South Sudan News Agency

If history is any guide, Khartoum’s agreement to the cease-fire terms dictated by the May 2, 2012 UN Security Council Resolution, supported by the African Union, will prove meaningless; follow-up agreements will be signed, and they too will prove meaningless. The National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime has never abided by any agreement with a Sudanese party---and never will, certainly not without much more vigorous international pressure on Khartoum, pressure that is not disabled by a factitious “even-handedness,” a moral equivalency between the NIF/NCP génocidaires and the struggling leadership in Juba.

By Eric Reeves

INTRODUCTION

May 7, 2012 (SSNA) -- That we should be asking with such uncertainty about the fate of a cease-fire agreement that may hold the key to whether Sudan and South Sudan resume war is not surprising.  At countless junctures in the past year and a half, the Khartoum regime has been encouraged to think that it can, without real consequence, abrogate or renounce agreements made with various Sudanese and South Sudanese parties.  The military seizure of Abyei represents only the most conspicuous example.  Present uncertainty, then, is not surprising; what is surprising is how rapidly the international community, and too often news reporting, has lost sight of the historical context out of which our uncertainty grows.  Since fall of 2010 there have been a great many agreements abandoned by Khartoum---indeed, if we are even slightly scrupulous, all agreements the regime has made have been abrogated, renounced, violated, or simply ignored. 

This in turn continues a pattern that stretches back to the beginning of the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime following its military coup in June 1989---a coup, we should recall, deliberately timed to abort the most promising chance for a North/South peace agreement since independence in 1956.  Both the Umma of Sadiq al-Mahdi and the Democratic Unionist Party seemed prepared to reach an agreement with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army.

Instead, unfathomably destructive war continued, in which more than 2 million people were killed, and as many as 5 million displaced.  The human suffering, overwhelmingly by Southern and Nuba civilians, defies all description.  And yet, despite the demands of a UN Security Council resolution on Wednesday, May 2, Khartoum violated the cease-fire on Friday, May 4 according to reports from Juba: Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) used long-range artillery to target Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) positions within the Tishwin, Lalop and Panakuach area of Unity State.  Indeed, on the very day following the UNSC cease-fire demand, backing the African Union peace mediation effort, Juba reported that twelve bombs again targeted Lalop, critically wounding a child and mother.  There are unconfirmed but highly plausible reports of artillery fire into these same areas on Saturday, May 5.  The cease-fire has already been violated by Khartoum.

We should note that the UN Security Council threw its support squarely behind the AU effort despite the fact that the Southern leadership has long been distinctly unhappy with chief AU mediator Thabo Mbeki (as were Darfuris before Southerners).  Even so, it was Juba that first and eagerly embraced the cease-fire proposal and continued AU mediation, even before the Security Council resolution; it was Khartoum that accepted the AU framework only "in principle"---a qualification behind which massive violence is likely to be justified.

We have only to look at comments coming from the Foreign Ministry to see the implications of Khartoum's "acceptance in principle," and its claims that the SPLA is still "occupying" parts of northern Sudan.  Encouraged by the hasty and deeply misguided international effort to describe SPLA seizure of Heglig as an "invasion" of the North, Khartoum is now making a series of commensurately misleading claims:

"[The Foreign Ministry cited] 'continuous aggression and attack from South Sudan's army on Sudanese soil until today.' 'The government of Sudan hopes the other party will commit to stop the hostilities completely and withdraw its troops from the disputed areas so as not to put SAF (Sudanese Armed Forces) in a situation where it has to defend itself,' the ministry added." (Agence France-Presse [Khartoum], May 4, 2012)

Here we see the dangerous result of South Sudan becoming independent without strong international commitment and assistance in resolving border disputes with Khartoum and overseeing final border demarcation.  We can expect to see this excuse for military actions on Khartoum's part for the foreseeable future, even as some of the "disputed" areas are disputed only on the basis of regime intransigence (see, for example, the Rift Valley Institute analysis of the Kafia Kingi area in Western Bahr el-Ghazal, where the January 1, 1956 border conspicuously puts the enclave in South Sudan). Without clearly delineated and demarcated borders, the opportunities for Khartoum to initiate military actions self-described as "self-defense" will be many and continuous. In turn, the grim and dispiriting lessons of Abyei have certainly not been lost on Juba.

Yet again, the international community focuses on only one issue in Sudan

Arguably the most dangerous part of this uneasy "cease-fire" is that it diverts international attention away from the massive humanitarian crises the regime has engineered in other parts of Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan, Blue Nile, the refugee camps for people who have fled from conflict in these regions (more than 100,000 in Upper Nile; likely more than 40,000 in Unity; and perhaps 40,000 in Ethiopia)---and of course Darfur. Relentlessly suffering, and increasingly invisibly, the people of Darfur have been betrayed repeatedly by the international community, most recently and destructively in the form of the widely despised Doha Peace Agreement (July 2011) (see Appendix 1 to Part 1 for a bibliography of recent reports on humanitarian and security conditions in Darfur).  As Darfur was sacrificed on the altar of CPA completion in 2004, at the very height of the genocide---and beyond---so it is again the victim of diplomatic tunnel vision.

Despite increasingly desperate calls from humanitarian organizations, especially those working on food, water, and sanitation, many of these humanitarian efforts remain under-funded and without adequate resources. More dangerously, there is still no access to the Nuba Mountains or displaced persons in Blue Nile.  Although Juba accepted a joint UN/African Union/Arab League proposal for humanitarian access to all in need on February 9---three months ago---Khartoum has recently declared that it is still studying this multilateral proposal, which it again welcomes "in principle."  The clear effort is to wait out the remainder of the dry season, and offer limited access only once the rains have begun (any week now), making delivery inordinately more difficult.

One measure of how little access there is to these desperate regions is the continually recycled figure of "417,000 displaced by fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile."  This figure was first promulgated by the UN in early December 2011 (see a Reuters dispatch of December 13, 2011).  That the figure has not changed in five months---it continues to be regularly cited in a range of dispatches and reports, without any acknowledgement of its original date---is a measure of how little we know about the scale of the catastrophe that is unfolding, largely invisibly; substantial anecdotal reports, however, from a wide range of observers in the Nuba make clear that this number almost certainly vastly understates.  That the UN is not in a position to update this figure---only the relentlessly increasing number of refugees pouring into Upper Nile and Unity States (South Sudan) and Ethiopia---should be a scandal. Instead, the figure is uncritically re-cycled.

