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Darfur and the Diplomacy of Abandonment

By Eric Reeves

March 16, 2012 (SSNA) -- For more than a year and a half the Obama administration has been engaged in a callous and largely surreptitious disengagement from the ongoing human catastrophe in Darfur. This disengagement has taken many forms, and had various articulations. In August 2010 the phrase of choice was "de-emphasizing Darfur" in U.S. Sudan policy. In November 2010 a senior administration official spoke of "de-coupling Darfur" from considerations of whether Sudan should be on the State Department list of terrorism-sponsoring nations. Darfur, home to hundreds of thousands of in desperate need, now commands no significant policy attention in the Obama administration.

For example, this week Dane Smith, Obama's senior adviser for Darfur, declared in Pittsburgh that the Obama administration believed that "regime change" in Khartoum would be counterproductive. This message has been conveyed by the United States to the various rebels groups in Darfur and two other northern states currently under genocidal siege by Khartoum's military forces, Blue Nile and South Kordofan. These rebel groups, united uneasily under the banner of the Sudan Revolutionary Front, include the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-North as well as the most powerful Darfur rebels movements. They are politically and ideologically heterogeneous, but if militarily united have the power to bring down the tyranny in Khartoum that for twenty-three years has been responsible for massive ethnically targeted human destruction, wholesale denial of humanitarian assistance, and systematic displacement of nearly 10million human beings.

Why should these rebel groups forgo an opportunity---should it exist---to compel a change of regimes in Khartoum? Why are members of this ruthless security cabal no more in need of removal than Libya's Qaddafi, Syria's al-Assad, or Afghanistan's Taliban leadership---all examples of regime change that the United States has supported or is working for? Does it not matter that Darfuris are being asked to negotiate with a regime whose president and defense minister are under indictment by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity and genocide?

It has long been clear that only regime change offers the chance for true peace in Sudan: the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime is not a force for peace, but a potent catalyst for ongoing rebellion and military violence---and not just in Sudan. We need only look at the current widespread assaults on the civilian populations in Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan, conflict along the North/South border (including Khartoum's bombing of a refugee camp inside South Sudan with more than 20,000 civilians), the increasing likelihood of all-out war between Khartoum's forces and those of the new Republic of South Sudan, long and bitter resentment of the regime in eastern Sudan and Nubia in the far north, and the continuing violence in Darfur.

Why does Dane Smith counsel "engagement" with a regime that has never abided by a single agreement it has made with any Sudanese party? Why should rebel groups sit down with a regime that conducts indiscriminate aerial attacks on civilians while denying international humanitarian aid to many hundreds of thousands of desperate people in South Kordofan and Blue Nile? Because, Smith says, rebel efforts to overthrow the regime would "polarize the Arabs against everyone else, so they can say, 'Arabs are under attack. Islam is under attack.'"

And yet the entire population of Darfur is Muslim. How could Muslim Darfuri rebels create the impression that "Islam is under attack"? And more to the point, what in the broader insurgency---which includes a number of Arabs---could give the impression that "Arabs are under attack"? It is difficult to imagine an argument that could hold less force within the African ethnic groups that have been attacked on the basis of their ethnicity for the past twenty-three years---under the banner of an aggressively Islamist and Arabist ideology. The rebel groups, despite their many shortcomings and abuses in Darfur, arose precisely in response to the fact that "Africans were under attack" in the region, and had been since the NIF/NCP regime came to power by military coup in June 1989.

Moreover, the July 2011 Doha "Peace Agreement" that Smith touts is a disaster. It has been overwhelmingly rejected by Darfuri civil society, both within Darfur and in the diaspora. It represents an agreement between Khartoum and one small, militarily impotent, and politically unrepresentative rebel "grouping," a factitious entity cobbled together by the United States and Qaddafi's Libya. Negotiations in Doha produced no significant achievements in the critical area of human security, which continues to deteriorate in Darfur despite the presence of a $1 billion per year "hybrid" UN/African Union peacekeeping force. At Doha, Thabo Mbeki, former president of South Africa, Ibrahim Gambari, the head of the hybrid mission, and Burkina Faso's Djbril Bassolé, the diplomat actually designated as the UN/AU joint negotiator, wrangled and jostled for control of the negotiations. So much went wrong, and so little was actually achieved, that one close observer of the earlier process that led to the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement in Abuja (Nigeria) described Doha to me as "Abuja replayed as farce.

In short, in the interest of avoiding the impression that "Arabs are under attack" and "Islam is under attack," the rebel groups are being urged to halt efforts to change the regime and to participate in a peace process that has already been rejected by the people the rebel groups claim to represent.

On the same recent occasion, Smith took the opportunity to acknowledge that "we haven't seen justice served in Darfur." But he didn’t suggest what the United States is prepared to do to see that justice is rendered at the ICC, or that impunity in Darfur is ended---impunity that sustains an ongoing epidemic of sexual violence, and radical insecurity in many camps and rural areas, while the Central Reserve Police (the Abu Tira) has become a lawless force, murdering, robbing, and kidnapping at will. It's true, as Smith notes, that "Darfuris not the same as the same place it was in 2003 and 2004," but the notion that after 2004 things were bad but not really so very bad ignores a number of indicators. Since 2004 there have been more than 650 confirmed aerial attacks on civilian targets; since 2007, when the UN Security Council authorized the hybrid force, more than 1.2 million Darfuris have been newly displaced, according to UN and aid group estimates. Many tens of thousands of women and girls have been raped, and continue to be raped. The UN High Commission for Refugees estimates that 264,000Darfuris remain in eastern Chad as refugees---too fearful to return even as they face increasingly limited prospects of humanitarian assistance.

Smith went on to point out that "in 2003 just 18percent of Darfur was considered urban settlements, but today it is 50 percent urban." But as Smith must understand, this increase is due overwhelmingly to the growth of squalid, under-served camps for displaced persons in the immediate environs of major cities and towns. These people will not leave the camps because of security conditions, and because many of their villages and agricultural lands were either destroyed or seized by Khartoum's militia allies. And the evidence from the past sixty years is clear: the longer displaced persons or refugees stay in camps, the less likely that they will ever leave.

There are very few jobs in the camps or the adjacent urban areas, and as the economy of (northern) Sudan continues its sharp contraction, there will be even fewer. Economic hardship will fall disproportionately on the poorest, who struggle to secure or purchase enough to eat. Children, some of whom have been in camps for more than eight years, are losing any sense of connection to the land and the agricultural way of life their families have known for countless generations.

This way of life is dying, even as much of the land around these overcrowded urban areas faces unprecedented environmental distress. A sobering study was released last month by the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization showing that "current wood harvesting is causing the degradation and depletion of existing resources" (Land Cover Mapping and Wood Energy Analysis of Darfur’s IDP Regions). This seventy-five-page study augurs poorly for the future of Darfur: in those areas where people are most concentrated, the imbalance between wood energy production (biomass) and demand is shockingly great. In Nyala, capital of South Darfur, the annual accessible supply potential of wood fuel for 2011 was 52,000 tons; but actual demand was 366,000tons. Since wood energy is critical not only to cooking but to the makeshift industries that have sprung up in the camps (like charcoal production), we may expect to see even greater costs incurred by families that are already unable to afford sufficient food, as well as the collapse of many small employment sources.

Darfur may not be seeing the levels of violence that marked the early years of the genocide, but Smith's casual historical bifurcation downplays not only violence after 2004, but the needs of the people displaced by that violence. The Obama administration, like the Bush administration before it, has been unable to conceive of a global or truly strategic Sudan policy that makes Darfur integral to all future negotiations. Meanwhile, Khartoum continues to play one region of the country against another in order to create diplomatic disarray and retain political power.

Smith shows no sign of appreciating Amnesty International’s recent report, "No End to Violence in Darfur: Arms Supplies Continue Despite Ongoing Human Rights Violations," or other reports that suggest just how great violence and civilian insecurity presently are in Darfur. Smith has also yet to make a public comment on the effective demise of the UN Panel of Experts on Darfur, authorized by UN Security Council Resolution1591 (March 2005) to monitor an arms embargo and a ban on all offensive military flights by Khartoum. Nor has he spoken directly of the ominous reports on humanitarian conditions, sometimes smuggled out of the region, including a substantial, unreleased Tufts University study of a year ago: "International humanitarian capacities have been seriously eroded and impaired to a point that leaves Darfuris in a more vulnerable position now than at any other time since the counter-insurgency operations and forced displacements in 2003."

