out in Blue Nile state; however, the condition of refugees from Blue Nile indicates that the food security situation in that state may be comparable to that in South Kordofan today.

The findings verify suspicions held by the international community for more than a year: that the government of Sudan’s violent campaign against civilian populations in South Kordofan state and its intentional denial of international humanitarian aid to areas controlled by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, or SPLM-N, have resulted in severe malnutrition and dire food security outlooks.

  • UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "South Sudan: Aid organizations prepare for new refugee influx from Sudan," 3 October, 2012:


Humanitarian organizations have reported that up to 40,000 refugees affected by conflict and food shortages in Sudan could arrive in South Sudan by the end of the year, after the heavy rains and flooding subside.

Since the conflict broke out in Sudan’s Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile regions in 2011, over 170,000 refugees have fled to South Sudan’s Unity and Upper Nile States in search of safety. At the height of the crisis in May 2012, up to 32,000 people crossed into the Upper Nile’s Maban County within just a few days. Many arrived malnourished and exhausted, having walked for weeks without food or clean water. Heavy rainfall and flooding in August led to a decrease in the number of refugees crossing into South Sudan, as most border areas became impassable. But aid workers expect the influx of refugees to increase when the rains subside in November.

“The crisis is certainly not over. We anticipate that up to 350,000 Sudanese will be hosted in South Sudan by the end of 2013,” said OCHA’s Operations Director, John Ging, who visited refugee camps in South Sudan last month.

  • The Sudan Consortium: African and International Civil Society Action for Sudan, Human Rights Update (June 2014), "Three-year anniversary of outbreak of conflict sees highest number of attacks directed against the civilian population of Southern Kordofan.


The Government of Sudan’s (GoS) military offensive against opposition forces of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) in Southern Kordofan reached a new level of intensity during June, provoking increased concern over the fate of civilians in those areas.

Between 1 and 22 June [2014], monitors on the ground recorded a total of 1,062 bombs and 1,229 artillery/rocket shells landing on or near civilian settlements in Southern Kordofan during the course of 82 separate attacks. This represents the highest number of attacks directed against the civilian population in Southern Kordofan since the conflict began in 2011.

Additionally, on 16 June, Sudanese government aircraft bombed a hospital run by the international organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). This follows a similar attack on the Mother of Mercy Hospital in South Kordofan at the beginning of May, an attack which was widely condemned by the international community. These repeated attacks on clearly marked medical facilities indicate that, at the very least, the Sudanese government is failing to take all feasible precautions to ensure that its attacks do not violate the protected status of these facilities under international humanitarian law. A more straightforward interpretation of the observed facts on the ground is that the hospitals are being deliberately targeted.

  • Arry Organization, "Three Years of War in Nuba Mountains: Another failure of the International Community," June 5, 2014:


After three years of war in Nuba Mountains, the indiscriminate bombardment and the massive human rights violation continue to escalate. During the last five weeks, the Janjaweed (Rapid Respond Forces as the government calls them), were deployed in large numbers to several areas in Nuba Mountains. The government media reported on April 26, 2014, that the Janjaweed militias were legal troops, affiliated with the National Security forces; and their mission in Nuba Mountains was to end the insurgency in the region during this summer.

Few days after the militia arrived in Southern Kordofan, they engaged in fighting in Daloka with the SPLM/N and lost one of their important leaders. In response to the Janjaweed defeat, the Sudanese government bombed Kauda for three days in a row with over 54 bombs from May 27 to May 30, 2014. The indiscriminate bombardment destroyed civilian houses, orphans school and humanitarian NGO offices. More importantly, the civilians in Kauda reported many unexploded bombs, which endanger the lives of children and farmers in the area.

According to news reports and local resources, the Sudanese intelligence forces in Kadugli, executed 30 local merchants on May 28, 2014. The merchants were arrested in different periods in the last few months; as they were accused of smuggling food supplies to the SLM/N controlled areas. According to the resources; another 24 were executed the same day in Khor Alfan near the military base in Kadugli. The second groups identity was not confirmed, but some of them might be civilians accused of supporting the SPLM/N.

The reports from inside Southern Kordofan continue to be more difficult to get out, because of the increased security restriction on movement and the communication censorship. The humanitarian situation in the region continues to deteriorate, but no solutions appear in the horizon.

  • Eric Reeves, "An interview with Dr. Tom Catena concerning the Nuba Mountains, and a humanitarian update on the region," 9 March 2013


The sorghum harvest this year—the staple crop of the region—was very poor, according to Dr. Catena. People in large numbers are on the verge of joining more than 200,000 refugees who have already fled to South Sudan and Ethiopia. Many spot nutritional surveys reveal Global Acute Malnutrition above the emergency threshold; the most recent of these found a 30 percent Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate among children under five; this is double the international threshold for a humanitarian emergency. Moreover, a frightening percentage of children under five are experiencing Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM), a condition typically fatal without therapeutic intervention.

Let us be perfectly clear: all this is intentional.

It is a campaign of annihilation in response to military rebellion by the indigenous Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-N). The SPLA-N has repeatedly mauled Khartoum’s regular and militia forces, especially in the Nuba, and the response has been a systematic aerial campaign to destroy agricultural production. It is on the verge of success, as people are simply too fearful to plant, tend, or harvest most of their larger fields. At the same time, Khartoum maintains a complete humanitarian embargo on regions under rebel control (the great majority of territory in the Nuba).

The weapon of choice is the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) Antonov “bomber.” Of course the Antonov is not a military bomber, but rather a retrofitted Russian cargo plane from which crude but deadly barrel bombs are simply rolled out the cargo bay, spreading a hail of shrapnel in all directions on impact. The have no militarily purposeful precision, but they are extraordinarily efficient in creating civilian terror. Early on in the conflict, Khartoum also deployed Sukhoi-25 military jet aircraft, also based at el-Obeid, but Dr. Catena told me that the SAF has settled into a pattern of sufficient regularity with Antonovs to keep fear so high that people are unable to farm.

Khartoum is presently concluding a deal with Ukraine to purchase five more Antonovs.

The conspicuous precedent here is the genocidal campaign against the Nuba in the 1990s, which very nearly succeeded in destroying them. Current efforts are neither surprising not out of character for this regime. And yet former U.S. special envoy for Sudan Princeton Lyman, in a moment of outrageously ignorant presumption, declared in late June 2011 that,

“Nuba Mountain people are fighting back and I don’t think the North is capable of dislodging large numbers of people on an ethnic basis…. Second, I’m not sure that’s the objective of the government.” (June 28, 2011).

[Presumably, in light of the evidence now at hand, Ambassador Lyman no longer cleaves to his factitious skepticism about Khartoum's "objective"—ER, September 27, 2014]

[full interview with Dr. Catena, the only surgeon working in the Nuba Mountains, at |

  • Sudan Tribune, "NISS to deploy more rapid support militias to suppress South Kordofan rebels," April 26, 2014 (KHARTOUM)

The Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) has announced that it is deploying additional Rapid Support Forces (RSF) troops to South Kordofan in order to end rebellion in the state. The RSF militia, which is widely known as the Janjaweed militias, were originally mobilised by the Sudanese government to quell the insurgency that broke out in Sudan’s western region of Darfur in 2003.

The militia was activated and restructured again in August last year under the command of NISS to fight rebel groups in Darfur region, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states following joint attacks by Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) rebels in North and South Kordofan in April 2013…. The move comes within a framework of a plan to intensify military operations in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states following statements made by senior military commanders that this summer would witness the end of rebellion in both areas.