Attention remains diverted as well from Abyei, where we are approaching the one-year anniversary of Khartoum's military seizure of the contested region, in violation of the Abyei Protocol and the 2009 ruling by the PCA.  More than 100,000 Dinka Ngok who were forced to flee Abyei to Warrap and other Southern states are still unable to return, and confront grim humanitarian conditions.  There is no evident pressure on Khartoum to withdraw its forces from Abyei, despite a June 20, 2011 commitment to do so with deployment of an Ethiopian peacekeeping force under UN auspices.  Indeed, Khartoum still refuses to negotiate in good faith a Status of Forces Agreement with the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA).  The international community, taking its cue from the U.S., seems content to see the dream of self-determination for the "residents" of Abyei, promised by the CPA, slowly wither away.

The need for historical context

No assessment of prospects for the current cease-fire agreement, such as it is, can possibly be meaningful without taking account of the Khartoum regime's 23 years of relentless abjuring, reneging, renouncing, ignoring, and denial of agreements it has signed or committed to.  That it continues to receive international diplomatic credit for these agreements---despite relentlessly consistent bad faith---of course only encourages the regime to sign more agreements, agreements that it has no intention of abiding by.

This promiscuous agreement-making and -signing is part of what energizes the deeply misguided "moral equivalence" that has stalked Sudan diplomacy for well over a decade.  It is the illusion that the political, diplomatic, and finally moral equities of Southerners and the Khartoum regime are somehow equivalent when they clearly are not.  This is the same illusion that leads U.S. special envoy Princeton Lyman to oppose regime change in Khartoum, and at the same time to declare his confidence in the regime's ability to "carry out reform via constitutional democratic measured." Once Khartoum has been conceded this much, it is no surprise that the results are the very opposite of those Lyman professes to believe possible under this tyrannical regime.

With such a perspective dominant within the international community, we can do no more at present than survey recent and more distant history: the chances that this cease-fire agreement is more likely to hold than Khartoum's commitment to previous agreements can be calculated only on the basis of previous abrogations. 

The present time-line focuses in Part 1 on those agreements Khartoum has made and/or violated in the first five months of 2012. It extends the time-line running through December 31, 2011, which appears here---in revised form---as Part 2.  Part 2 focuses on events leading up to and including the May 2011military seizure of Abyei, which abrogated the agreement represented by the Abyei Protocol of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005), as had the earlier denial of a self-determination referendum to the people "resident" in Abyei, as defined geographically by the 2009 PCA ruling.  The timeline continues through Khartoum's military assaults on Southern Kordofan (June 5, 2011) and Blue Nile (September 1, 2011).

[Significant violations of agreements, signed or committed to, are highlighted by §.  All emphases, bold and italics, throughout these timelines have been added.]

Introduction: A time-line of reneging and bad faith

§ 1999:  As a framework for understanding the agreements to which Sudan has formally committed itself (Parts 1 and 2), we should recall a time when the UN human rights reports on the "situation in Sudan" were actually worth reading---here from May 1999 (E/CN.4/1999/38/17):

"As a Member State of the United Nations, the Sudan is bound by the Charter of the United Nations. Further, it is obliged to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons within its territory, as set out inter alia in the following instruments to which the Sudan has become a party:

the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;

the Convention on the Rights of the Child;

the Slavery Convention, as amended;

the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery;

the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Additional Protocol thereto.

"As a member of the International Labour Organization, the Sudan has ratified its Conventions concerning Forced Labour (No. 29), the Abolition of Forced Labour (No. 105), the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining (No. 98), Employment Policy (No. 122) and Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) (No. 111).

"On 23 September 1957, the Sudan became a party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which set out humanitarian rules for armed conflicts.

"Further, it is to be noted that the Sudan has signed the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Although signature has not yet been followed by ratification, the Sudan has, by signing, shown the intention to accept the obligations under this Convention and, under customary international law, as reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is obligated not to do anything which would defeat the object and purpose of the Convention against Torture, pending a decision on ratification.

"In addition to the obligations arising from conventional international law, the Sudan is also bound to respect the standards of international customary law."

This list of obligations will seem a dismaying grotesquerie to those familiar with the regime's long history of brutal domestic repression, it policy of enslaving Southerners, its massive and continuous violations of the Geneva Conventions to which it is party, the vast crimes against humanity represented by the systematic denial of humanitarian assistance to desperate civilians, as well as by widespread and systematic bombing of civilian and humanitarian targets for more than a decade, its routine use of torture as an instrument of the security forces, and the conspicuous racism embodied not only in the practice of slavery, the widespread institutional exclusion of "Africans," the racial basis for targeted human destruction (including the Nuba and the people of Darfur), but the present practice of "ethnic culling" of the northern population, a policy that de-nationalizes "Southerners" solely on the basis of race and ethnicity (see July 4, 2011 in Part 2).

The violations of these various "agreements" are so utterly routine that only the most dogged human rights organizations continue to make mention of them.

Other agreements violated over the past decade:

§  January 2002: Although usually touted as impressive success, the UN peacekeeping mission in the Nuba Mountains was responsible for securing compliance with an agreement that included, inter alia, the demand that there be no redeployment of military forces.  On signing the agreement, and in direct contravention of its terms, Khartoum immediately took military advantage of the cease-fire and re-deployed two full brigades from South Kordofan to the fighting in the oil regions of what was then Western Upper Nile.  In January 2003 I questioned in Kauda the head of this mission, Norwegian Brigadier-General Jan Erik Wilhelmsen, about the redeployment of the two SAF brigades in violation of the agreement.  The General sniffed contemptuously and said only that "this occurred before I got here."  Such casual acceptance of violations of agreements set the stage for much that would follow.

§  October 2002: Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army signed a "Cessation of Hostilities Agreement."  And yet three months later I was interviewing civilians from Western Upper Nile who had recently been badly wounded by helicopter gunships.  Not until further international pressure in February 2003 was the cease-fire meaningfully observed by Khartoum, in large part because of the superb work of the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) based in Rumbek (Lakes State).