This is, as I have repeatedly argued, "genocide by attrition," a deliberate effort by Khartoum to further attenuate the humanitarian presence following the expulsion of thirteen of the world's most important relief agencies in March 2009---half the total humanitarian capacity in Darfur. Recently I have received authoritative reports of visas and travel permits being denied to humanitarian workers trying to reach Darfur---a continuation of the pattern of obstructionism, harassment, and intimidation that has marked Khartoum's response to relief efforts for more than eight years. Radio Dabanga reports almost daily on the local impact of this war on humanitarian assistance: people continue to die, in large numbers, from a lack of food, clean water, and primary medical care. Khartoum suppresses mortality figures, as well as reports on malnutrition, even from areas that are experiencing emergency levels of malnutrition.

A diplomacy of abandonment has proved the path of least resistance for the Obama administration, and the face of that abandonment is Ambassador Smith. That he would presume to tell the people of Darfur to accept the present regime of génocidaires as a legitimate negotiating partner is a measure of the moral rot at the center of the Obama administration's Sudan policy.

Eric Reeves, a professor at Smith College, has published extensively on Sudan, nationally and internationally, for more than a decade. He is author of A Long Day's Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide.

Making Sense of South Sudan Ambassadorial Appointment

I was shocked with the appointment of such army of ambassadors all at once at a time when our country is faced with serious economic hardship as a result of the oil shutdown (Luke Dak, USA).

By Paanluel Wël, Washington DC, USA, Planet Earth

March 13, 2012 (SSNA) -- In exercise of the powers conferred upon him under Article 101 (o) of the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011 A.D, read together with section 25 (1) (4) of the Diplomatic and Consular Service Act 2011, General Salva Kiir Mayaardit, founding and current President of the Republic of South Sudan, issued a Presidential Decree for the appointment of grade (1), (2) and (3) Ambassadors into the Diplomatic and Consular Services in the ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Sudan on March 07, 2012 A.D. The Ambassadorial list consists of 10 grade (1), 43 grade (2) and 25 grade (3), making a total of 78 Ambassadors. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Hon. Nhial Deng Nhial, was directed by the President to transfer and assign the appointed Ambassadors in accordance with the Presidential Decree.

Among those appointed to Grade One are: 1- Mr. Majok Guandon Thiep 2- Dr. Chol Deng Alak 3- Mr. Mohamed Hassan Bakeit 4- Mr. Makelele Nyajok 5- Dr. Eluzai Mogga Yokwe 6- Dr. Akec Khoc Acieu 7- Mr. Sebit Abbe Alley and 1- Mr. Paul Macuel Malok 2- Dr. Andrew Akon Akec Kuol 3- Mr. Kuol Alor Kuol.

Grade Two appointees are: 1- Mr. Anthony Louis Kon 2- Mr. Ajing Adiang Mariik 3- Mr. Alier Deng Rual 4- Mr. Akuei Bona Malwal 5- Mr. Majak Philemon Majok 6- Mr. Baak Valentino Wol 7- Mr. John Andruga Duku 8- Mr. Mariano Deng Ngor 9- Dr. Francis George Nazario 10- Mr. Joseph Moum Majak 11- Mr. Parmena Makuet Mangar 12- Mr. Philip Jada Natana 13- Mr. Arop Deng Kuol 14- Mr. Michael Majok Ayom 15- Gabriel Gai Riak 16- Mr. Bol Wek Agoth 17- Dr. John Gai Yoh 18- Dr. Daniel Peter Othol 19- Mr. Ezekiel Lol Gathouth 20- Mr. Samuel Luate Lominsuk 21- Mr. Awad El Karim Ibrahim Ali 22- Mr. Adam Saeed AbuBakr Kabawa 23- Mr. Mustafa Lowoh Walla 24- Mr. Aban Yor Yor 25- Ms. Sittona Abdalla Osman 26- Mr. Pidor Tut Pul 27- Mr. James Ernest Onge 28- Mr. Jwokthab Amum Ajak 29- Mr. Paul Malong Akaro 30- Mr. Deng Deng Nhial 31- Mr. Lazaros Akoi Arou 32- Mr. Ruben Marial Benjamin 33- Abdon Terkoc Matuet 34- Mr. James Pitia Morgan 35- Mr. Dhanojak Obongo Othow 36- Mr. Jokwen Yukwan Ayiik 37- Mr. Michael Nyang Jok 38- Mr. Michael Mayiel Chuol 39- Ms. Abuk Nikonora Manyok 40- Ms. Nyandeng Joshua Dei Wal 41- Mr. Chol Mawut Unguec Ajonga 42- Mr. Darius Garang Wol Mabior 43- Mr. Joseph Ayok Ayok.

While Grade Three included the following names: 1- Mr. Thiik Agoth Giir 2- Mr. Nickson Deng Peter 3- Mr. Morris Batali Simon 4- Ms. Mary Badoda Francis 5- Mr. Hamilton Michael Lugor 6- Mr. Akwoch Daniel Diing 7- Ms. Jago Arop Yor 8- Mr. James Kur Muorwel 9- Ms. Sarah Victor Bol 10- Mr. William Wani Ruben 11- Mr. Wol Mayar Ariec 12- Mr. David Buom Choat 13- Ms Agnes A.O Oswaha 14- Mr. Caesar Oliha Yanga 15- Mr. Garang Garang Diing 16- Mr. Kau Nak Maper 17- Mr. Ambrose Raphael Tamania 18- Mr. Kahmis Agar Wol 19- Mr. Hassan Yousif Ngor 20- Mr. John Simon Yor Kur 21- Mr. Juma Dino Amoi 22- Mr. Dominique Panthair Mading 23- Dr. Riek Pouk Riek 24- Mr. Martin Kahmis Tabia 25- Mr. Raphael Nhial Kulang

The following variables can be employed to illustrate and better appreciate and understand this Presidential Decree for the Appointment of Ambassadors into the Diplomatic and Consular Services in the ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Sudan: region, state, party, gender, educational and prior experience qualifications among others.

                   Analysis of South Sudan's Ambassadorial List. 

S/N

Name of Ambassador[1]

Region From

State From

Party From

Former Position

Country Assigned to

1

Majok Guandon Thiep

Greater Upper Nile

Jonglei

SPLM

Fmr. Sudan Ambassador to Kenya

--

2

Dr. Chol Deng Alak

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Abyei or Warrap

SPLM

Fmr. Sudan Ambassador to Russia

--

3

Mohamed Hassan Bakeit

Greater Equatoria

Central Equatoria

SPLM

--

--

4

Makelele Nyajok

Greater Equatoria

Central Equatoria

SPLM

Ex-Judge of Appeal Court

--

5

Dr. Eluzai Mogga Yokwe

Greater Equatoria

Central Equatoria

SPLM

Fmr. Sudan Ambassador to France

--

6

Dr. Akec Khoc Acieu

Greater Upper Nile

Jonglei

SPLM

Fmr. Sudan Ambassador to the USA

--

7

Mr. Sebit Abbe Alley

Greater Equatoria

Central Equatoria

SPLM

Fmr. GoSS Ambassador to Zambia

--

8

Paul Macuei Malok

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Lakes State

SPLM

Fmr. Sudan Ambassador to Bulgaria

 

--

9

Dr. Andrew Akon Akec Kuol

Greater Upper Nile

Jonglei

SPLM

--

--

10

Kuol Alor Kuol

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Abyei or Warrap

SPLM

Fmr. GoSS
Ambassador
To Ethiopia

--

11

Anthony Louis Kon

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Northern Bahr El Ghazal

SPLM

Fmr. Sudan Ambassador to Congo

 