  • Radio Dabanga, "Intensified attacks on South Kordofan villages displace more than 100,000," 14 May 2014

The security situation in the Nuba Mountains, South Kordofan, deteriorated since mid April, when government forces began their attacks on areas in Rashad and Habila localities. As of 12 May, the estimated number of newly displaced in South Kordofan is close to 116,000. Several areas west of Rashad town were bombed by the Sudanese Air Force from 13 to 18 April. The area of Abri in neighbouring Habila locality was bombed on 28 April, the Nuba-based Human Rights and Development Organisation (Hudo) reported in its April report. The Sudan Armed Forces, backed by the paramilitary Popular Defence Forces, and the Rapid Support Forces also attacked the areas on the ground.

The aerial and ground attacks on the villages west of Rashad town, Um Darawa, Tendimin, El Beyeera, El Mangala, Serein, Elsaraf, Woroula, Douma, El Mansour, El Moglum and Keleiro, have resulted in a wave of displacement towards Rashad town, where more than 7,000 newly displaced have occupied schools and mosques. Other families fled to Abu Gebeiha and Abbasiya, and as far as Um Rawaba and El Obeid in North Kordofan. Elders and pregnant women, who failed to walk a distance of 15 km to Rashad, sought refuge in the mountains. The newly displaced are, apart from food and shelter, in dire need of drinking water, as many water resources have been destroyed.

In the areas controlled by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), the Sudanese Air Force has intensified its aerial bombardments in April, in particular the area around Kauda. The bombings also affected the Nuba who were living in refugee camps in the South Sudanese Upper Nile State and Unity State, and fled from the fighting there, and returned to the southern areas of South Kordofan. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that per 12 May, the estimated number of newly displaced in South Kordofan, as a result of the intensified fighting in April and May, is close to 116,000.

  • REPORT from UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 11 April 2014

[There is only one air force in the various conflicts in Sudan—that of the Sudan Armed Forces; although UNHCR cannot bring itself to state this indisputable fact, but instead refers to "unidentified aircraft," this shows that Khartoum is willing to attack Nuba refugees in South Sudan, as they did in a November 2011 attack: two bombs hit the camp; one, which fortunately did not detonate, hit the perimeter of the school in the camp—ER]

UNHCR is deeply concerned about the safety of refugees and aid workers in Yida, South Sudan, after unidentified aircraft circled over the settlement several times on 9 April [2014]. The sighting raised fears that the refugee settlement may soon come under direct or indirect military attack. The incident came just two days after the aerial bombardment of Neem, a community 26 kilometres north of Yida and close to the disputed border area of Jau. Local authorities reported that on 7 April a suspected military aircraft dropped more than five bombs over Neem….

Yida, a spontaneous settlement sheltering 70,000 Sudanese refugees, has come under aerial attack before. In November 2011, two bombs fell within the camp, including one close to a school for refugee children. Yida is located in the north of Unity State, close to the highly militarized Jau corridor.

Eric Reeves' book-length study of greater Sudan (Compromising With Evil: An archival history of greater Sudan, 2007 - 2012;; review commentary at:

Looking Directly into the Heart of Darkness: What the Khartoum Regime Really Thinks

(leaked minutes of critical August 2014 meeting of senior military and security official)

By Eric Reeves

September 24, 2014 (SSNA) -- I received on 22 September 2014, from a source within Sudan whom I trust implicitly, a truly extraordinary, indeed explosive document, containing the "Minutes of the Military and Security Committee Meeting held in the National Defense College [Khartoum]"; the meeting referred to took place on August 31, 2014; the date of the minutes for the document is September 1, 2014 (Sunday).

What makes the document so extraordinary is the participation of the regime's most senior military and security officials, expressing themselves freely, and in the process disclosing numerous highly consequential policy decisions, internal and external. We learn, for example, of Sudan's continuing involvement with international terrorism and radical Islamic groups, including an ongoing "strategic" partnership with Iran. There is certainly evidence here that Khartoum has reneged on its putative commitment to provide the U.S. intelligence community with information relevant to counter-terrorism. More explicitly, the document reveals a determination to continue bombing agriculture and food supplies as a means of waging war against the people of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, with an explicit, declared goal of starvation. Regime officials also emphasize that there will be no lifting of the humanitarian embargo that prevents international relief efforts from reaching the desperate civilians in rebel-held territories of South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

There is much in this document making clear that political machinations surrounding the so-called "national dialogue" are nothing but a sham in the eyes of the regime, merely a means of filling time uselessly before the 2015 elections—a constant topic of discussion. We see that Darfur has been largely written off as a military threat, or at least one that requires no more than an expansion of the re-invigorated and openly embraced Janjaweed militias, now known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). In addition to encouraging the uncontrolled predations of the RSF, these senior officials speak openly about renewed efforts to empty the camps for Darfuri displaced persons.

We also learn much about the extent to which Khartoum is committed to supporting the rebel groups in South Sudan, promising heavy weapons, including tanks, artillery, and other "advanced weapons"—as well as re-supply and security in Khartoum. Riek Machar and his deputy Taban Deng Gai are reported to have expressed their regret at Southern secession.

And there is a great deal more.

[All quotes included here come from a lightly edited version of the English translation of the original Arabic document; edits are for punctuation errors (including apostrophes indicating possession, extra spaces, gratuitous end punctuation, and a great many unnecessary commas; some unidiomatic passages have been made slightly clearer. As they appear in this analysis, some excerpts have been somewhat more heavily edited, but still limited to matters of grammar and idiom. Brackets [ … ] are used where editorial intrusion has been greatest. All comments by me, including interpolations of explanation and identification, as well as extended critical remarks, are in italics.]


Inevitably there will be questions about the authenticity of this document, marked internally as "Secret," "Confidential," and "Restricted." I should say first that I do not know what the full "chain of custody" for the document is (documents rather: for in addition to the English translation of the Arabic, there are photographs of every page of the original Arabic document, as well as of every page of the handwritten translation into English; there are 46 documents in all, most in .JPG format; typically, however, I will refer simply to "the document").

A close linguistic analysis of the English text makes clear that while the prose is of very good quality, and written by someone with considerable intelligence, there are many small typographic and punctuation errors that are typical of even skilled native Arab speakers writing in English; a few idiomatic errors recur with telling familiarity. The person who produced this text is well-educated person, very proficient in English, whose native language is Arabic (I have taught English as a second language, and specifically to native Arabic speakers.)

That I am not able say to say how the document made its way to my source is hardly surprising: the transfer of such a document would have been extremely dangerous at all stages, given its explosive contents and the greatly enhanced intercept capabilities of Khartoum's security services (something discussed and referred to in authoritative detail at various points in the document). Everyone involved in producing and transporting or transmitting the documents was (and is) at risk of arrest and execution for treason. Gratuitous explanatory communications of any kind explaining movement or transmission of the document would increase the risk of exposing all involved. I have concluded after much reading and reflection that the unknown nature of original transmission or physical transfer of the document is not in itself suspicious.

And there are a great many reasons to believe that the document is authentic. Some are small: the transliterative use of "Hisen" rather than "Hussein" (as in Abdel Rahmin Mohamed Hussein, Minister of Defense) seems odd, but transliteration may not be a familiar exercise for the person(s) who undertook the translation. On the other hand, a skilled fabrication would be unlikely to make such a peculiar choice in transliteration; and if this is indeed a fabrication, it is an astonishingly skilled one, even as it serves no obvious purpose for the regime and in several respects seems quite beyond the capacity of the rebel movements.