§  2004: The breakthrough Abyei Protocol---negotiated in 2004---was a linchpin in the successful completion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (signed January 9, 2005).  As discussed above and below, Khartoum massively violated this agreement and construed its terms in ways that were contemptibly disingenuous.  Especially conspicuous actions included:

§  July 2005: President Omar al-Bashir refuses to accept the findings of the Abyei Boundaries Commission, established by the CPA and whose membership was agreed to by both Khartoum and Juba.

§  May 2008:  Khartoum's regular and militia forces burn Abyei town to the ground, and in a prelude to the military seizure of May 2011, force many tens of thousands of Dinka Ngok to flee southward to Warrap State.

§  January 2011: efforts by the regime to delay and ultimately prevent the agreed upon self-determination referendum prove fully successful.

March 2011: SAF military deployments captured in satellite photography make unambiguously clear that Khartoum intends to seize Abyei militarily; there is no meaningful response from the international community, which is well aware of what is impending.

§  May 20 - 21, 2011: Khartoum easily moves from its positions of forward deployment to seize Abyei militarily.  A year later, the SAF remains in full military control, despite the presence of an Ethiopian peacekeeping brigade with UN auspices.

[for a detailed timeline of the events in Abyei through late May 2011, see: "An Abyei Timeline: The Long Road to Khartoum's Military Invasion."]

§  2005 - 2011: The various terms of the CPA designed to "make unity attractive" for all Sudanese quickly fall apart, as many of the most powerful officials in Khartoum's security cabal have no intention of fulfilling the terms of the CPA.  Southerners quickly find that whatever portfolio they might nominally hold, a "shadow ministry"---staffed by senior regime officials---wields real control over the ministry portfolio.  Key meetings are either secret or deliberately conducted in an Arabic that goes at a pace and with a colloquial content that often makes it difficult even for those with fluent "Juba Arabic" to keep up with important points of discussion.  This is the regime's vision of "power-sharing."

§  Wealth-sharing quickly became for Khartoum an exercise in bookkeeping obscurantism: we will never know how many billions of dollars altogether were kept from the South by means of accounting legerdemain, but it is a very substantial number.  Khartoum's willingness to cheat on the terms of wealth-sharing were recently underscored when during fighting between Tishwin and Heglig, the SPLA discovered an illegal and surreptitious "tie-in" pipeline designed.

Khartoum also refused to convene in a timely way the boundary commission charged with first delineating and the demarcating the North/South border as it stood on January 1, 1956.  What participation occurred was largely in bad faith, at least at the highest political levels.  The deliberate obstruction of this critical task was, it is now clear, designed to make possible the present militarily ambiguous situations, which profit only Khartoum; Juba gains nothing from such indeterminate borders, and international policing is made infinitively more difficult in the absence of demarcation, indeed even delineation in far too many places.

§  The CPA was also to have afforded "popular consultations" for the people of South Kordofan and Blue Nile; they were to address key outstanding political issues in these long marginalized regions.  Precisely what these "consultations" were to provide, and by what mechanisms, was never adequately specified.  But Khartoum's intentions were easily discerned when in early May 2011 the regime engineered the election of Ahmed Haroun as governor of South Kordofan.  Haroun is under indictment by the International Criminal Court for scores of war crimes and crimes against humanity.  He was put in his present position by Khartoum to continue those crimes against the Nuba.

Although hastily and foolishly ratified by the Carter Center, the South Kordofan elections were yet another violation of the CPA, no matter how we construe "popular consultations."  Moreover, the Carter Center account was subsequently vigorously challenged by a forceful and fully informed critique from the Rift Valley Institute; but the damage had been done, and a month after Haroun's election, South Kordofan was turned into a bloodbath by Khartoum's regular and militia forces

§  October/November 2010: Obama administration officials, including special envoy Scott Gration and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, bring conspicuous pressure to bear on Juba to compromise further on Abyei, despite the compromises already represented in both the Abyei Protocol and Juba's acceptance of the July 2009 ruling on Abyei's boundaries by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.  Senator John Kerry, part-time administration envoy and aspirant to the office of Secretary of State, reveals a contemptible but consequential ignorance in declaring Abyei to be an insignificant "few hundred square miles" standing in the way of peace for millions (in fact, Abyei as defined by the PCA is over 4,000 square miles, almost the size of Kerry's larger neighbor to the south, the state of Connecticut.

§  November 2010: Khartoum begins regular bombings of South Sudan, right up to and following the self-determination referendum of January 9, 2011. Even before the recent massive wave of aerial attacks, there had been more than 40 confirmed attacks on civilians or humanitarians in the South---or attacks so indiscriminate as to have no possible primary military purpose. These attacks violate a wide range of international human rights and humanitarian law.

Part (2012), including Darfur Appendix, can be found at: http://www.sudanreeves.org/2012/05/07/part-1-a-timeline-for-khartoums-abrogation-of-agreements-to-date-in-2012/

Part 2 (2011) can be found at:

http://www.sudanreeves.org/2012/05/05/part-i-a-timeline-for-khartoums-violation-of-agreements-in-2011/

Eric Reeves, a professor at Smith College, has published extensively on Sudan, nationally and internationally, for more than a decade. He is author of A Long Day's Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide.

By Eric Reeves

May 2, 2012 (SSNA) -- The location of Heglig/Panthou has been badly and inaccurately reported for weeks, in no small measure because of diplomatic blundering by the U.S., the European Union, the African Union, and the UN.  A corrective is desperately needed, and we will have no more authoritative account than the substantial overview provided here by distinguished Sudan historian Douglas H. Johnson.  Among his many other qualifications, Johnson was a member of the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) established by the Abyei Protocol of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005).

Let us be clear at this urgent moment: the issue of Heglig/Panthou is of fundamental importance in resolving present military confrontations along the border regions between Unity State (South Sudan) and South Kordofan (northern Sudan), and must be addressed honestly and on the basis of all available information. In light of the present 48-hour countdown to a North/South cease-fire---a deadline set by the UN Security Council this morning (May 2, 2012)---the issue cannot be finessed or avoided. 

It is imperative that UN Security Council members, the AU, the EU, and the U.S. back away from previous peremptory and unjustified assignments of Heglig/Panthou to northern Sudan.  Not to do so will, no doubt, please Khartoum; but it make all-out war distinctly more likely, given the intensity of recent fighting in the Heglig/Panthou region, and the military testing that Khartoum's Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) will undoubtedly begin on the expiration of this 48-hour period.  This is the most likely precipitant of renewed violence, should a cease-fire take hold.