--

12

Ajing Adiang Mariik

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Warrap

SPLM

--

--

13

Alier Deng Rual

Greater Upper Nile

Jonglei

SPLM

Diplomat,  

Sudan Ministry of Foreign Affairs

--

14

Akuei Bona Malwal

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Warrap

SPLM

Fmr. Sudan Ambassador to the AU

--

15

Majak Philemon Majok

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Lakes State

SPLM

Diplomat,  

Sudan Ministry of Foreign Affairs

--

16

Baak Valentino Wol

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Warrap

SPLM

--

--

17

John Andruga Duku

Greater Equatoria

Eastern Equatoria

SPLM

Fmr. GoSS Ambassador to Kenya

--

18

Mariano Deng Ngor

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Northern Bahr El Ghazal

SPLM

--

--

19

Dr. Francis George Nazario

Greater Equatoria

Eastern Equatoria

SPLM

Fmr. GoSS Ambassador to the EU, Brussel

--

20

Joseph Moum Majak

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Warrap

SPLM

Fmr. GoSS Ambassador to Canada

--

21

Dr. Parmena Makuet Mangar

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Lakes State

SPLM

Fmr. GoSS
Ambassador to Egypt and Middle East

--

22

Philip Jada Natana

Greater Equatoria

Central Equatoria

SPLM

 Fmr.GoSS
Deputy Amb. to Ethiopia

--

23

Arop Deng Kuol

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Abyei or Warrap

SPLM

Fmr. GoSS Ambassador to Ethiopia

--

24

Michael Majok Ayom

Greater Upper Nile

Jonglei

SPLM

Fmr. GoSS Ambassador to Kenya

--

25

Gabriel Gai Riak

Greater Upper Nile

Jonglei

SPLM

Fmr. GoSS Ambassador to Nigeria

--

26

Bol Wek Agoth

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Warrap

SPLM

Fmr. GoSS Ambassador to Norway

--

27

Dr. John Gai Yoh

Greater Upper Nile

Upper Nile

SPLM

Fmr. GoSS Ambassador to S. Africa

--

28

Dr. Daniel Peter Othol

Greater Upper Nile

Upper Nile

SPLM

Fmr. GoSS Ambassador to the UK

--

29

Ezekiel Lol Gathouth

Greater Upper Nile

Upper Nile

SPLM

Fmr. GoSS Ambassador to the USA

--

30

Samuel Luate Lominsuk

Greater Equatoria

Central Equatoria

SPLM

Fmr. GoSS Ambassador to Zimbabwe

--

31

Awad El Karim Ibrahim Ali

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Western Bahr El Ghazal

SPLM

--

--

32

Adam Saeed AbuBakr Kabawa

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Western Bahr El Ghazal

SPLM

--

--

33

Mustafa Lowoh Walla

Greater Equatoria

Western Equatoria

SPLM

--

--

34

Aban Yor Akol Ajawin

Greater Upper Nile

Upper Nile

SPLM

Fmr. Sudan Deputy Amb. to the U.N

 

--

35

Sittona Abdalla Osman

Greater Upper Nile

Jonglei

SPLM Veteran

--

--

36

Pidor Tut Pul

Greater Upper Nile

Upper Nile

SPLM

--

--

37

James Ernest Onge

Greater Equatoria

Eastern Equatoria

SPLM

Fmr. GoSS Ambassador to Uganda

--

38

Jwokthab Amum Ajak

Greater Upper Nile

Upper Nile

SPLM

Fmr. GoSS Ambassador to Australia

--

39

Paul Malong Akaro

Greater Equatoria

Central Equatoria

SPLM

Fmr. GoSS Ambassador to the UK

--

40

Deng Deng Nhial

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Warrap

SPLM

Deputy GoSS Amb. to the USA

--

41

Lazaros Akoi Arou

Greater Upper Nile

Jonglei

SPLM

Fmr. GOSS ambassador to Congo-Brazzaville

--

42

Ruben Marial Benjamin

Greater Upper Nile

Jonglei

SPLM

Deputy GoSS Amb. to Egypt

--

43

Abdon Terkoc Matuet

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Lakes State

SPLM

--

--

44

James Pitia Morgan

Greater Equatoria

Central Equatoria

SPLM

Fmr. GoSS Ambassador to Indonesia

--

45

Dhanojak Obongo Othow

Greater Upper Nile

Jonglei

SPLM

--

--

46

Jokwen Yukwan Ayiik

Greater Upper Nile

Upper Nile

SPLM

Fmr.Sudan
Ambassador to Russia

 

--

47

Michael Nyang Jok

Greater Upper Nile

Jonglei

SPLM

SPLM/A Veteran

--

48

Michael Mayiel Chuol

Greater Upper Nile

Unity State

SPLM

Chairperson, Referendum Committee in Unity State

--

49

Abuk Nikonora Manyok

Greater Upper Nile

Jonglei

SPLM

Director Bureau of public outreach

--

50

Nyandeng Joshua Dei Wal

Greater Upper Nile

Upper Nile

 

SPLM

--

--

51

Chol Mawut Unguec Ajonga

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Western

Bahr El Ghazal

SPLM

Fmr. 1st secr of Goss to Holland

--

52

Darius Garang Wol Mabior

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Northern Bahr El Ghazal

SPLM

--

--

53

Joseph Ayok Ayok

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Lakes State

SPLM

--

--

54

Thiik Agoth Giir

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Warrap

SPLM

--

--

55

Nickson Deng Peter

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Lakes

SPLM

Fmr. GoSS Ambassador to the EU, Brussel

--

56

Morris Batali Simon

Greater Equatoria

Central Equatoria

SPLM

Fmr. deputy Goss Amb. to Canada

--

57

Mary Badoda Francis

Greater Equatoria

Western Equatoria

SPLM

--

--

58

Hamilton Michael Lugor

Greater Equatoria

Eastern Equatoria

SPLM

--

--

59

Akwoch Daniel Diing

Greater Upper Nile

Upper Nile

SPLM

Fmr. deputy Goss Amb. to Canada

--

60

Ms. Jago Arop Yor

Greater Upper Nile

Upper Nile

SPLM

Fmr. deputy GoSS Amb. to South Africa

--

61

James Kur Muorwel

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Warrap

SPLM

Fmr. deputy Goss Amb. to Norway

--

62

Sarah Victor Bol

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Warrap

SPLM

Fmr. deputy
GoSS Amb. to the UK

--

63

William Wani Ruben

Greater Equatoria

Central Equatoria

SPLM

--

--

64

Wol Mayar Ariec

 

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Warrap

SPLM

--

--

65

David Buom Choat

Greater Upper Nile

Upper Nile

SPLM

South Sudan Ambassador to the UN

--

66

Ms Agnes Oswaha

Greater Equatoria

Eastern Equatoria

SPLM

Worked in Goss Mission to the USA

--

67

Caesar Oliha Yanga

 

Greater Equatoria

Eastern Equatoria

SPLM

--

--

68

Garang Garang Diing

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Northern Bahr El Ghazal

SPLM

Fmr. deputy Goss Amb. to Kenya

--

69

Kau Nak Maper

 

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Lakes State

SPLM

--

--

70

Ambrose Raphael Tamania

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Western Bahr El Ghazal

SPLM

--

--

71

Khamis Agar Wol

 

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Lakes State

SPLM

--

--

72

Hassan Yousif Ngor

Greater Upper Nile

Upper Nile

SPLM

Fmr. Sudan Ambassador to Uganda

--

73

John Simon Yor Kur

Greater Upper Nile

Upper Nile

SPLM

Fmr. deputy Sudan Amb. to Canada

--

74

Juma Dino Amoi

Greater Equatoria

Eastern Equatoria

SPLM

Fmr. GoSS Ambassador to Uganda

--

75

Dominique Panthair Mading

Greater Upper Nile

Jonglei

SPLM

--

--

76

Dr. Riek Pouk Riek

Greater Upper Nile

Upper Nile

SPLM

Fmr. deputy Sudan Amb. to Libya

--

77

Martin Kahmis Tabia

Greater Equatoria

Western Equatoria

SPLM

--

--

78

Raphael Nhial Kulang

Greater Bahr El Ghazal

Lakes State

SPLM

--

--

79

 