Most of the reasons for believing the document to be authentic, on my reading, have to do with the extremely close resemblance of much of what is said by officials in this meeting and what has been said and done publicly by the National Congress Party/National Islamic Front regime, but in the minutes with more detail, specificity, and nuance of expression. To be sure, not all of what is said in the confidence of this meeting would be uttered by regime officials so bluntly when communicating with the international community—within the various worlds in which Khartoum understands itself to be speaking. It uses many "dialects," as these exchanges make clear: to the Saudis and Arab Emirates, to Iran, to the U.S., to the UN and its various representatives in Sudan, to the European Union, and to the African Union.

But why fabricate a document only to persuade an audience of the fact that the NCP/NIF speaks bluntly in private meetings? What could be the motive for the regime to fabricate a document that contains so much of what we know to be the case, if cast in brutally unvarnished and contemptuous fashion?

I believe the congruence between what is in the document and what has long been known, but little discussed publicly by the regime, is itself telling at various points. It has long been known, for example, that many within the regime opposed the Naivasha peace talks that yielded the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between north and south Sudan (January 2005)—that there were a number, especially in the military, who felt too much had been given away, and that this was humiliating to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), since they had not been defeated in many areas they were obliged to leave.

But there is still some shock in reading the current Defense Minister and former Minister of the Interior during the most violent years of the Darfur genocide, Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein, declare baldy: "If it were not for Naivasha, all the rebellion[s] should have finished" (page 22). Lt. General Bakri Hassan Saleh, current Vice President of the regime, speaks contemptuously of his interlocutors at the time of Naivasha in the context of current efforts to understand Khartoum's multiple and highly secretive security services: "They are targeting the security organs, but they don’t know how these organs work. Even those who came during the days of Naivasha went [away] without knowing how we think or work" (page 19). Notably, of the fourteen participants listed in the documents, twelve have military titles—all generals of some rank, primarily Lt. General. Some wear two hats: Vice President Bakri Hassan Saleh also has the specified rank of "First Lieutenant General."

Further Observations on Authenticity

In compiling these documents, someone/some group took an extraordinary risk even in assembling the photographs and written translation records, as well as the final time-consuming translation, and then transmitting them, unless we make the unlikely assumption that the documents were created abroad, smuggled back into Sudan, and then passed on to my source. Certainly one thing we hear again and again in the minutes—nothing really new—is how effective the regime's intercept capabilities are. Perhaps the documents were smuggled out of the country by "flash drive," which might be very small and still contain all these data. But this, it must be emphasized, would entail extreme risk on departing Sudan. Indeed, mere possession of even fabricated minutes for such a meeting as is reported would be considered as treasonous as actually transcribing and translating the contents of a real meeting.

Moreover, the documents reveal considerable disagreement, especially about the strategic relationship with Iran, and how to finesse the problems this has created with Saudi Arabia and the Arab Emirates. In closing the meeting Vice President Bakri declares that: "In this meeting it is not necessary that we agree on every point we discuss"—this to the most hardline elements within the current regime.

In his concluding remarks at the meeting, Vice President and First Lt. General Bakri Hassan Saleh also declares:

"A number of policy options and emphases are considered, not all compatible—what we would expect of a real meeting of the most powerful men in Khartoum, not a fabrication of such a meeting." [The irony here is almost too rich—ER.]

Iran is always referred to as a "strategic issue," a "strategic partner," what again is widely known but not in the nuanced, often urgent terms of policy debate reflected in these documents. It is particularly difficult to imagine the fabrication of this extensive part of the discussion, including the highly detailed accounts of what leverage Khartoum has with neighboring countries, how the regime plans to deal with the issue of Shite proselytizing in Sudan, the extent of Iranian military assistance and help in providing military production capacity, and other very specific topics. Collectively, the details suggest a range of compelling knowledge that would in fact be available only to these men.

To the extent we know anything of the character of the men in this meeting, this knowledge seems to be consistent with what can be discerned of character in various passages—especially the thuggish and clumsy Hussein (who refers at once contemptuously and confusingly to his arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court for multiple crimes against humanity). And there is a fearsome bluntness to the comments of Vice President Bakri Hassan Saleh, who has long been known for his brutality and cruelty, his willingness to suppress political dissent by any means necessary, and his loyalty to President al-Bashir. This translates into ruthless political judgments and actions, partially captured in this passage (page 27):

"The negotiations, national dialogue, Paris Declaration and all their statements are needed to take us to the elections." [In other word, Bakri is admitting that all this diplomatic activity is merely a useful distraction from the relentlessly pursued goal of retaining the presidency—ER]

"Those who are interested to join the Ingaz and co-exist with us are welcome. But we are not ready to respond or work under pressure. Nobody is paying us and we are not indebted to anybody." [This seems a spectacularly bizarre view of the US$47 billion that Sudan owes many creditors around the world—ER]

"America deceived us in regards to the separation of the South. They did not lift our name from the list of the States sponsoring terrorism or relieve our debts. So the Envoy should not come." [Nobody is better at the most cynical Realpolitik than Bakri, who might have added his view that American "reneging" justifies what is clearly reneging on the part of the regime in its commitment to provide the U.S. with counter-terrorism intelligence, especially about North Africa and the Gulf States—ER]

A great deal more could be said about what is revealed by a close, detailed examination of the contents and verbal habits of those who speak in this document. From the point of view of such analysis, I believe all evidence points to authenticity.

My source is regarded by all who know him as a man of the greatest integrity; one frequent and highly knowledgeable traveler to Sudan says of him, "he is the most honest, trustworthy and highly principled man" I have met in Sudan. My source is intelligent, highly resourceful, and extremely well-informed; he would not knowingly put my reputation for accuracy at risk gratuitously. I have never, in fifteen years of writing extensively about Sudan, been accused of relying on a fabricated document or source; my source on this occasion is well aware of this, and how destructive to my reputation it would be were the document a fabrication. At the same time, my source sees no point in speaking openly to me in Northampton, Massachusetts about the details of how he came to possess the document in Sudan. He would be particularly vulnerable to Khartoum's enhanced intercept capacity.

The Burden of Proof

It would seem to me that the burden of proof is on those who would argue that the documents are fabrications, that there was no meeting such as described. Moreover, while the motives for fabrication by the regime are murky and implausible at best, there is certainly there is no difficulty at all in imagining the motives of someone who knew of the August 31, 2014 meeting and had access to these highly confidential and equally authoritative minutes. There are a great many Sudanese desperate to bring down the regime; and they know that it will require extraordinary and courageous actions, and that these are likely to be directed against exceptionally well-protected "targets." But given those in attendance and the agenda items of the August 31 meeting, this would be the moment to take the ultimate risk.

The English translation is 30 pages in length (a length that again argues against fabrication, given the continual potency and specificity of the revelations); it will require several thematic analyses to present what stands as consensus within the regime on a range of topics, to parse sometimes partially opaque pronouncements (or translations), and to provide a clear overall view of the regime's thinking at this crucial moment in the political history of Sudan. Additional portions of all documents will be released with these new analyses; eventually all will be released.

Some of the topics to be addressed individually:

[Again, all quotes included here come from a lightly edited version of the English translation of the original Arabic document; edits are for punctuation errors (including apostrophes indicating possession, extra spaces, gratuitous end punctuation, and a great many unnecessary commas; some unidiomatic passages have been made slightly clearer. In the context of this analysis, some excerpts have been somewhat more heavily edited, but still limited to matters of grammar and idiom. Brackets [ … ] are used where editorial intrusion has been greatest; these edits are occasionally the work of the translator, not mine; I've attempted to put all the former in different brackets { ... }. All comments by me, including interpolations of explanation and identification as well as extended critical remarks are in italics; all emphases have been added by me.]