Juba is all too aware of the geographic presumption that has guided previous international pronouncements on Heglig/Panthou; if this presumption persists, the Southern leadership will lose confidence in key members of the international community essential to any peaceful mediation.

Johnson's account full account, with critical historical maps, is available upon request as a PDF attachment; the text alone can be found below.

From his conclusion:

"Given the history of the Panaru area outlined above, any government or international body that declared that Heglig is 'internationally recognized' as part of Sudan has been premature at best and prejudicial to a final resolution at worst.

"The question that has to be resolved, in the terms of the CPA, is whether Panthou/Heglig is east or west of the boundary line established in 1931. If east, it is part of Unity State; if west, it is part of Southern Kordofan. If it is part of Unity, it is part of South Sudan; if it is part of Southern Kordofan it is part of Sudan.

"We know from the above summary that up through 2003 Heglig was generally assumed to be part of what is now Unity State. The boundary changes proposed in the national parliament in 1980 explicitly acknowledged this, as did the 1983 proposed route for the oil pipeline."

[full text]

NOTE ON PANTHOU/HEGLIG

By Douglas H. Johnson, 2 May 2012

THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND

The Rueng Dinka territory of Panaru is at the centre of the debate over the location of Panthou/ Heglig. The Rueng, who are now contained within Unity State in the Republic of South Sudan, neighbour the Ngok Dinka and originally were administered along with them as part of Kordofan Province. Their current location in Unity State, and the disputed location of Panthou/Heglig is the outcome of a series of administrative transfers in the early twentieth century.

At the beginning of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium the Rueng Dinka were found with their cattle as far north as Lake Keilak, in what is now South Kordofan.1  In 1907 it was reported that many of them had left ‘Fanaru [Panaru] in South Kordofan’ for Khor Atar in Upper Nile because of raiding by the Misseriya-Humr.2  By 1913 the Awet section of the Rueng were complaining about further incursions by the Misseriya-Humr on their lands around Lake Jau (or Abiad), where the Awet had settled ‘long before the Arabs came’.3

Map 1: Rueng Dinka sections (Sudan Survey Department, 1:2,000,000 Southern Sudan Map)

When the Nuba Mountains became a separate province in 1913 the Rueng sections were divided between the Nuba Mountains and Kordofan. One branch of Rueng was transferred to the neighbouring southern province of Bahr el-Ghazal in the early 1920s, and in1927, following the decision to re-absorb the Nuba Mountains Province into Kordofan, most of the rest of the Rueng were transferred there, too, on the grounds that they were more easily accessible to the administrators of Bahr el-Ghazal and that they were already in close contact with the Nuer of that province. The boundary rectification between the provinces was made at a local level meeting of the neighbouring District Commissioners.4        

The Rueng were now split between Bahr el-Ghazal and Kordofan, where some Dinka remained as part of the Southern Kordofan District with its headquarters at Kadugli.5   By 1930, however, all Rueng were transferred to the administration of Upper Nile Province, and in 1931 the provincial boundaries were gazetted as follows.6  As a result of the transfer of the Rueng Ajubba the Rueng Await [Awet] and the Rueng Alorr sections of Dinka from Kordofan to Upper Nile Province, the boundary between these Provinces has been altered as follows:-

Commencing from a point on the existing Province Boundary midway between Debba Mongok and Debba Karam Nyet (Lat. 9º 21' Long 28º 38') the boundary runs in an easterly direction until it meets Khor Amadgora. Thence northwards to the Bahr el Arab leaving the village of Rumla Ngork to the Upper Nile. Thence in a N. Easterly direction to the Raqaba ez Zarqa at a point 1/2 mile west of Tibusia, thence along the Raqaba ez Zarqa to 'Aradeib, thence eastward along Lat. 9º 45' to the old Kordofan - Upper Nile boundary, thence north along that boundary and continuing along the old Kordofan N.M.P. boundary to Lat. 10º 5' marked on the map 'Clump of Heglig' thence N. Easterly to a point 3 miles due west of the centre of Lake Abyad [Lake Jau], thence due east to the eastern shore of the Lake, thence S.E. through the Fed Abu Finyer to the Rest House at the point where the Tonga-Talodi road crosses the Haqaba south of Abu Qussa, thence up that Raqaba to where it joins the existing Province Boundary.

This was the official provincial boundary line in effect when Sudan became independent on 1 January 1956. The Sudan Survey 1:250,000 maps 65-H and 65-L on which this boundary was marked (see Map 2), and on which all subsequent maps of the area are based, was last updated for topographical detail in 1937. The area bisected by the line is mainly a blank space. Aside from marking some water sources and the occasional clump of heglig trees (Balanites aegyptiaca, hijlij in Arabic and thou in Dinka) no villages or annual cattle camps, no place names of 'Panthou', 'Aliny' or even 'Heglig' are recorded. The reason is that this area lay outside administrators' usual trek routes. The maps record the main lines of communication and main waterways. They document the limits of administrative knowledge, not the full scale of indigenous settlement.

OIL, NAME CHANGES AND ETHNIC CLEANSING

The discovery of oil in the late 1970s created immediate tensions between the central government in Khartoum and the Southern Regional Government in Juba. Oil was declared a national resource, and official announcements from Khartoum were vague about the location of the main oil fields, stating only that they were located some 500 kms south of Khartoum. The first fields to be developed were given names such as 'Unity' and 'Heglig' which disguised their location, and the Chevron oil company basing its headquarters in Muglad rather than Bentiu. In 1980 the national parliament attempted to redraw the boundaries of Upper Nile Province with the passage of legislation establishing new regional governments in northern Sudan, and the map accompanying the legislation annexed the oil fields to Kordofan. This map was withdrawn after protests from the Southern Regional government.

One of the first fields to be developed was at Panthou, meaning the place or village of the Balanites aegyptiaca in Dinka. The name was changed to Heglig in Arabic. Nimeiri proposed to create a new Unity Region by amalgamating Western Upper Nile District, Abyei and parts of Southern Kordofan, but in the end only Western Upper Nile was renamed Unity when the Southern Region was abolished in 1983 and Upper Nile Region was reconstituted by re-uniting Upper Nile and Jonglei Provinces.