 

 

 

 

 

80

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

          Summary of Ambassadorial Distribution at the Greater Regional Level

 

S/N

Region

Number of Ambassadors

% Share of Ambassadors

% Share of total national Population

1

Greater Bahr el Ghazal

(GBG region)

30

38.46%

33% (2.71M)

2

Greater Upper Nile

(GUN region)

28

35.89%

35% (2.89M)

3

Greater Equatoria

(GE region)

20

25.64%

32%  (2.62M)

Total

---------------------

78

100%

100% (8.26M)[2]

 

                          Summary of Ambassadorial Distribution at the State Level

 

s/n

Name of State

Number of Ambassadors

% Share of Ambassadors

% Share of total national Population

State Ranking

1

Jonglei

13

16.67%

16.26% (1.35M)

2

2

Unity

1

1.28%

6.98% (0.58M)

10

3

Upper Nile

14

17.94%

11.57% (0.96M)

1

4

Warrap

13

16.67%

11.67% (0.97M)

2

5

Lakes

9

11.53%

8.31% (0.69M)

5

6

Northern Bahr el Ghazal

4

5.13%

8.67% (0.72M)

7

7

Western Bahr el Ghazal

4

5.13%

3.98% (0.33M)

7

8

Western Equatoria

3

3.84%

7.35% (0.61M)

9

9

Central Equatoria

10

12.82%

13.25% (1.10M)

4

10

Eastern Equatoria

7

8.97%

10.96% (0.91M)

6

Total

——————

78

100%

100% (8.26M for 2009’s census)[3]

10

 

                     Summary of Ambassadorial Distribution at the Gender Level

 

S/N

Gender

Number of Ambassadors

% Share of Ambassadors

% Share of national Pop.

1

Men

71

91.02%

52%  (4.28M)

2

Women

7

8.97%

48%  (3.97M)

Total

-------------

78

100%

100% (8.26M)[4]

 

                 Summary of Ambassadorial Distribution at the Qualification Level

 

S/N

Prior Experience

Number of Ambassadors

Percentage share

1

Former Ambassadors

26

33.33%

2

Former Deputy Ambassadors

15

19.23%

3

New Faces

37

47.43%

Total

-------------------------

78

100%

 Further comparative comprehension of the above appointment would be aided by the following tables of the previous cabinet apportionment according to the greater regions and states:

Summary of the cabinet distribution at the Greater Regional Level  

 

s/n

Name of Region

No. of ministries

No. of Deputy Ministries

Total cabinet share

% Share of Cabinet Positions

1

Greater Upper Nile

9

11

20

35.71%

2

Greater Bahr el Ghazal

10

10

20

35.71%

3

Greater Equatoria

10

6

16

28.57%

Total

————————-

29

27

56

100%

 Summary of the cabinet distribution at the State Level

 

s/n

Name of State

No. of ministries

No. of Deputy Ministries

Total cabinet share

% Share of Cabinet Post

State Ranking

1

Jonglei

5

5

10

17.85%

1

2

Unity

0

3

3

5.36%

10

3

Upper Nile

4

3

7

12.50%

4

4

Warrap

4

6

10

17.85%

2

5

Lakes

2

2

4

7.14%

6

6

Northern Bahr el Ghazal

2

0

2

3.57%

9

7

Western Bahr el Ghazal

2

2

4

7.14%

6

8

Western Equatoria

3

1

4

7.14%

5

9

Central Equatoria

5

3

8

14.29%

3

10

Eastern Equatoria

2

2

4

7.14%

6

Total

————————

29

27

56

100%

10

While the above numbers speak better for themselves, it is imperative that something is mentioned about the criticisms garnered by the appointment among South Sudanese, particularly whether the new appointment reflect a lean and a broad-based government in the age of financial difficulties. One criticism is that the appointment is too bloated at a time when South Sudan, having shut down oil production, is confronting “transitional period of budgetary problems” and financial uncertainties.

Commenting on the ambassadorial appointment, Thirik Mijak, a South Sudan from the USA, believes that “such an ambassadorial appointment is contradictory to the recent austerity measures that was passed recently to avoid the problematic shortcomings of the financial constraints due to the shutdown of the oil pipelines as the main sources of public revenue” in the Republic of South Sudan.

Mijak adds: “it would be more appropriate to trim the number of these appointed ambassadors to a sizeable number that could be more affordable and significant to the number of countries with importance in terms of diplomatic ambassadorships.” Countries of diplomatic and economic importance should have been prioritized. For instance, “the great nations like USA, Canada, UK, China, Australia, Brazil, Norwegian, Germany, India plus our Eastern African nations like Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda should be given first priorities respectively.”

The second dissatisfaction with the appointment is manifested nature of underrepresentation in some states. Some South Sudanese do feel that some states have been underrepresented while others have taken more than their fairs share. For example, Unity State, which received no full ministerial position during last year cabinet formation is again shortchanged in this latest appointment—it has only about 1-2 ambassadorial positions while other states like Upper Nile, Jonglei and Warrap have taken a lion share of the ambassadorial appointees relative to their population size.

Dr. Riek Machar, the vice president of the Republic of South Sudan who hailed from Unity State has some explanations to do to the citizens of that state: what is going on in Juba in relation to Unity State, the very oil-producing state that is funding the whole of South Sudan? Why are they overwhelmingly and continually sidelined and undersold in the government?

Third disapproval is related to the pervasiveness of nepotism. There are couples of names on the ambassadorial list whose appointments may or may not have anything to do with their close relatives in the government of South Sudan. South Sudanese are wondering if the appointment of Kuol Alor Kuol (brother to Deng Alor), Deng Deng Nhial (brother to Nhial Deng), Akuei Bona Malual (son to Bona Malual), Arop Deng Kuol (brother to Pieng Deng), Aban Yor Akol (brother to Lam Akol), and Ruben Marial Benjamin (brother to Marial Benjamin), among others, have anything to do with their having close relationship to some of the ministers and Generals in Juba.

To their due credits, there is no child from the top guns in the government—President Kiir, VP Dr. Machar, Speaker Wani Igga, SPLM SG Pagan Amum etc. Design or coincidence?

And while some South Sudanese may see underrepresentation and nepotism in the appointment, others though see it in term of prior experiences and educational qualifications. According to Jouk Hakim, a South Sudanese from Germany, appointment to the diplomatic corps is not about tribes, regions, or state: “the diplomatic corps profession is not about ethnic and states representations, and that is why you can realize that some states do have more diplomats than others. Depending on level of qualifications and success during the examinations to join the diplomatic service when Sudan was still one.”

The question of Gender parity is another fundamental feature of this latest appointment! While womenfolk were deservingly represented during the cabinet formation, receiving over 26% of the portfolios, this is not the case in this newest nomination. Of the 78 ambassadorial appointees, there are only 7 members among them who are females, a paltry percentage of approximately 9%, with males taking a whopping percentage of about 91%. Since the constitution mandate 25% of all appointment to be allocated to the fairer sex, it is important to note that this selection has fallen short of that constitutional requirement.

Lastly, I would like to thank Uncle James Agor (USA), Luke Dak (USA), Gordon Buay (Canada), Thirik Mijak (USA), Tearz Ayuen (South Sudan), Jouk Hakim (Germany), Peter Karlo (USA), and especially those who requested to remain anonymous, for their invaluable assistances in tracking down and identifying the states and regions the ambassadors hail from., thank you! Any error or misrepresentation thereof is of my own making, however.

PaanLuel Wël is the Managing Editor of PaanLuel Wël: South Sudanese bloggers. He can be reached through his Facebook page, Twitter account or on the blog: http://paanluelwel2011.wordpress.com/


[1]  South Sudan Ambassadors: Presidential Decrees for the Appointment of South Sudan (First) Ambassadors.

http://paanluelwel2011.wordpress.com/2012/03/09/south-sudan-ambassadors-presidential-decrees-for-the-appointment-of-ambassadors/

[2] Sudan Tribune: “South Sudan census results officially released”, 2009: http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-census-results,31411

[3]Ibid.

[4] Ibid. 