§§§    Reneging on commitment to provide the United States with the intelligence acquired by the regime concerning terrorist groups, including in North Africa:

"The Gulf States have only very weak information about the terrorist groups that are based in Libya, Somali, Nigeria, Mali, North Africa Arab countries and Afghanistan because they have bad relations with these radical groups. They want us to cooperate with them in the war against terrorism because the radical groups constitute [a] direct threat to them. Their relation with ISIS, Nusra Front, Muslim Brothers, and Palestine Islamic Movement is even weaker. We will not sacrifice our relations with the Islamists and Iran for a relation with the Saudis and the Gulf States. What is possible is a relation that serves our economic interests in terms of investments, employment market, etc…," Lt. General Yahya Mohammed Kher, State Minister of Defense (page 12). [Can any reasonable person imagine that Khartoum is sharing with the Obama administration the intelligence bragged about here? – ER]

"Currently, there are twenty thousand (20,000) Jihadists and fifteen (15) newly formed Jihadist Movements who are scattered all over from Morocco to Egypt, Sinai, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, all Gulf States, [a w]ide presence in Africa and Europe and nobody else owns a data-base on that [such] as the one we have. We release only limited information to the Americans according to the request and the price is the armed movements file. The coming days carry a lot of surprises," First Lt. General and Defense Minister Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein (page 24). This clearly suggests reneging on any counter-terrorism effort promised to the U.S.—that if the U.S. doesn't ask the right question, make the right "request," they won't get the information they most want. Moreover, the claim that the price the U.S. is willing to pay is to provide he regime with intelligence on Sudan's rebel movements suggests an unscrupulous betrayal—ER]

[On Sudan's future relationship with international terrorism—ER]:

"We can create them a problem with the Islamic radicals, but we are not going to use this card now," First Lt. Gen. Hashim Abdalla Mohammed, Chief of Joint General Staff (page 17). [The clear implication is that "creating problems" with Islamic terrorists is one of the tools in the NCP/NIF bag of tools—one of their "cards" (a repeated, and telling, metaphor)—ER] 

§§§     The strength of the commitment to Islamism and political Islam, too often played down in current characterizations of the regime:

[Throughout the document the centrality of Islamism and Islamic rule is clear, and the corresponding fear that opposition movements are bent on … "remov[ing] the Islamic movement from power" (page 3).

"[Iran is] our biggest ally [because of] our web-like relations with all the Islamic Movements, world-wide," Lt. General Al-Rashiid Fagiri, Director of Popular Security" (page 9).

[The great rubric for all regime opponents is "supporters of the New Sudan Project," referring to the principle, most forcefully articulated by the late Southern leader John Garang, that neither race nor ethnicity nor religion should be the basis for citizenship in a truly multi-party, democratic Sudan—ER]

The phrase "New Sudan Project" is used incessantly, a sign of what the regime most fears—ER]:

"In order to foil the New Sudan Project we are watching closely all political party activities. When we discover that a politician is going abroad to meet the rebels we usually prevent him not to travel," Lt. General Abdalla Al-Jaili, Popular Defense Forces General Coordinator (page 9).

"We can bring all the Islamic movements to fight [the rebels], just we tell them that these rebels are collaborators and agents of America," First Lt. Gen. Hashim Abdalla Mohammed, Chief of Joint General Staff (page 17).

[Most notably, comments by the Vice President in his "recommendations" section—ER]:

"We consider the New Sudan Project as [the] top internal and regional challenge that endeavours to expand the foreign intervention and division of Sudan [understandably so—ER]. All the political, security, military, and diplomatic organs should change the approach in dealing with it" (page 28).

§§§      Support for Iran as a means of supporting Islamist movements worldwide and gaining important regional support:

"Are you sure Saudi Arabia can change its mind [concerning our relationship] after [the Saudis] classified the Muslim Brothers as terrorists? On the other hand you know that our relation with Iran is part and parcel of our relation with the Muslim Brotherhood International Islamic Organization. Accordingly, we must consult with Iran and our Islamist group, before taking any step in this regard. This is because the Kingdom cannot be trusted despite their knowledge that we are in a position to threaten their rule," Lt. General Abdal-Gadir Mohammed Zeen, National Service Coordinator (page 6).

"We are the only state that will not be affected by the conflicts taking place between Sunni Islamic groups and the Shite’. This is, because we succeeded to manage good relations with all Islamic groups, through the cover of social organizations, and not through the state apparatus. The secret of the strength of the Ingaz (NCP) government lies in the smooth management of the alliance with Shite’ Iran on one side and the alliance with the Sunni Islamic groups on the other side," question and statement from Lt. General Siddiig Aamir, Director General of M.I. [Military Intelligence] and Security (pages 10 – 11).

[Virtually every speaker invokes the "strategic relationship with Iran"; it is a constant in the discussion. In the past this "relationship" has dictated that Khartoum allow for the transfer of Iranian weapons destined for Hamas in Gaza to pass through Sudanese territory—ER]:

"The relation with Iran is one of the best relations in the history of the Sudan. The assistance we received from Iran is immeasurable. Accordingly, the management of this relation requires wisdom and knowledge with all its details. The commonalities between us are many," 1st Lt. General Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen [Hussein], Minister [of] Defense (page 26).

"Our relation with Iran is strategic one and unchangeable. {They} who wants to assist us can do that without conditions."

"Maintenance of relations with Iran [are] to be protected from any threats. Should be managed by military and security organs," (1st Lt. General Bakri Hasan Salih, 1st Vice President of the Republic of Sudan (page 28).

"In the open let us maintain good relations with the Gulf States, but strategically with Iran and to be managed secretly by the M.I. [Military Intelligence] and security organs," Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, Political Secretary of the NCP (page 4).

"There is no state other than Iran who has the courage to say no to the whole West. Iran is a real partner to the Ingaz revolution…. It was Iran who provided unlimited support to us…," Lt. General Abdalla Al-Jaili, PDF General Coordinator (page 7).

[Perhaps most tellingly]:

"[The Gulf States] also fear from our relation with Iran. Our relation with Iran is beneficial to us, because Iran is our biggest ally in the regionin terms of the cooperation in the areas of intelligence and military industrial production. This is due to our web-like relations with all the Islamic Movements World Wide. The importance of this relation comes from the fact that we constitute for Iran [access?] to all the Islamic groups, Lt. Gen. Siddiig Aamir, Director General of [Military Intelligence] and Security (page 9).

§§§     The willingness to destroy agriculture and food supplies as a means of attacking the rebel movements of South Kordofan and Blue Nile (the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement-North, SPLA/M-N); a concomitant commitment not to lift the humanitarian blockade put up around these regions and all civilians caught within them:

"This year the Sudan People’s Army (SPLA-N) managed to cultivate large areas in South Kordofan State. We must not allow them to harvest these crops. We should prevent them. Good harvest means supplies to the war effort. We must starve them, so that, commanders and civilians desert them and we recruit the deserters to use them in the war to defeat the rebels," Lt. General Siddiig Aamir, Director of M.I. and Security (page 10).

[This savage, ruthless assessment neglects to point out that the vast majority of agricultural production is a civilian undertaking, and that it will be civilians—primarily children, women, and the elderly—who will suffer most from this destruction of food supplies—ER]

[Declaring that negotiations with the rebels in South Kordofan and Blue Nile are a "waste of time," a senior general, Chief of Joint Operations, indicates that the military option is the only one to be considered—ER]:

"We should attack them before the harvest and bombard their food stores and block them completely," Lt. General Imadadiin Adaw, Chief of Joint Operations (page 14).