There was also controversy on the siting of an oil refinery to process oil from the field. The decision was made to site the refinery on the White Nile at Kosti, linked to the oil fields by a pipeline. In 1983, shortly before the Bor Mutiny and the outbreak of civil war, an official map of the route of the pipeline was released, showing it starting at the oil fields within Western Upper Nile District, but immediately routed out of Upper Nile into Kordofan, paralleling the Nile until it reached Kosti.7

The civil war brought an end to oil exploitation inside Upper Nile until the 1990s when the Sudanese Armed Forces and allied militias cleared large areas of their civilian populations. The establishment of Sudan’s oil industry in Unity State was accomplished through massive demographic displacement of its indigenous inhabitants, especially along the old provincial boundary lines. The territory of Panaru, in particular, was cleansed of its occupants to make way for the development and expansion of the oil industry.8

Up through 2003 it was generally understood that Panaru, or Heglig, was part of the Unity State administration, and the National Congress Party-appointed governor of Unity State, Dr. Joseph Monytuil described it as such in his 2003 annual report. In mid-2004, as the CPA negotiations were drawing to a conclusion, he was informed by Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie, then Minister of Federal Government Chambers in the office of the Presidency, that he was mistaken, and 'that Heglig does not belong to Unity State as it appeared in your aforesaid map but it belongs to Western Kordofan State as indicated in the accompanying map approved by the National Survey Corporation, for information and correction of the map of Unity State referred to'.9  The accompanying map identifying this correction is not detailed enough to determine whether Heglig is located in relation to the 1931 provincial boundary line at 29° 32' (and some seconds), or the line has been moved east in order to include Heglig in Western Kordofan.

Map 3: Nafie Ali Nafie's 2004 Map

It should be noted that the two protocols of the CPA affecting the division of oil revenues - the Wealth Sharing Protocol (7 January 2004), and the Abyei Protocol (26 May 2004) - were signed before the date of Nafie Ali Nafie's letter (14 June 2004). Placing Heglig in Western Kordofan would therefore have been done in full knowledge that only the revenue from fields within South Sudan would be shared.

HEGLIG AND THE ABYEI BOUNDARIES COMMISSION

It has been commonly asserted that the 2005 Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) allocated Heglig to Abyei, and the 2009 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) finally determined that it was part of Sudan. Neither assertion is strictly correct.

The ABC was tasked to determine the territory of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred from Bahr el-Ghazal to Kordofan in 1905. We were enjoined repeatedly by the members of the government delegation not to take into consideration any developments in the territory that post-dated 1905. This meant in practice that the development of cotton cultivation in the Nyama area, the construction of the railroad passing through Meiram, and drilling of oil wells were irrelevant to our deliberations and were not to be a factor in our decision.

The maps we had at our disposal and which we examined for topographical, demographic and historical evidence therefore did not include details of the recent establishment of the oil industry in and around the area. We did ask the Sudan Survey Authority for copies of the most recent editions of the 1:250,000 maps to compare them with the historic maps we had consulted, but we never received the maps we requested.

Our understanding of the oral testimony we gathered from the Ngok and Rueng groups we spoke to was that Ngok and Rueng territories were contiguous, which is, in fact, how they are depicted on the Sudan Survey 1:2,000,000 tribal map of Southern Sudan (Map 1). We knew from the historical records referred to above that the Rueng were transferred, bit by bit, from Nuba Mountains, Bahr el- Ghazal and Kordofan to Upper Nile, and that the province boundary drawn on the map in 1931 after the final transfer was complete represented the dividing line between Rueng and Ngok territory. We drew our boundary up to that line, which was also the provincial boundary line in existence in 1956.

The ABC did not push the boundary line east in order to include Heglig in Abyei. Heglig is mentioned only once in passing in our report (as part of an SPLM submission which we did not accepted in full), and it does not appear on any of the maps accompanying the report.

If Khartoum moved the boundary to include Panthou/Heglig inside Western Kordofan (as is suggested by Nafie Ali Nafie's 2004 letter and Map 3), that does not affect our decision in any way, since we were using the 1931 boundary as a fixed point on which we could anchor Abyei’s northern boundary line, not the boundary between Western Kordofan and Unity as it was in 2005. Panthou/ Heglig was part of the ABC award only if its location is west of the 1931 boundary line. If its location is in fact east of that line, then it could not have been included in the ABC award.

The PCA did not give the same weight to oral and historical evidence as we did when reviewing the eastern border of the Abyei Area. Their decision to adjust the boundary was based on their assessment that we had not given sufficient reason in the ABC report for adopting the old Kordofan–Upper Nile boundary as the eastern boundary of the Ngok territory.

The PCA made no ruling about Panthou/Heglig itself, or about any other portion of the 1956 boundary line. To do so would have exceeded their mandate, and had the court exceeded their mandate no doubt the Sudan government would have objected.

The government of South Sudan asserted its claim over Panthou/Heglig shortly after the PCA ruling, stating that the issue of Heglig was still to be resolved in the North-South border demarcation process. They have repeated this in their submissions to the North-South Border Technical Committee and to the African Union High Implementation Panel.10

RESOLUTION

Given the history of the Panaru area outlined above any government or international body that declared that Heglig is 'internationally recognized' as part of Sudan has been premature at best and prejudicial to a final resolution at worst.

The question that has to be resolved, in the terms of the CPA, is whether Panthou/Heglig is east or west of the boundary line established in 1931. If east, it is part of Unity State; if west, it is part of Southern Kordofan. If it is part of Unity, it is part of South Sudan; if it is part of Southern Kordofan it is part of Sudan.

We know from the above summary that up through 2003 Heglig was generally assumed to be part of what is now Unity State. The boundary changes proposed in the national parliament in 1980 explicitly acknowledged this, as did the 1983 proposed route for the oil pipeline. If Juba can prove that Khartoum either moved the boundary or falsified the map in 2004 then they win their case.

But it must be remembered that map evidence is only a representation of the situation on the ground. Maps can be imprecise, inaccurate, or false. Testimony, whether documentary or oral, on how the area was administered since 1931 is as important, if not more important, in determining the jurisdiction over Panthou/Heglig. All such evidence should be considered in order to reach a fair and just solution to this dispute.