Rape as a Continuing Weapon of War in Darfur: Reports, bibliography of studies, a compendium of incidents

Attention to sexual violence and rape in Darfur has ceased to command the attention it once had---not because this brutal epidemic has ended but because of the absence of human rights reporting, news reporting, and the intimidation of humanitarian organizations ensures that we hear very little about one of the most brutal features of the Darfur genocide.  This brief provides [1] a select bibliography of reports and studies examining the realities of rape and sexual violence in Darfur (in progress); [2] an overview of what was already evident of these realities from mid-2005; [3] a lengthy compendium of reports of specific incidents of sexual violence and rape.  This compendium is also a work in progress, extending back into report archives, and grimly forward as rape continues to be reported on a nearly daily basis by Radio Dabanga, despite various assertions that Darfur is settling into a more "peaceful" state. 

There can be no possible claim to definitive figures; but the evidence assembled here makes clear than many tens of thousands of Darfuri girls and women have been raped.

By Eric Reeves

Part I: ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (in progress)

(i) Amnesty International, "Sudan, Darfur: Rape as a Weapon of War" [July 19, 2004] at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR54/076/2004 ] One of the very earliest human rights accounts of what had already reached epidemic proportions.  This lengthy report by Amnesty is authoritative, based on very substantial field research, and compelling in its analysis and framing of issues in terms of international humanitarian and human rights law.  It has never been the case that the international community was unaware of the scale of sexual violence and rape in Darfur; such awareness simply did not translate into meaningful responses.

(ii)  Tara Gingerich, JD, MA and Jennifer Leaning, MD, SMH, "The Use of Rape as a Weapon of War in the conflict in Darfur, Sudan" (October 2004). Prepared for the US Agency for International Development/OTI under the auspices of the Harvard School of Public Health and the Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights. A powerful study of sexual violence in Darfur published in fall 2004, it deserves the closest attention.

(iii) Human Rights Watch, "Sexual violence and its consequences among displaced persons in Darfur and Chad," (April 2005)

[from the Introduction]  "Since early 2003, Sudanese government forces and government-backed ethnic militias known as 'Janjaweed' have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and 'ethnic cleansing' in the Darfur region of Sudan. They have targeted for abuse civilians belonging to the same ethnic groups as members of two rebel movements, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)."

"Rape and sexual violence against women and girls has been a prominent feature of the 'ethnic cleansing' campaign carried out by government forces and militias, both during and following displacement in Darfur. Once displaced into camps in Darfur, or into refugee camps in Chad, women and girls continue to suffer sexual and gender-based violence. As discussed below, rape and sexual violence have numerous social, economic and medical consequences, including increasing the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS as a result of the violence."

(iv)  Doctors Without Border/Médecins San Frontières (MSF)/Holland in March 2005("The Crushing Burden of Rape: Sexual Violence in Darfur," MSF-Holland, March 2005, http://www.nsvrc.org/publications/reports/crushing-burden-rape-sexual-violence-darfur). In the wake of the report's release, Khartoum arrested and eventually expelled the two most senior MSF-Holland officials working in Sudan.  The MSF report, with an extraordinary body of first-hand evidence, documents more than 500 cases of rape; this report figured in Khartoum's decision to expel the organization, along with twelve others, in March 2009.

(v)  "Genocidal Rape and Assault in Darfur" (Dirksen Senate Office Building & Rayburn House Office Building, July 21, 2005)   Sponsored by members of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus & the Congressional Caucus on Women’s Issues. Testimony of Eric Reeves, Smith College: "Responding to Sexual Violence in Darfur."

(vi) Human Rights Watch, "Five Years On: No Justice for Victims of Sexual Violence in Darfur," (April 2008)  [from the Introduction]  "Five years into the armed conflict in Sudan's Darfur region, women and girls living in displaced persons camps, towns, and rural areas remain extremely vulnerable to sexual violence. Sexual violence continues to occur throughout the region, both in the context of continuing attacks on civilians, and during periods of relative calm.  Those responsible are usually men from the Sudanese security forces, militias, rebel groups, and former rebel groups, who target women and girls predominantly (but not exclusively) from Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit, Berti, Tunjur, and other non-Arab ethnicities."

(vii) Physicians for Human Rights, May 2009.  The psychological, physical, and social destructiveness of rape as a weapon of war can scarcely be overstated. As deployed in Darfur, it is meant to destroy family structures within the non-Arab or African populations that have, overwhelmingly, been the target of campaigns of rape. The best account of the physical and mental devastation occasioned by rape in Darfur is a May 2009 study by Physicians for Human Rights, "Nowhere to Turn: Failure to Protect, Support and Assure Justice for Darfuri Women" (http://darfuriwomen.phrblog.org/nowhere-to-turn/ ). The effects of eight years of displacement by genocidal counter-insurgency warfare have left civilians suffering from a wide range of severe mental disorders, particularly girls and women who have been victims of rape. In its meticulously researched study, PHR chronicled in soul-destroying detail some of the devastation among Darfuri refugee girls and women in eastern Chad:

"Researchers asked women to rate their physical and mental health status in Darfur and now in Chad on a 1-5 scale with 1 being 'very good' and 5 being 'poor.' Women reported a marked deterioration in their physical health status since leaving Darfur, with an average ranking of 3.99 for health in Chad versus 2.06 for Darfur."

Even more alarmingly,

"The study indicated a marked deterioration in self-reported mental health, where the average score in was 4.90. 'I am sad every day (since leaving Darfur). I feel not well in my skin,' explained one respondent. [ ] Women who experienced rape (confirmed or highly probable) were three times more likely to report suicidal thoughts than were women who did not report sexual violence."

(viii) Halima Bashir, Tears of the Desert: A Memoir of Survival in Darfur (Random House, 2009); Bashir, a Zaghawa woman trained as a doctor, was herself savagely raped and tortured because of her courageous medical response to the mass rape of school girls in North Darfur.  This searing account takes the reader to the very heart of darkness in Darfur.

[Part II]  RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE VIEW FROM JUNE 2005

Jan Egeland, UN Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs, June 5, 2005: "In Darfur, rape is systematically used as a weapon of warfare."

Eric Reeves
June 22, 2005

Egeland's recourse to the present tense in describing the use of rape as an ongoing weapon of war in Darfur is entirely appropriate. The Janjaweed militia forces allied with the Khartoum regime are continuing a brutal campaign of systematic sexual violence directed against the women and girls of non-Arab or African tribal groups. Khartoum for its part remains deeply complicit in this campaign, now in its third year, as Egeland makes clear in his characteristically forthright statement:

"[Egeland said] the impact of [sexual] violence was compounded by [the government of] Sudan's failure to acknowledge the scale of the problem and to act to stop it. 'Not only do the Sudanese authorities fail to provide effective physical protection, they inhibit access to treatment.' He said in some cases unmarried women who became pregnant after being raped had been treated as criminals and subjected to further brutal treatment by police. 'This is an affront to all humanity,' Egeland said." (Reuters, June 21, 2005)

The consequences of systematic, racially/ethnically-animated sexual violence in Darfur are enormous. Rape as a weapon of war is one the defining features of the insecurity defining most of Darfur; sexual violence increasingly paralyzes civilian movement and powerfully circumscribes the grim lives within overcrowded and under-served camps for displaced persons. More broadly, insecurity continues to attenuate humanitarian reach and efficacy.

The threat of rape severely inhibits the gathering of firewood, water, and animal fodder. The collapse in Darfur's food production is also directly related to the ongoing intimidating effects of sexual violence. More generally, rape---and the impunity with which it is committed by Khartoum's proxy military force in Darfur---contributes to a desperate decline in morale within many camps and among displaced persons, some now entering their third year in this debilitating condition.