§§§     The determination to complete the destruction of African tribal groups in Darfur:

Vice President Bakri recommends that the regime: "Support the mechanism intended to disperse or empty the IDP camps. Create differences and security strike[s] in the IDP camps" (page 29).

"We must continue the military operations. We shall continue bombarding the rebel concentration areas [in Darfur, as well as South Kordofan and Blue Nile] by air force. In the coming dry season we need any fighter from any country that can fight under our command in addition to the sons of the war-affected areas to act as guides to the rebel defenses," 1st Lt. General Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen [Hussein], Minister [of] Defense (page 22).

[Less is said about Darfur than one might expect; the general tenor of comments suggests that Khartoum believes Darfuri rebels by themselves are no longer a serious threat to the regime—only insofar as they assist the efforts of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (if the U.S. is indeed providing intelligence to Khartoum on the Darfuri rebel groups, this military weakness on their part becomes less surprising). Darfur is a strategic afterthought at this point, no matter how great the violence, displacement, and deprivation of Darfuri people—ER]

§§§     Plans for weakening South Sudan through support of the rebel forces (the Sudan People's Liberation Army-in Opposition):

[Vice President Bakri recommends that the regime]: "Recognize Dr. Riak [Machar] Liaison office and all organs are required to provide protection and security to them."

"I met Riak [Machar], Dhieu and Taban [Deng Gai] and they are regretting the decision to separate the South and we decided to return his house to him. [Riek Machar lived in Khartoum for a number of years during the long civil war (1983 – 2005)—ER.] He [Riek Machar] requested us to assist him and that he, has shortage in the M.I. personnel, operations command and tank technicians. We must use the many cards we have against the South in order to give them unforgettable lesson. [Yet again the "card" metaphor—ER]

The operational military commanders have particularly strong views—ER]:

"[Juba is] still supporting the two divisions of Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. Accordingly, we must provide Riak forces with big support in order to wage the war against Juba and clean the whole of Greater Upper Nile area. Riak and Taban during their visit to Khartoum disclosed to us everything about the logistical support from Juba to the rebels, the route of supply and who transport it to them" Lt. General (PSC) Imadadiin Adawi, Chief of Joint Operations (page 14). [The verb "clean" here has extremely ominous implications, given the history of the regime's engaging in what many call "ethnic cleansing"—ER]

"We must change the balance of forces in South Sudan. Riak, Taban and Dhieu Mathok came and requested support in the areas of training in M.I. and especially in tanks and artillery. They requested armament also. They want to be given advanced weapons. Our reply was that we have no objection, provided that we agree on a common objective. Then we train and supply with the required weapons," 1st Lt. General Hashim Abdalla Mohammed, Chief of Joint General Staff (page 16).

§§§     The militarization of foreign policy:

[Vice President Bakri recommends that]: "Foreign policy management departments should work under the supervision of the military and security organs responsible for the national security affairs to cope with the new internal and external changes," (page 28).

"We intensified the work to train and graduate Libyan M.I. [Military Intelligence] cadres. Currently, they are undergoing an advanced course in in Internet operation, de-ciphering of codes, interception of telephones and wire-less radios. Their leadership requested us to train and establish for them a strong M.I. apparatus," Lt. General Siddiig Aamir, Director General of M.I. and Security (page 11).

"In the open let us maintain good relations with the Gulf States, but strategically with Iran and to be managed secretly by the M.I. [Military Intelligence] and security organs," Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, Political Secretary of the NCP (page 4).

§§§     The determination to hold the 2015 national elections, including the all-important Presidential election, on time; this entails wholesale bribing of potential opposition parties and individuals, and threatening protestors:

"Demonstrations or uprising is a red line and will be confronted with fire and those who are interested in the New Sudan Project should go to the South," Lt. General Abdalla Al-Jaili, Popular Defense Forces General Coordinator (page 7). [Presumably "fire" means a reprise of the shooting of last September, which occurred under "shoot to kill" orders—ER]

"We still remember [the] September 2013 experience, and that after we fired at them [fired with "shoot to kill" orders, according to Amnesty International—ER] they stopped issuing any statement or movement or talk about the then on-going military operations. The coming demonstrations they are planning to conduct during the elections constitute a crime and we will deal with it firmly and timely [again, presumably on the basis of "shoot to kill" orders]," First Lt. General and Defense Minister Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein (page 23).

[In preparation for the coming elections]:

"… this year we have already trained suicidal teams and strategic battalions to protect the elections and assist the police to suppress any such activities that may be carried out by the rebellion or the supporters of the New Sudan Project," Lt. General Abdal-Gadir Mohammed Zeen, National Service Coordinator (page 7).

"Any journalist or politician who criticizes the RSF (Rapid Support Forces, the most recent incarnation of the Janjaweed militias that became notorious for their savagery and brutal destructiveness in the Darfur conflict—ER] must be arrested and charged with spying [i.e., treason—ER] and collaboration [with the enemy]," 1st Lt. General Mohammed Atta Al-Mowla, Director General N.I.S.S. (page 19).

"The elections must take place on time. Holding the elections constitutes a psychological war against the armed movements and may frustrate them and lead to the end of the project of the New Sudan Project," Lt. Gen. Salah Al-Tayib, DDR [Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration] Commissioner (page 6).

"There must be strict control over the freedom of the press, political statements of the party leaders, and the national security should remain a red line. Any political or press statement should not violate the rule of law…, 1st Lt. General Hashim Osman Al-Hisen, Director General of Police. (page 15). [Those crossing the regime's various "red lines" risk imprisonment, torture, rape, and execution, as well as a dramatic loss of educational and employment opportunities—ER]

§§§     Skill with which the regime plays off regional actors against one another:

[This should be read in light of recently strained relations between Khartoum and Cairo—ER]:

"The Egyptians have no choice, but to establish especial relations with us, given the victory of the Islamists in the battle for Tripoli, despite Egyptian support to Gen. Haftar. They will not dare to open two fronts, one against Libya and the other against us. These are useful cards at hand and we should use them properly," Lt. General Abdal-Gadir Mohammed Zeen, National Service Coordinator (page 6 – 7). [And yet again the "card" metaphor appears—the regime is making clear that it knows exactly how to deploy its various assets, and that it will do so in strategic fashion—ER]

"We managed to secure the borders with Ethiopia and have already signed an agreement to form a joint force covering the whole border between the two countries, exchange of information, prevention of any insurgency that can start from one country against the other, and our contribution or role in the protection of Nahda Dam (Renaissance Dam). This agreement is beneficiary to us because we can use it to cross into the Ethiopian side of the boarder in the name of visiting the refugees, which can allow us to recruit Ethiopian soldiers who can collect and supply us with the necessary information about SPLA-N camps in Yabus and other areas to be bombarded by air force," Lt. General Imadadiin Adaw, Chief of Joint Operations (page 13).

§§§     Skill in co-opting and disrupting international and regional diplomatic efforts; UNAMID head Mohamed bin Chambas and AUHIP chair Thabo Mbeki seem the most fully corrupted by contact with the regime;

"No dialogue to take place abroad." "Mbeke meeting with the armed forces in Addis Ababa is just a public relations exercise." "The AUHIP representative Abdul Mohammed told me that the armed movements do not trust Mbeke on one side and that, Malik [Agar] and Yasir [Arman] complained against him to the Ethiopian Prime Minister and the American envoy," Lt. General Salah Al-Tayib, DDR Commissioner (page 6).