Douglas H. Johnson   2 May 2012

1 Butler, 'Report on Patrol in Southern Kordofan', 14 February 1902, National Records Office, Khartoum [NRO] CAIRINT 3/5/92.

2 Sudan Intelligence Report [SIR] 154 (May 1907), NRO INTEL 6/5/16.

3 C.C. Marshall, Inspector Talodi, Koweilat Dinkas of Mek Mabior & Mek Fadl-el-Maula Bilkwai, 1 April 1913, NRO Dakhlia I 112/13/84.2

Map 2: Kordofan–Upper Nile Province 1931 boundary line (Sudan Survey 1:250,000 maps 65-H and 65-L)

4 Governor Kordofan Province to Civil Secretary, Khartoum, 3 January 1927 NRO Bahr el-Ghazal Province [BGP] 1/5/30. Sudan Monthly Intelligence Report 399 (October 1927), NRO INTEL 6/16/55.

5 J.A. Gillan, Governor Kordofan to Governor Bahr-el-Ghazal, 1 July 1929, NRO BGP 1/5/30.

6 C.A. Willis, The Upper Nile Province Handbook, Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 1995, p.306; 'Alteration of boundaries between Kordofan and Upper Nile Province', Sudan Government Gazette 546, 15 May 1931, p.115 (Sudan Archive Durham vol. 1931; The National Archives, Kew, FO 867/43).

7 I was shown a copy of this map by the Deputy Commissioner of Upper Nile in Malakal in May 1983 when I was there transferring Malakal's closed files to the Southern Regional Records Office in Juba. He complained, 'First you come to take our archives, now they come to take our oil.'

8 Human Rights Watch, Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights Abuses, New York & Washington, DC, 2003.

9 Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie, Minister, Federal Government Chambers, Khartoum, to Dr. Joseph Monytuil, Governor, Unity State, 14 June 2004.

10 See Luka Biong Deng, 'Abyei and Panthou (Heglig): Clarifying the Deliberate Confusion', Gurtong, 1 May 2012, http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ID/6894/Default.aspx

Eric Reeves, a professor at Smith College, has published extensively on Sudan, nationally and internationally, for more than a decade. He is author of A Long Day's Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide.

By Eric Reeves

April 27, 2012 (SSNA) -- The location of Heglig/Panthou in relation to the North/South border at the time of Sudan's independence (January 1, 1956) continues to be misrepresented by not only the Arab League and African Union, but now (implicitly) by the UN Security Council, which has introduced the threat of sanctions against Khartoum and Juba if the African Union vision of how peace is to be achieved is not followed. Let us recall first the view of the African Union, which on April 14, 2012 "noted with alarm, the occupation of the Heglig by the forces of (South Sudan) ...." (all emphases added)

The U.S State Department followed suit, "strongly condemn[ing] the military offensive, incursion to Southern Kordofan state, Sudan, by the SPLA today [April 12, 2012]." Not to be outdone, the European Union, through EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton asserted that "the move by the South Sudanese armed forces to occupy Heglig is completely unacceptable." Associated Press reports that in Cairo (April 27) the Arab League "condemned South Sudan's 'military aggression' against an oil-rich border region claimed by Sudan while also supporting Sudan's right to defend itself."

I offered an extensive correction to these peremptory and misguided claims, implicit and explicit, on April 14, 2012. What is added here are two additional notes:

[1] The Small Arms Survey in its April 27 report on Heglig reminds us of crucial historical facts:

"Heglig, which is known as Thou (or Panthou) in Dinka, was one of the territories depopulated by militias during the second civil war, when Sudan used paramilitary Popular Defence Forces (PDF) to clear southern residents from areas around oil-producing sites. For many Dinka at the border, accepting Sudan's possession of these territories is tantamount to accepting the ethnic clearings of the 80s and 90s."

More importantly, on the precise location of Heglig in relation to the North/South border at the time of independence (January 1, 1956), Douglas Johnson---distinguished historian of Sudan and a member of the Abyei Boundaries Commission established by the Abyei Protocol---has offered me his own unsurpassably authoritative account of the issue. He indicates (most importantly) that there is no map extant that unambiguously locates Heglig vis-à-vis the 1/1/56 North/South border:

"The 1:250,000 Sudan Survey maps, which are the most detailed, and on which all other maps are based, shows the provincial boundary as it was established in 1931, but they do not show any place with the name Aliny, Panthou, or Heglig. There are 'clumps of Heglig' marked on the map, both east and west of the boundary line, but no villages of any sort or locations with any of those place names. I attach a detail." [ ]

"Until the line of the 1956 border is agreed and re-established on the ground, we won't have an answer to the question of which side of the border Heglig is on." (email received April 26, 2012)

It is important to recall again that the July 2009 Abyei boundary ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration did not place Heglig in northern Sudan or South Sudan; it simply said that Heglig lies to the east of Abyei.

"The eastern boundary of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905 runs in a straight line along longitude 29° 00' 00" E, from latitude 10° 10' 00" N south to the Kordofan---Upper Nile boundary as it was defined on 1 January 1956."

This ruling did nothing to settle where the "1 January 1956 border" actually lies. It had no mandate to make such a determination, and did not attempt to do so. This elemental fact has escaped virtually all international actors, in large part because Heglig has been robustly controlled militarily for a great many years by virtue of Khartoum's militia proxies and ethnic cleansing of precisely the sort Small Arms Survey reports.

Declarations and resolutions that presume to judge the location of Heglig/Panthou prior to a negotiated delineation of the 1/1/56 North/South border will inevitably embolden Khartoum in its ongoing campaign of aerial bombardment against civilians in the unambiguously sovereign territory of South Sudan, and deepen the skepticism of Southern leaders about international impartiality. War is made more, not less likely.

Eric Reeves, a professor at Smith College, has published extensively on Sudan, nationally and internationally, for more than a decade. He is author of A Long Day's Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide.