A powerful study of sexual violence in Darfur was published last fall and deserves the closest attention. Written by Tara Gingerich, JD, MA and Jennifer Leaning, MD, SMH, "The Use of Rape as a Weapon of War in the conflict in Darfur, Sudan" (October 2004) was prepared for the US Agency for International Development/OTI under the auspices of the Harvard School of Public Health and the Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights.  Virtually all of the conclusions and assessments made in this detailed and historically informed study continue to be borne out by realities on the ground more than half a year later. [And indeed, continue to be borne out to the very present: see below---ER, March 4, 2012]

Certainly the central claim of the report stands without meaningful challenge:

"Our findings suggest that the military forces attacking the non-Arab people of Darfur, the Janjaweed in collaboration with forces of the Government of Sudan, have inflicted a massive campaign of rape as a deliberate aspect of their military assault against the lives, livelihoods, and land of this population." (page 1)

Equally certainly,

"The highest priority now is to introduce a measure of real protection for the populations now displaced in Darfur and Chad in order to reduce the ongoing risk of rape to women and girls as they move outside camps and villages to find firewood and water." (page 1)

But again, more than half a year later, such protection is nowhere in sight. Indeed, June 22, 2005 Congressional testimony by US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick works to ensure that current plans for an expanded but still wholly inadequate African Union (AU) deployment will constitute the full extent of international response to ongoing genocidal violence and destruction:

"The Bush administration is opposed to the dispatch of U.S. or European forces to help enhance security in Sudan's Darfur region because they could be vulnerable to attack by terrorists, [Zoellick] said Wednesday. 'The region is populated by some bloodthirsty, cold-hearted killers,' Zoellick said, mentioning Somalia in particular as one possible source." (Associated Press, June 22, 2005)

Leaving aside the disgracefully lazy geography invoked, Zoellick is apparently unaware of the grim irony in declaring that Western troops cannot be deployed to Darfur because of "bloodthirsty, cold-hearted killers" in Somalia (well over 1,000 miles away)---even as defenseless women and girls in Darfur are daily and directly vulnerable to the "bloodthirsty, cold-hearted killers" that are the Janjaweed.

Genocide is a brutal, ongoing reality in Darfur---an assessment recently confirmed in the abstract by President Bush---and yet the U.S. remains content with an "Africa only" response, despite the clear inadequacies of the AU, even with NATO logistical and material support. Zoellick offered nothing in his Congressional testimony that suggests how the deployment of even 7,700 AU personnel by September (a suspiciously optimistic time-frame) can address the multiple security tasks all too conspicuous in Darfur---including the protection of women and girls from sexual violence.

Though there can be no denying the significant physical risks associated with humanitarian military intervention by American, European, Australian, or Canadian troops, these risks are almost certainly less than those confronted in Iraq and Afghanistan, even as the basis for participation in such military action is morally and legally much less ambiguous: halting genocide, halting the deliberate destruction of the African ethnic groups in Darfur because of who they are, "as such." Here we should bear in mind two of the acts of genocide specified in Article 2 of the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (to which the US, the countries of the European Union, and all current members of the UN Security Council are contracting parties):

[b] Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

[d] Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

Considerable international jurisprudential thought has been given to the particular meaning of these phrases, but both have a clear bearing on how we consider the implications of systematic, ethnically-targeted rape in Darfur. Rape causes extremely serious bodily harm, particularly the gang-rape so characteristic in Darfur, as does rape accompanied by non-sexual violence, also typical in Darfur. Rape causes excruciating mental trauma. For a variety of reasons, rape also serves as a means of preventing births on the part of women within the targeted African groups. Those girls and women raped are often socially ostracized, and become much less valued as potential wives; violent rape often leads to medical complications that make further child-bearing impossible or much riskier; and rape often carries the threat of disease and infection, including direct threats to the lives of potential mothers.

Rape as committed by Khartoum's military proxy in Darfur is entirely consistent with the genocidal ambitions that have been in evidence for over two years, and contributes significantly to the current genocide by attrition that has succeeded the previous campaign of large-scale violent destruction of the lives and livelihoods of Darfur's African tribal groups. That sexual violence continues on a significant and consequential basis has been confirmed by UN reports (including the most recent [June 2005] by the Secretary-general), and by reports from human rights observers and humanitarian organizations on the ground in Darfur.

But for Zoellick and the Bush administration---and clearly with the support of the European Union and officials within NATO---there is no willingness to contribute U.S. or European personnel to this most urgent humanitarian intervention.

Genocide, including rape as a weapon of war in Darfur, will as a consequence proceed at a pace limited only by the drastically inadequate AU deployment, currently operating without a mandate for civilian or humanitarian protection. "Time must be given for an African solution to work," Zoellick declared in his Congressional testimony (Voice of America, June 22, 2005). But as Zoellick well knows, the AU has been shamefully reluctant to admit its own fundamental limitations, has failed to secure a mandate for civilian protection, and has deployed (in well over half a year) only about two thirds of the 3,500 personnel planned for early last fall. The AU has no capacity---either in material, manpower, or logistics (including "inter-operability")---to reach the 7,700 target figure for September, a date much too far in the future given critical current needs for protection. [ ]

NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN DARFUR

So long as the international community fails to supplement the African Union in Darfur, and fails to provide a force in place with a mandate for civilian protection, an intolerable number of women and girls will be raped. This will compound the ongoing failure of the international community, in particular the UN Security Council failure to secure from Khartoum compliance with the only significant "demand" made to date: that the regime disarm the Janjaweed murderers and rapists, and bring their leaders to justice (UN Security Council Resolution 1556, July 30, 2004).

In a region the size of Spain, with over 2.5 million internally displaced persons and refugees (including eastern Chad), many hundreds of thousands of women and girls are daily at risk of the sort chronicled by Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (MSF) in its immensely powerful and clinically informed study: "The Crushing Burden of Rape: Sexual Violence in Darfur" (Amsterdam, March 8, 2005). Without international protection, girls as young as eight will continue to experience the most vicious form of sexual violence. MSF provides all too many horrific examples:

"'Five women, 2 young girls (13 and 14 years old) and 3 older women, went to collect grass for their donkeys. The group got ambushed by three armed men. 'I was taken to the near-by river bed away from the other women. One man took me in one direction. The other man took the other girl. [ ] The man who took me told me to sit on the ground. But I refused. He hit me twice on my back with a stick. Then he took out a knife and threatened me by pointing the knife at me. I sat down. And then he told me to take off my underwear. I refused, but he threatened me again with his knife. He pulled his trousers down and raped me. He left without saying anything or even looking at me.' (Young girl, 13, February 2005, South Darfur)"

"'One of the three man took me away from the other women. He threatened me with his knife by pinching my chest with it. He pushed me on the ground and took off my underwear. He raped me and was repeating "I will kill you" all the time to intimidate me.' (Young girl, 14, February 2005, South Darfur)"

A hateful racial/ethnic animus is all too often in evidence in these violent rapes:

"We saw five Arab men who came to us and asked where our husbands were. Then they told us that we should have sex with them. We said no. So they beat and raped us. After they abused us, they told us that now we would have Arab babies; and if they would find any Fur [one of the non-Arab or African tribal groups of Darfur], they would rape them again to change the colour of their children.' (Three women, 25, 30 and 40, October 2004, West Darfur)" (page 1)

Gingerich and Leaning also report on the racial/ethnic animus in the accounts of rape coming from non-Arab or African women, accounts that make clear the genocidal nature of these assaults:

"It is widely reported that during the attacks, the Janjaweed often berated the women, calling them slaves, telling them that they would now bear a 'free child,' and asserting that they (the perpetrators) are wiping out the non-Arabs." (page 15)

Gang-rape is, as MSF has established beyond doubt, a characteristic feature of sexual violence in Darfur:

"[A number of] women described that the rapists abducted them and held them captive for several days and during that period they were raped regularly by several men. One woman reported that her abduction lasted 6 days and she was raped by 10 men. In addition, almost half of the survivors report that there was more than one victim in the attack." (page 5)

Individual women offer counts of unsurpassable horror:

"'I was walking with a group of nine women and two men. We met some armed men along the road. They took the nine women and held us under a tree in their camp. They released us after three days. During all this time, I was raped every night and every day by five men.' (Woman, 30, October 2004, South Darfur) (Among the nine women, only three came to the clinic, among which two girls were 12 and 13 years old.)" (page 5)

This authoritative MSF report was the reason given by Khartoum for the recent arrest of the two most senior officials of MSF working in Sudan and Darfur. Aware of the clinical authority of MSF's report, and the international respect for the organization (which won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999), the regime clearly fears the impact of reports of rape within the Muslim world. For while all too much of the Muslim world has shown a disgraceful willingness to countenance mass murder in Darfur in the name of "counter-insurgency," as promulgated by Khartoum, rape has proved to be much more difficult to justify as a tool of war.