"I [1st Lt. General Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen [Hussein], Minister [of] Defense] told him [Thabo] Mbeki, [chair of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel] that we trust [Mohamed] Bin [C]hambas [who recently resigned as head of UNAMID amid a growing scandal over the performance of the peacekeeping force in Darfur—ER], who will bring to you all the Darfur movements in Addis Ababa and the aim of the Addis meeting with them is for consultation only and not for negotiation."

"In case one of them is interested in negotiation let him go to Doha [now regarded by all international actors of consequences as a "diplomatic dead letter—ER]. He is going to bring all of them to Addis and seek their opinion on the proposal; if [they] reject the [national] dialogue, then the position of Sudan will be correct, and we will be able to defend it in front of the international community. In that case Sudan would be seen to have done its best by the international community. Mbeke will participate in the dialogue from within as an observer. Also I met Ali Al-Zaatari (UN) and he is pro us. And met Salah Halima (Arab League) and he is also supporting us, and Hailey Menkariuos and he is also pro us. We did a big job for Mohammed Bin [C]hambas." [This would seem a very considerable understatement, but it does much to explain the following—ER]:

"When I met him [bin Chambas], he said the UN is going to investigate into the reports of the UNAMID Mission and [bin Chambas] advised me to correct things on the ground to conform to their reports about our performance. He told me that Darfur has no case or problem and their remaining movements should join Doha agreement, and if they want to join the internal national initiative it is up to them and let them come," 1st Lt. General Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen [Hussein], Minister [of] Defense (page 21).

[The attraction of Mbeki as a biased negotiator is unmistakable—ER]: "[The rebels'] plan is to see that the elections do not take place. Accordingly, we must support all the efforts carried by Mbeke," Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, Political Secretary of the NCP" (page 3).

[The final word, in all matters of consequence, clearly rests with the military leaders in the regime—ER]:

"SAF [the Sudan Armed Forces] is against any dialogue that is supervised by foreigners, because it will end up dismantling SAF. We support separate forums for negotiation with the rebels, no unification of forums or negotiation with them as a group… [Today the rebels say that the] SAF is not a national force, or SAF is using foreign militias and mounted their campaign against SAF. Permit SAF and the RSF [Rapid Support Forces—the reconfigured Janjaweed militias—ER] plus the sons of those areas to attack and clean these areas from the rebellion. We are ready for military operations," 1st Lt. General Hashim Abdalla Mohammed, Chief of Joint General Staff (page 15)

§§§     Cynical view of the much-touted "national dialogue":

"The only option in front of us now is the [national] dialogue that is leading to the holding of elections on time. No postponement of the elections, whatsoever the case. I met with the EU ambassadors and all of the are supporting the dialogue initiative that [they believe] can lead to political reforms…." Lt. General Salah Al-Tayab, DDR Commissioner (page 5).

"Let us go and prepare a force to protect the elections. Secondly, if the peace talks are necessary let them take place after the elections, and the internal national dialogue can continue after we hold the elections. We will continue recruiting and splitting the field commanders, and win them to our side since we have all the information about the rebels. We have to sign more agreements and never sit with the rebels as a group or collectively," 1st Lt. Gen. Hashim Osman Al-Hisen, Director General of Police (page 15).

§§§     Sophistication of surveillance and intercept capabilities; the security services provide massive amounts of detailed intelligence on political enemies or potential enemies:

"We intercepted all the telephone calls coming from Saudi, Emirates and Egyptian intelligence, and some people from the political parties of the Sudan [in September 2013]. They were instructing people to go for demonstrations. They brought experts to administer the demonstrations. Since we were following the telephones we managed to arrest the real players and they confessed and disclosed all the details about the conspiracy and the name of officers assigned to supervise the demonstrations and the leadership in each country was receiving daily reports. That is why the Egyptians, Saudis and Emirates will fear when they discovered that, all the elements they sent were arrested by the security. On our side we did not disclose anything up to now, instead we want to use this file to blackmail them," 1st Lt. General Mohammed Atta Al-Mowlem, Director General N.I.S.S. (page 17).

"All the Embassies and Chanceries in Khartoum are infiltrated and our elements report to us who visited the Embassy and who went out from the Embassy staff and to where," Lt. General Al-Rashiid Fagiri, Director of Popular Security (page 8).

"Regarding the rebels, I, can say that we have managed to infiltrate their rank and file. We are following all their movements, chats, private affairs with women, the type of alcohol preferred or taken by each one, the imaginary talks when they get drank. We have ladies who are always in contact with them. The ladies managed to send to us their e-mails, telephone numbers, skypes, "whats-up's" and all their means of communications. By that, we are now able to infiltrate them electronically. We are following all their activities and contacts with people inside the country," Lt. General Al-Rashiid Fagiri, Director of Popular Security (page 8).

§§§     The skill of which they boast in their "divide and conquer" tactics of the past 25 years:

"We are working to cause differences and divisions within the SRF [Sudan Revolutionary Front—ER] to weaken and destroy it. The same policy of divide and weaken will be applied to all the political forces in the north, like DUP [Democratic Unionist Party], Eastern Sudan, Umma party after we see Sadik [el-Mahdi] comes back. We bring him back using his own sons Abdal-Rahman and Bushra to convince him. We collected all the information about the SPLM-N cadres and working now to launch a psychological warfare campaign on them to see that they got divided like the SPLM in the South," Lt. General Al-Rashiid Fagiri, Director of Popular Security (page 7).

§§§     Racist attitudes towards the West, Western humanitarian efforts, and democratic ideals:

Mustapha Osman Ismail speaks of the uprising of all 2013 as "a political crisis created by the racist and tribal project of the New Sudan" (page 3).

"Let [the rebel forces] come to the battlefield. They are dreaming to rule Sudan. It is just a fuss that will fade away. The White People will never give you enough support or fight along with them. The greatest liars are White People; they are concerned about their own interest only," 1st Lt. General Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen [Hussein], Minister [of] Defense (page 22).

[This is a conspicuous echo of a comment by President Omar al-Bashir made a year ago—ER]:

“If a white man brings you relief, don’t take it and whip him on his back." (Sudan Tribune, October 25, 2013).

§§§     And perhaps most tellingly, the failure to understand the economic disaster that these policies have created (see my recent analysis at the Enough Forum |

"We are currently facing an acute economic crisis that need to be addressed in order to alleviate the suffering of our people, and look for alternatives that can enable us to control the market forces," Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, Political Secretary of the NCP (page 3).

While acknowledging the extent of the economic crisis, "Dr. Smile" hardly understands the difficulty of controlling market forces in a highly inflationary economy with no significant foreign exchange reserves (and thus very limited ability to import foods and other commodities), growing debt—already a staggering US$47 billion in external debt—and a rapidly depreciating currency. Even less comprehending, however, is the brutal and intellectually limited First Lt. General and Defense Minister Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein—ER]:

"The economic situation can be addressed and will improve due to the fact that our country have all the requirements needed for industrialization, Agriculture, basic infrastructure, oil and there is no hungry person. This is temporary; just days and they will pass. The military industries will cover all our needs in the armed forces." (page 23)

[Fantastically, Hussein claims there is not a single hungry person in Sudan despite reports from various UN and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations that Global Acute Malnutrition rates and Chronic Malnutrition rates are, especially for children under five, at crisis levels—ER]

One of the most remarkable features of the document is that these powerful men nowhere discuss in any detail the economic crisis that has already taken a terrible toll on Sudan's people, and certainly make no proposals to deal with the inevitable consequences of ongoing crisis. Instead, there is a constant discussion of who has been paid off, which of the many small parties have received enough money to ensure their support in the elections, money for bribes, money for infiltrators, money for recruits into the armed forces—a constant patter of references to significant expenditures that are at once the political mainstay of the NCP/NIF regime, but also an enormous drain on national resources and one reason the fiscal budget gap cannot be closed. For of course none of these expenditures appear in the data the regime reports to the IMF—and the IMF asks no questions.