By Eric Reeves

April 25, 2012 (SSNA) -- Traveling to South Sudan and the Nuba Mountains in January 2003, months after a ceasefire agreement had been signed between North and South, an unnerving conviction, a grim certainty, was expressed to me by every military and civil society official I spoke with, including John Garang, the deceased former leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Army and Sudanese vice president: if war comes again to Sudan, it will be the most destructive of all our wars. This was an extraordinary observation coming from people who had just begun to emerge from a civil war that claimed well over 2 million lives and displaced between 4 and 5 million civilians. The prediction was made not in a bellicose spirit, but as a matter of fact, something that should be clear to anyone who understood the nature of the military forces in the North and the South, and the conduct of war by northern governments, including the current National Islamic Front/National Congress Party (NIF/NCP) regime, between 1983 and 2005. In recent weeks, those terrible premonitions from 2003 seem on the verge of becoming a vast and uncontrollable reality.

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) leadership has long understood, according to numerous Sudanese I have spoken to in the last decade, that there would be no international guarantors of the security arrangements in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), completed in 2004 and finally signed on January 9, 2005. The SPLM/A was adamant about maintaining its own army, because in the event that the NIF/NCP regime violated the peace, no other country would offer meaningful help or protection to the South.

The moment they had feared appears almost at hand. In the last few weeks, the SPLA has repeatedly repulsed a (northern) Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) assault on the border settlement of Tishwin in Unity State, South Sudan. In the process of driving the SAF north, the SPLA temporarily seized the critical oil hub of Heglig, which lies in a complicated and contested border area (Heglig is called Panthou by most Southerners). The fighting was particularly significant in the wake of Khartoum's May 2011 seizure of the large Abyei area just to the west of Heglig---another contested area of immense significance to southerners, and in which Heglig had been placed by the CPA's Abyei Boundaries Commission.

The SPLA withdrew forces from Heglig at the behest of the international community (or, according to Khartoum, pressure from the SAF), but the situation is now explosive. As of today, the northern Sudanese regime was openly bombing targets across the border from Heglig. The NIF/NCP regime, particularly its increasingly militarist generals, was humiliated by the ease of the SPLA victory at Heglig. A vehement, angry rhetoric dominates all its pronouncements, despite concerns about imperiling the infrastructure at a site that produces half of what remains of northern oil production. (Much damage has already been reported, most of it from inaccurate bombing and shelling by the SAF.)

The leadership in Juba, South Sudan, initially demanded as a condition of withdrawal that the UN assure that Heglig would not be used to stage further attacks on the South. (The recent major assault on South Sudan was not the first in recent weeks, and has been accompanied by a steady increase in aerial attacks on southern territory.) But there has been no follow-up on creating a UN buffer zone between the two forces. Further conflict seems inevitable without meaningful diplomatic engagement, which we have yet to see.

Sudan's long civil war was fought between a guerilla insurgency and a national army with substantial assistance from proxy militias. If the recent fighting precipitates war between North and South Sudan, it will be a conflict between two very powerful military forces. The South would have better logistics, communications, and transport than it did during the 1983-2005 conflict, while the SAF will again be fighting far away from Khartoum. The SAF will also have a far more difficult time forcibly conscripting recruits from regions it formerly counted on, including Blue Nile, South Kordofan, Darfur, and South Sudan itself, since it is presently waging war in all those territories.

Perhaps most important, the people of the South generally feel that if war comes, they will be fighting for their survival, given Khartoum’s unconstrained military ambitions. SPLA morale is correspondingly much higher than in the SAF, which is spread very thin. There are credible reports about splits within the SAF over the decision to go to war with South Sudan. Moreover, all evidence suggests that the SAF is being badly mauled by the Sudan People's Liberation Army-North in months of brutal fighting within the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan. Khartoum’s response has been an increasing reliance on bombing, long-range artillery, advanced rocket launchers---"stand-off weaponry"---and the ruthless determination to starve and deny humanitarian assistance to the people of the Nuba Mountains as a way of ending the insurgency. But crushing defeats of the SAF in military encounters with the SPLA-North are increasingly in evidence, and this is taking a significant toll on the larger military force.

Over the past year, fighting has spread from Abyei to South Kordofan to Blue Nile to the border regions, and in each instance Khartoum has been the clear aggressor, evidently convinced that it can somehow seize southern oil fields or create a situation on the ground that will strengthen its negotiating position. The SAF began (or, rather, resumed) indiscriminate aerial assaults on civilians in November 2010, shortly before the southern self-determination referendum. This has accelerated in recent months and weeks; the very recent bombing of Bentiu, a major city and the capital of Unity State, signals a willingness to attack civilians on a large scale.

For its part, the leadership in Juba is bewildered and dismayed. While appropriately fearing the military threat posed by Khartoum, the SPLM/A did not anticipate during peace negotiations that it would be abandoned diplomatically, allowing Khartoum to pick which elements of the CPA Protocols it would observe and which it would ignore. To understand the current dire situation, we must remember that the international community never secured from Khartoum good faith participation in negotiations over delineation and demarcation of the North/South border, per the explicit terms of the CPA.

South Sudanese President Salva Kiir knows that, as the leader of an impoverished new nation with few friends, he must place the diplomatic ball in the international court if negotiations with Khartoum to reduce the present level of violence are to succeed. Unfortunately, he was denied the assistance he needed to de-escalate the fighting in the Tishwin/Heglig area. Instead, Kiir and the South Sudanese leadership stood accused by the UN, the AU, the EU, the UK, and the United States of military aggression against northern Sudanese territory, even though all evidence---from UN observers from the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), journalists on the ground, and oil workers---points to Khartoum as the clear aggressor in both major assaults on Tishwin.

Some of the confusion in international reporting comes from a failure to follow the course of the dispute over the Abyei border region, which Khartoum seized a year ago. Following Khartoum's military assault on Abyei town in May 2008, the southern leadership---convinced that the matter could not be resolved militarily---concluded that "final and binding" arbitration of the Abyei border issue was essential, and succeeded in bringing the matter before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the Hague. Though in many ways unfavorable to Juba, the PCA ruling was nonetheless accepted. Khartoum's land grab last year flouted the court’s "final and binding" ruling, issued in July 2009, which defined the area in which the critical Abyei self-determination referendum was to be held. This abrogation of a key protocol called into serious question Khartoum’s commitment to honor the CPA.