But sexual violence has undeniably been an essential tool of war from the beginning of Khartoum's barbarous war on the people of Darfur and continues to be so today, as MSF insists in the report that to angered the regime:

"Since early 2003, the people of Darfur have endured a vicious campaign of violence, which has forced almost 2 million people to flee from their destroyed villages in search of safety. Rape against women, children, and men has sadly been a constant factor in this violence throughout this campaign of terror. More tragically, it continues to this day even long after people have fled from their villages. The stories of rape survivors give a horrific illustration of the daily reality of people in Darfur and especially of women and young girls, the primary victims of this form of violence. [The] first waves of people in flight repeatedly recounted to our teams how armed militias attacked their villages, killing and raping the inhabitants."

"The hundreds of thousands who fled the destroyed villages have now sought refuge in makeshift camps with little but rags and sticks as shelter. But they have found no safety there. In spite of high-profile visits of the world's leaders, people still face persecution and intimidation inside the camps. Rape, a feature of the attacks on their villages, has now followed them insidiously into their places of refuge. Families, in order to sustain themselves, have to continue collecting wood, fetching water or working their fields. In doing so, women have to make a terrible choice, putting themselves or their children at risk of rape, beatings or death as soon as they are outside the camps, towns or villages." (page 1)

MSF has quantified a number of their findings, and it was for uttering these terrible truths that Khartoum arrested the senior MSF officials in Sudan:

"The majority (82%) were raped while they were pursuing their ordinary daily activities. Only 4% of women reported that the rape occurred during the active conflict, while they were fleeing their home village. Almost a third (28%) of the victims reported that they were raped more than one time, either by single or multiple assailants. In more than half of the cases, physical violence was inflicted beyond sexual violence; women are beaten with sticks, whips or axes. Further, some of the raped women were visibly pregnant at the time of the assault, sometimes up to eight months." (page 3)

But MSF is far from alone in reporting on the realities of rape. There have long been numerous accounts from the UN as well as human rights organizations, both international and Sudanese expatriate. The scale and viciousness of rape, especially in the more violent phases of the Darfur conflict, are suggested by a UN dispatch following an attack in the Tawilah area of North Darfur (one in which the notorious Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal is clearly implicated):

"In an attack on 27 February [2004] in the Tawilah area of northern Darfur, 30 villages were burned to the ground, over 200 people killed and over 200 girls and women raped---some by up to 14 assailants and in front of their fathers who were later killed. A further 150 women and 200 children were abducted." (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, March 22, 2004)

This was but one of countless such attacks.

We have no clear idea about the number of women and girls who have been raped in Darfur, in part because of the extraordinary reticence---for cultural and religious reasons---on the part of the women assaulted.

Amnesty International delegates in Chad in November 2003:

“Women will not tell you easily if they have been raped. In our culture, it is a shame. Women hide this in their hearts so that men don’t hear about it.”

But we may be sure that UN Under-secretary for Humanitarian Affairs Egeland is correct when he refers to the implications of the MSF study and its clinical recording of the experience of rape victims: "'This [MSF figure of 500 rape victims] is just a fraction of such attacks'" (Reuters, June 21, 2005).

Gingerich and Leaning report that,

"a Darfurian nongovernmental organization has documented 9,300 cases of rape [footnote 72: interview, October 12, 2004], although other observers on the ground have argued that the number of rapes is closer to double that figure" [footnote 73: Interviews, September 21, 2004]. (page 16)

Given the often determined silence of raped women and girls, and the extreme limitations in reporting range and access on the ground, such estimates clearly suggest the possibility that many tens of thousands of rapes have already occurred in Darfur.

It is in such a statistical context that we must understand the implications of Gingerich and Leaning's account of "the strategic use of rape," and its particular relevance for Darfur:

"Rape in the context of war serves to create fear, shame, and demoralization among many others in addition to the individual who has been directly assaulted. Communities threatened by mass rape in war may well be more likely to choose flight in advance of the enemy attack and may delay return to captured areas. Further, if a war aim is to take territory and resources and prevent the return of the target population, systematic rape can be seen as a potentially effective means to sap the capacity of groups and societies to reconstitute themselves and organize a sustained return."

"In extreme circumstances, mass rape has been used to further an agenda of cultural and ethnic destruction, by polluting blood lines and preying upon deeply-instilled prejudices about victims of rape to weaken marital and communal relations. The poisonous power of rape to drain capacity for explanation or re-organization of self and community makes it a uniquely effective tool for undermining the social order. When the war aims include the ethnic cleansing or annihilation of a particular identified group, systematic rape could arguably be deployed to manipulate norms of honor, chastity, virginity, femininity, masculinity, loyalty, marriage, and kinship, and insert an emanating set of experiences and memories that destroy group bonds through time."

"'Raped women become pregnant by the enemy, they may suffer grievous physical and psychological injuries, they may die, they may be abandoned or disavowed by shamed families and husbands, all of which degrade the ability of a culture to replenish itself through sexual reproduction' [footnote 29, Jonathan Gottschall, 'Explaining Wartime Rape']."

It is impossible to do full justice to either the data or accounts of rape as a weapon of war. The number of studies available is already considerable (for example, in addition to the reports by MSF and Gingerich and Leaning, see Amnesty International, "Sudan, Darfur: Rape as a Weapon of War" [July 19, 2004] at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engafr540762004). What is clear from all extant accounts, surveys, and data is that rape has in fact been were widely and deliberately deployed as a weapon of war, indeed as a weapon in service of genocidal assault. The subsiding of large-scale conflict has not diminished the ongoing significance or extent of this weapon.

Here we must bear in mind the highly significant finding of MSF:

"The majority (82%) [of women and girls] were raped while they were pursuing their ordinary daily activities. Only 4% of women reported that the rape occurred during the active conflict, while they were fleeing their home village." (page 4)

As women have continued to be forced into camps for displaced persons, or trapped in besieged villages, this statistic is terrifying in its implications: there is no hiding or respite from rape. The UN (in Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 14; May 1, 2005) estimates that 1.88 million Darfuris are now internally displaced (the UN estimates another 200,000 are refugees in eastern Chad). This figure for human displacement represents only those persons to which the UN has access (mainly through UN World Food Program registration); it does not represent a huge and inaccessible rural population that is either displaced or acutely vulnerable in situ. In short, the extreme threat of rape continues for as many as 1.5 million women and girls. This has immense implications for the populations of Darfur, as Gingerich and Leaning make clear in their analysis of the "strategic use of rape as a weapon of war in Darfur":

"Aspects of the underlying strategic rationale for these rapes can be discerned as follows:

•"Create a sense of fear in the civilian population in order to restrict freedom of movement and economic activity. The consistency and implacability of the Janjaweed attack pattern has cast a massive shadow of fear across Darfur. Word of the rapes of the non-Arab population has spread to all those who have not yet been struck. This fear translates into a siege situation, whereby no one ventures outside the confines of the village unless it is absolutely necessary.” (page 17)

•"Instill flight to facilitate capture of land and killing of male civilians. The modus operandi of the Janjaweed and Government of Sudan military attacks on Darfurian villages has become known across the region. Defiance in the face of the onslaught simply leads to death. Over these months of war, the military aims of these forces have become easier to accomplish: they ride up to the horizon of a settlement and everyone before them tries to flee." (page 18)

•"Demoralize the population to reduce their will to resist and prolong their forced exit from the land. Mass rape in war ruptures community ties and disorganizes family structure, behavior, and expectations through time. In a culture that places such high value on virginity and chastity as Darfur, the burden inflicted by rape is particularly devastating and enduring." (page 18)

•"Tear apart the community, by breaking family and community bonds and by engaging in ethnic cleansing through 'pollution' of the blood line. A key motive of the Janjaweed use of rape as a weapon of war appears to be to destroy the non-Arab Darfurian society as a separate ethnic entity. Reports of rapes are replete with statements made by the Janjaweed perpetrators suggesting their intent to make a 'free baby' (implying that the non-Arabs are slaves) and to 'pollute' the tribal blood line, which is patrilineal in the Darfurian tribes." (page 18)

The strategic use of rape as a weapon of war is also evident in the numerous reports of women deliberately scarred or branded as part of sexual violence, this in order to make them more conspicuously victims of rape and thus less desirable as prospective wives or mothers. Even women who will under no circumstances speak of their brutal experience must nonetheless bear the cruelly and purposefully inflicted marks of that experience.