Looking forward

In-depth analyses of these various topics will for forthcoming, seriatim. The document is thirty pages and all the issues they raise deserve careful, detailed, analytic attention.

Below I have included the first two pages of the translation (one text is in exactly the format received, with no modification of any kind; the second has been slightly reformatted for clarity). I have also included .JPG files showing these first two pages of the Arabic original since they were photographed for purposes of confirmation (see below and All documents, in all formats, will be published in the coming days and weeks.


[Original formatting of translation:

In the name of God most gracious and most merciful

Restricted and Confidential

Date: 01/09/2014                                                                  Republic of Sudan

National Intelligence & Security Service

Central Security Corporation

Management of Military Activities

To: Lt. Gen. Osman Tajasir

The Managing Director of Central Security Corporation

Peace be on you,

Find enclosed:

1/ Joint Military and Security Committee Meeting held in National Defense College on 31/08/2014.

2/ Support Hamas Meeting held in Sudan Scientific Corporation Premises on 31/08/2014.

Maj. Gen. (Security): Abdal-Wahab Al-Rashiid



In the name of God most gracious and most merciful

Minutes of the Military and Security Committee Meeting held in the National Defense College

Sunday 31/08/ 2014

# 1st. Lt. Gen. Bakri Hasan Salih welcomed the attendance.

# Reading and analysis of the SRF. Statement 20 - 25/08/2014.

# Study of Paris Declaration signed by the SRF and Sadik Al-Mahdi on 18/08/2014.

# Activities report covering Sadik Al-Mahdi visits and meetings in Cairo, Arab Emirates and Addis-Ababa.

# Reports on Rebel Leaders activities, contacts and meetings.

The Agenda of the meeting:

1- Paris Declaration and SRF statement impact.

2- Radical and moderate trends in regards to Shite Belief activities in Sudan.

3- President Mbeke role and Sudanese issues.

4- Elections, National Dialogue and Peace Negotiations- The Priority.

5- New Sudan Project and its impact on the national security and economic activity.


1-  1st. Lt. Gen. Bakri Hasan Salih – 1st. Vice President of the Republic of Sudan

2-  1st. Lt. Gen. Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen- Minister of Defence.

3-    ,,   ,,     ,,   . Mohammed Atta- Al- Mowla – Director General N.I.S.S.

4-    ,,   ,,   ,,     . Hashim Osman Al-Hisen- Director General of Police.

5-    ,, ,,   ,,     . Hashim Abdalla Mohammed- Chief of Joint General Staff.

6-    Lt. Gen.     . Imadadiin Adawi                   - Chief of Joint Operations.

7-    Professor. Ibrahim Ghandur                   - D/ Chairman of the N.C.P.

8-    Lt. Gen.     . Yahya Mohammed Kher       - State Minister of Defense.

9-    ,,     ,,         . Siddiig Aamir                         - Director General of M.I. and Security.

10- ,,     ,,         . Al-Rashiid Fagiri                     - Director of Popular Security.

11- ,,     ,,         . Abdalla Al-Jaili                       - PDF. General Co-ordinator.

12- ,,     ,,         . Abdal-Gadir Mohammed Zeen- National Service Co-ordinator.

13- ,,     ,,         . Salah Al- Tayib                       - DDR. Commissioner.

14-  Dr.             . Mustafa Osman Ismail         - Political Secretary- NCP.


[Text reformatted for clarity:

In the name of God most gracious and most merciful

Restricted and Confidential

Date: 01/09/2014

Republic of Sudan

National Intelligence & Security Service

Central Security Corporation

Management of Military Activities

To: Lt. Gen. Osman Tajasir, Managing Director of Central Security Corporation

Peace be on you,

Find enclosed:

[1] Joint Military and Security Committee Meeting held in National Defense College on 31/08/2014.

[2] Support Hamas Meeting held in Sudan Scientific Corporation Premises on 31/08/2014 (This document did not accompany the first—ER]

Signed, Maj. Gen. (Security): Abdal-Wahab Al-Rashiid


In the name of God most gracious and most merciful

Minutes of the Military and Security Committee Meeting held in the National Defense College

Sunday 31/08/ 2014

• 1st Lt. Gen. Bakri Hasan Salih welcomed the attendance.

• Reading and analysis of the SRF Statement 20 – 25/08/2014 .

• Study of Paris Declaration signed by the SRF and Sadik Al-Mahdi on 18/08/2014.

• Activities report covering Sadik Al-Mahdi visits and meetings in Cairo, Arab Emirates and


• Reports on Rebel Leaders activities, contacts and meetings.

The Agenda of the meeting:

[1] Paris Declaration and SRF statement impact.

[2] Radical and moderate trends in regards to Shite Belief activities in Sudan.

[3] President Mbeke role and Sudanese issues.

[4] Elections, National Dialogue and Peace Negotiations- The Priority.

[5] New Sudan Project and its impact on the national security and economic activity.


[1] 1st Lt. Gen. Bakri Hasan Salih –                                   1st Vice President of the Republic of Sudan

[2] 1st Lt. Gen. Abdal-Rahim Mohammed Hisen –        Minister of Defence.

[3] 1st Lt. Gen. Mohammed Atta Al-Mowla –                 Director General N.I.S.S.

[4] 1st Lt. Gen. Hashim Osman Al-Hisen –                     Director General of Police.

[5] 1st Lt. Gen. Hashim Abdalla Mohammed –              Chief of Joint General Staff.

[6] Lt. Gen. Imadadiin Adaw   –                                        Chief of Joint Operations.

[7] Professor Ibrahim Ghandur –                                      D/ Chairman of the N.C.P.

[8] Lt. Gen.Yahya Mohammed Kher –                             State Minister of Defense.

[9] Lt. Gen. Siddiig Aamir –                                                Director General of M.I. and Security.

[10] Lt. Gen. Al-Rashiid Fagiri –                                        Director of Popular Security.

[11] Lt. Gen. Abdalla Al-Jaili   –                                         PDF General Co-ordinator.

[12] Lt. Gen. Abdal-Gadir Mohammed Zeen –                National Service Co-ordinator.

[13] Lt. Gen. Salah Al- Tayib   –                                          DDR Commissioner.

[14] Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail –                                     Political Secretary-NCP.

Eric Reeves' book-length study of greater Sudan (Compromising With Evil: An archival history of greater Sudan, 2007 - 2012;; review commentary at:

Exploring every avenue for urgent peace in South Sudan

By Jacob K. Lupai

September 22, 2014 (SSNA) -- Right now South Sudan is going through a situation of uncertainty that many must be wondering what may become of it in the next coming years. Depending on the level of pessimism others may conclude that South Sudan is already a failed state and on its way to the dustbin of history. However, it should be understood that the people of South Sudan are resilient and optimistic, and their optimism had sustained their protracted liberation struggle for fifty years (1955 – 2005) for freedom and independence. There is therefore no room for despair but to explore consistently every avenue in search of a lasting peace in South Sudan.

Without peace there is no way to create cohesion for sustainable national unity. South Sudan may ultimately disintegrate in the absence of an urgent peace. However, this will be unfortunate for the people of South Sudan who had struggled and suffered so much for their call for equality, justice and prosperity in what was then known as Old Sudan.