As we are counseled by the Bush administration "to give time for an African solution to work," the transparent inability of the AU---now or in any foreseeable future---to provide civilian protection ensures that rape will continue to be deployed as a strategic weapon of genocidal war.

And time is on the side of Khartoum's génocidaires and their brutal militia proxy, the Janjaweed. Although there are a number of reports that Khartoum's regular forces have also participated in the mayhem of sexual violence in Darfur (see Gingerich and Leaning, page 19), it is the Janjaweed---still unconstrained by Khartoum in any meaningful sense---that continue to rape on a massive, systematic basis. This is so despite the UN Security Council's futile "demand" that the regime disarm the Janjaweed and bring its leaders to justice.

Nor is there any prospect of justice for these girls and women. Violations of international law, including the use of rape as a weapon of war (see Gingerich and Leaning, pages 6-12), have nominally been referred by the UN Security Council to the International Criminal Court. But Khartoum continues to evince nothing but contempt for the ICC, insisting both that no Sudanese will be extradited to The Hague and that preposterous domestic show trials, hastily contrived by the "justice ministry," will have sole jurisdiction for all of Sudan.

THE BLUNTEST TRUTH

The NIF/NCP regime in Khartoum has no interest in seeking and sustaining a just peace for Sudan, or for any of the marginalized populations of this vast country, including those in the increasingly explosive east. The regime's génocidaires seek only political survival on the most favorable terms. They will make no peace with the people of Darfur that threatens them more than the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (January 9, 2005) with southern Sudan already does.

Those women seeking justice from this regime will seek in vain. And those in the international community who refuse to see this regime for what it is, who refuse to see that the regime seeks neither a just peace for the people of Darfur nor justice for the most aggrieved civilian survivors of ongoing genocide, are complicit in condemning the women and girls of Darfur to an indefinite future of the most heinous crimes of sexual violence.

[Part III]   A COMPENDIUM OF TERROR:

Authoritative reports of rapes from Radio Dabanga, human rights organizations, and other sources (identified where appropriate).  These accounts, while representative of the scale, range, continuity, and brutality of rape and sexual violence in Darfur, can do nothing to indicate total numbers.  Here we must be guided by generalizations from previous studies and field dispatches:

•As of fall 2004, Gingerich and Leaning report: "a Darfurian nongovernmental organization has documented 9,300 cases of rape [footnote 72: interview, October 12, 2004], although other observers on the ground have argued that the number of rapes is closer to double that figure [footnote 73: Interviews, September 21, 2004].” (page 16)

• Associated Press reported from Nyala (May 26, 2007): "UN workers say they registered 2,500 rapes in Darfur in 2006, but believe far more went unreported. The real figure is probably thousands a month, said a UN official. Like other UN personnel and aid workers interviewed, the official insisted on speaking anonymously for fear of being expelled by the government."

• UNICEF "Child Alert," page 19, December 2005:

"A recent report from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights said that in almost one in three reported rapes [in Darfur], the victims were children, and a recent UNICEF/UN Population Fund study suggests that the number might be even higher."

•"Focus on Mornay camp," Médecins Sans Frontières, 20 June 2004 (Sudan: no relief in site): "Nearly 14% of the 132 victims of violence treated by medical teams from MSF over the last nine weeks were victims of sexual violence." [Altogether, more than 3 million people, more than half girls and women, have been displaced over the course of violent conflict in Darfur.]

Racist animus in sexual assaults:  It is imperative to bear in mind that rape and sexual violence have a strong racial/ethnic animus in Darfur.  Virtually all the reported attacks are of Arab men upon non-Arab or African women (in its 2004 study, Amnesty International found only one instance in which rebel forces from the Fur, Massalit, or Zaghawa non-Arab or African ethnic groups were responsible for rape).  This must not be lost sight of, as some have already done (for example, political scientist Alan Wolfe offers displays a painful ignorance in speaking on this issue: see Dissent Magazine (January 26, 2012).  The examples here from Amnesty International ("Sudan, Darfur: Rape as a Weapon of War," July 19, 2004) could be replicated from countless other reports and news accounts:

[1]  "Omar al Bashir told us that we should kill all the Nubas. There is no place here for the Negroes any more."  (Words of a Janjawid fighter, according to a refugee from Kenyu, interviewed by Amnesty International in Chad, May 2004)

[2]  "The Tama, a small ethnic group mainly composed of farmers, have been both victims of attacks and accused several times of siding with the Janjawid in the 2003-2004 conflict: 'Slaves! Nubas! Do you have a god? You, ugly black pretend... We are your god! Your god is Omer al-Bashir.'"

[3] "You blacks, you have spoilt the country! We are here to burn you...We will kill your husbands and sons and we will sleep with you! You will be our wives!"

(The words of members of the Janjawid as reported by a group of Masalit women in Goz Amer refugee camp, interviewed by Amnesty International in May 2004)

[4]  "M., a 50-year-old woman from Fur Baranga reported: 'The village was attacked during the night in October 2003, when the Arabs came by cars and on horses. They said "every black woman must be killed, even the children."'"

[5]  "Sudanese refugees interviewed by Amnesty International in Chad, who alleged that Salamat nomads from Chad and fighters from Mauritania were recruited to fight in Darfur:

'What we heard from the Janjawid is that Omer al-Bashir tells the foreigners that they are Arabs and that they should come and live in a country that is ruled by Arabs. That they should not stay where they are ruled by Africans. They say that "Sudan is a country for Arabs."'"  (M., Sudanese refugee in Chad, interviewed by Amnesty International in May 2004)"

[6]"'The government gave the Arabs confidence, arms, cars and horses.  We cannot go back; there will be no security for African people in Darfur.' (Sudanese woman interviewed by Amnesty International in Mile refugee camp, Chad, May 2004)"

[7]  "M., a Masalit chief of the village of Disa,reported that during attacks in June 2003 by the Janjawid and in July and August by the military, 63 persons were killed, including his daughter. In June the Janjawid reportedly accused the villagers of being 'traitors to Omer Hassan Al-Bashir.' [ ] In July the military arrested several persons including Brahim Siddiq, a seven-year-old boy. In June the Janjawid said during the attack: 'You are complicit with the opponents, you are Blacks, no Black can stay here, and no Black can stay in Sudan.' Arab women were accompanying the attackers singing songs in praise of the government and encouraging the attackers. The women said:

'The blood of the Blacks runs like water, we take their goods and we chase them from our area and our cattle will be in their land. The power of al-Bashir belongs to the Arabs and we will kill you until the end, you Blacks, we have killed your God.'  They also insulted the women from the village saying 'You are gorillas, you are Black, and you are badly dressed.'"

Gingerich and Leaning also report on the racial/ethnic animus in the accounts of rape coming from non-Arab or African women, accounts that make clear the genocidal nature of these assaults: "It is widely reported that during the attacks, the Janjaweed often berated the women, calling them slaves, telling them that they would now bear a 'free child,' and asserting that they (the perpetrators) are wiping out the non-Arabs." (page 15)

Specific dispatches, edited for length, highlight particular instances of rape and sexual violence; they are organized from the most recent to the most distant.  It is a grim and lengthy work in progress, to be found at: http://www.sudanreeves.org/2012/03/04/incidents-of-rape-to-be-read-with-rape-as-a-continuing-weapon-of-war-in-darfur/

Eric Reeves is a Sudan researcher and analyst at Smith College, and author of A Long Day's Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide (Key Publications/Canada, 2007); he has published extensively on Sudan, nationally and internationally, for more than a decade.

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