Basics of liberation struggle

A liberation struggle is not waged for fun simply to lose dear lives and property for nothing. It should instead be waged for a basic and fundamental call for equality, justice and prosperity. A clear example of this was when South Sudan called for equality with North Sudan in the Old Sudan in the arrangement for independence from British colonial rule. As a blatant oppression of South Sudan, North Sudan made it a point to have all the senior positions in the South to be occupied by northerners. When the southern demand for a federal system was rejected by the North there was a bitter disappointment and widespread discontent in the South. This was the genesis of a protracted liberation struggle against inequality and injustice perpetuated by the North. It was obvious for the people of South Sudan that they would have to make expensive sacrifices for ultimate independence.

As people of one destiny South Sudanese fought and died together in trenches for freedom as comrades and people of one diversified and colorful family, South Sudan. This spirit clearly made people of South Sudan what they are today, people of an independent country of their own. Prior to independence this spirit of togetherness was manifested when Dr Lam Akol and Dr Riek Machar rejoined Dr John Garang for that great and historic achievement of the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) of 2005 that restored relative peace to South Sudan and made the Old Sudan never to be the same again. It was not clear whether without the unity among Dr Lam Akol, Dr Riek Machar and Dr John Garang there would have been any CPA that would have brought independence to South Sudan.

Era of relative peace

In the beginning of the CPA the people of South Sudan became euphoric. The CPA was seen as bringing conditions of paradise on earth in South Sudan. The rampant insecurity experienced during the northern colonial rule was to become a thing of the past. Indeed the beginning of the CPA showed signs of relative peace. This, however, was short-lived as conditions began to deteriorate as though the post CPA government was not prepared for governance. Poor governance characterized this era. However, President Salva Kiir Mayardit asserted in no uncertain terms that unity was not made attractive and threatened that crossing the referendum date was a redline. This is a shining legacy of Salva Kiir Mayardit which he should not squander for unwarranted petty leadership quarrels that have unfortunately turned violent.

The sheer determination for independence made people to deliberately turn a blind eye to many shortcomings of the post CPA government. Given the history of long wars of liberation, poor infrastructure, limited capacity for governance and weak state institutions, peace could have been short-lived. Nevertheless, the CPA era was considered as a preparation for independence. Rocking the boat was not an option in the face of mounting insecurity, corruption, nepotism, land grabbing and arrogance.

Also, it was not uncommon to hear some simple-minded claiming they were the only instrumental in liberating the people of South Sudan from the yolk of the North. The so-called loud mouth liberators must have actually liberated themselves from poverty because theft seems to be their trademark. Land grabbing as part of theft was on the rise with the government absolutely doing nothing, a sure license for rampant land grabbing.

Land grabbers who were identified as soldiers used guns to impose their criminal act of land grabbing with the government turning a blind eye, contrary to the government’s claim that no one was above the law. It was very difficult to understand why was there such an outrageous indiscipline among soldiers who illegally occupied people’s plots of land when there was commander-in-chief, minister of defense and general chief-of-staff who were all supposed to be in full control of their soldiers in the effort to promote army-civilian cordial relations for national unity. It should be clear to those concerned that land grabbing won’t sustain national unity.

Independence of South Sudan

If anyone in the world doubts the unity of the people of South Sudan as people of one destiny they should think again and better look at the results of the referendum for independence. The results were 98.43 per cent Yes for independence and 1.57 per cent No for Unity of Old Sudan. This also confirmed that there were no people as instrumental liberators for the 98.43 per cent of people who voted in the referendum liberated the South.

Arguably the people of South Sudan did not vote overwhelmingly for independence as one people but as people of one destiny. Those who think and talk of the people of South Sudan as one people are grossly misleading others. The people of South Sudan fought for freedom as people of one destiny against oppression because this was the common denominator. After the CPA and independence there was little cohesion among the people as cracks began to appear.

The euphoria after the referendum and independence gave way to bitter disappointment as the people wanted their government to deliver security and basic services as the anticipated peace dividends. Despite the initial euphoria claims of corruption, nepotism, exclusion, and domination of government and business by some ethnic groups seemed to have eroded people’s enthusiasm in the government. Above all the security of individual and property was and is of major concern. This has been the most important expected peace dividend. People have been disappointed with poor delivery of security. The government therefore has a lot to improve security.

Incident of 15 December 2013

The incident of 15 December 2013 should not have taken place if people had strictly adhered to the vision and mission of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).

According to the SPLM Manifesto 2012, Comrade Salva Kiir Mayardit, the Chairman of SPLM, in his letter addressed to citizens of South Sudan said in part that, “Although South Sudan became a sovereign state on 9 July 2011, we still have much work to do to liberate our citizens from the ravages of poverty, lack of basic services like health care, education systems, and infrastructure and food security. A new nation comes with new challenges. We must face those challenges with innovative solutions and a bold approach. We have no interest in repeating the mistakes of the rest of the world – indeed, we will learn from them”.

The above is an indication of no to war. For the vision of the SPLM it is to build an inclusive secular democratic developmental state, to spearhead rapid human and sustainable economic development and environmental green economy.

The mission of the SPLM is to construct a knowledge economy in South Sudan and to build a nation and a society inspired by peace, freedom, justice, unity, prosperity and progress.

With the vision and mission of the SPLM as shown above, how on earth couldn’t have the incident of 15 December 2013 been avoided. One thing might be certain. It was uncontrolled greed for leadership, power and hegemony, something contrary to the vision and mission of the SPLM. The incident of 15 December 2013 risks tearing up the country with Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal poles apart, and Equatoria concentrating on peace and development as part of its well known characteristics.

Search for peace in South Sudan

There is no military solution in sight in response to the ongoing senseless war of destruction. People must be wasting their valuable time if they think a military solution is imminent. It is only unfortunate that events have turned ethnic as the vicious struggle for power between the Jieng and the Naagat ethnic groups seems to suggest, with tribal militias being employed with devastating effect. The vision and mission of the SPLM seem to have been thrown out contemptuously through the window.

The search for peace in South Sudan should be a national agenda but not restricted to those in government and opposition or to the Jieng and the Naagat as the only dominant participants. There are people who do not subscribe to such a senseless war of annihilation and destruction simply to maintain the status quo of either the Jieng or the Naagat domination.

Part of the mission of the SPLM says, “The SPLM will ensure democracy under the rule of law and good governance, to safeguard fundamental human, economic, social, cultural and religious rights and freedoms”. The question is how does this senseless war in conformity with this part of the mission of the SPLM?

It is clear that people may need to rise above personal interest for the overall prosperity and unity of the country.


It is not yet too late that South Sudan has reached a point of no return but only to disintegrate into three independent states of Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria as in the former Soviet Union or in the Balkans. As the people of South Sudan had endured decades of destruction, the 9-month senseless war is nothing but a warning for the people to double their efforts in search of an urgent and lasting peace to save the country from utter destruction. It is possible that the country, led by an Equatorian may save the situation.

President Salva Kiir Mayardit and Dr Riek Machar have a legacy of being freedom fighters for the dignity of the people of South Sudan. Both had put their lives online to bring us to where we are today. It is therefore important that the two should think carefully.

In conclusion, to simply throw away the shining legacy of a freedom fighter that restored the dignity of the marginalized and oppressed poor of South Sudan is something that somebody should really think seriously about it. People are looking at the two leaders for their humanity, irrespective of their individual ambitions, to save the country from complete destruction.

Jacob K. Lupai is the author of a new book, South Sudan, Issues in Perspective, which will shortly be launched in Juba, South Sudan.

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