The PCA ruling, it should be noted, did nothing to settle where the "1 January 1956 border" lies. It had no mandate to make such a determination, which was to be determined by post-CPA negotiations between Juba and Khartoum. But feeling no real international pressure, Khartoum never engaged in good faith negotiations on the North/South border, which has shifted steadily southward since 1956.  Indeed, Khartoum used its military to prevent demarcation of areas in Abyei that had already been delineated, as international leaders rarely acknowledge. And yet the South has mostly faced one-sided denunciations for its incursion into Heglig, from the U.S. State Department, the UK minister for Africa, the chief EU foreign policy official, and the African Union. These international actors, along with the UN Security Council, are silent on the seizure of Abyei even though they presume to judge the location of the North/South border, an issue that is very much on the negotiating table so long as Abyei remains occupied by Khartoum. These peremptory judgments unwittingly but effectively encourage the regime to remain intransigent in any future negotiations on the location of the border.

In one of the few sensible diplomatic statements during the present crisis, Norway proposed a Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mission, reiterating a previous proposal that was stymied by Khartoum. Juba likely wishes for nothing so much as an active and robust JBVM Mission. Only Khartoum benefits from ambiguous borders, and an ability to project military power without a clearly defined tripwire. The ambiguity of the border has also permitted the North to build a secret "tie-in" oil pipeline in Heglig that would have had the capacity to siphon off as much as 25,000 barrels of crude from southern oil fields per day.

The outlook for North and South Sudan is extremely bleak. There is no evidence of countervailing forces to bring Khartoum back from its present characterization of the fighting as "South Sudan's blatant invasion of Heglig"---an "invasion" that requires a massive military retaliation. If there is to be a chance of peace, the factitious parceling out of equal blame to Juba and Khartoum must end. To be sure, the odds of changing this decades-long pattern seem exceedingly small next to the likelihood of war.

At the same time, the UNMISS force in South Sudan needs better transport and logistics to ensure that it can re-deploy more rapidly, and should include a Border Verification and Monitoring team like the one Norway proposed. Khartoum will resist, and may make deployment impossible in many areas; this fact should then be made widely known. UNMISS must also be freed of UN political manipulation. Currently, UN political officials conceal most of the mission's findings despite the fact that they make clear that the military actions reported by Southerners and the SPLA have occurred. UN political suppression of observations and investigations that have direct bearing in assigning responsibility for the current military situation is deeply irresponsible.

For border delineation to begin in earnest, substantial diplomatic commitment will be needed. Immediately following delineation of any section of the border, the UN should begin demarcation as a means of creating a credible, effective tripwire along the North/South border to prevent, if possible, future aggressive military actions against the South by Khartoum.

In all likelihood, none of these measures will be taken, with Khartoum's obduracy used to justify diplomatic fecklessness. But the responsibility for that war will not be Khartoum's alone. It will be shared by the international leaders who chose the expedient route, even with millions of lives at risk.

Eric Reeves, a professor at Smith College, has published extensively on Sudan, nationally and internationally, for more than a decade. He is author of A Long Day's Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide.

If all the rich [South Sudanese] and all of the [government ministers in Juba] should send their children to the public schools, they would feel bound to concentrate their money on improving these schools until they met the highest ideals--Susan Brownell Anthony (1820–1906) American civil rights leader.

By PaanLuel Wël, Washington DC, USA, Planet Earth

The indispensability of quality education to the socioeconomic and political development of the war-ravaged Republic of South Sudan can’t be accentuated enough. However, the contemporary pathetic state of educational systems in South Sudan is not one that is conducive enough for the propagation of knowledge to school future leaders and to foster skilled workforce for the propulsion of the South Sudan’s economic prosperity.

It is not just quality of education in South Sudan that is so wanting; there are insufficient numbers of graduates from all levels of educational systems. And worse still, there are fewer than the required numbers of students in either primary or secondary schools and even in higher learning centers of education.

Cognizance of this educational quandary, President Kiir, on his inaugural address to the South Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) at Nyakuron Cultural Centre in Juba, August 8, 2011, conceded, and then promised, that “education remains a major challenge as only a minority of our children has access to education. There is a need to scale up education enrolment quickly all over the country. To demonstrate our seriousness, within the first 100 days of the new government, 30 new primary schools and four new secondary schools will be constructed.”^[1]

Well, the time to witness the fruition of “our seriousness within the first 100 days of the new government” is here. On April 20, 2012, the Minister for General Education and Instruction, Ustaz Joseph Ukel, officially released the results of the South Sudan Certificate of Secondary Education (SSCSE) Examination, 2011.

The ministry of General Education and Instruction reported that there was “general improvement in the performance with 67% scoring at least a C- compared to 2010 when only 34% attained a similar score. Geography is the best-performed subject with 71.3% attaining C-. The worst performed subject is Maths in which only 9.25% obtained C-. The most improved subject is English in which 60.5% of the candidates scored C- compared to 36.9% in 2010. The results of two schools were withheld pending investigations into alleged examination malpractices.”

While 968 candidates registered for the 2011 South Sudan Certificate of Secondary Education (SSCSE) Examinations, only 880 sat the examinations because 88 of the registered candidates didn’t show up for the exams. Of the 880 who sat for the 2011 SSCSE, only 588 of them managed to score a mean grade of C- and above.

Gender-wise, of the 968 candidates registered for the 2011 (SSCSE) Examinations, 742 were boys while 226 were girls. The examination was taken at 27 different secondary schools within 11 counties and across 5 states (namely E.E.S, W.E.S, C.E.S, Lakes, and Jonglei) with E.E.S leading with 14 secondary schools. Unsurprisingly, E.E.S has the lion share of the candidates who sat the 2011 SSCSE exams.

The best overall candidate for the 2011 South Sudan Certificate of Secondary Education (SSCSE) Examinations was Lotara Charles Nyanzi from Magwi Secondary School, Magwi County of Eastern Equatoria State, with a mean score of 11.17 (A-). He was followed by Kon Emmanuel Chol with a mean score of 11.00 (A-) from St. Bakhita Secondary School in Kapoeta East County, Eastern Equatoria State, and Victoria Aledi Akec, third position, with a mean score of 10.83 (A-) from Loreto Girls Secondary School in Rumbek Central County, Lakes State.

The leading secondary school nationwide is Fulla Secondary School from Magwi County, E.E.S, with a mean grade of 7.6633 (B) followed by Kajo-keji Secondary School from Kajo-keji County, C.E.S, with mean grade of 7.0561 (C+). Of the top ten best-performing schools nationwide, 6 are from Eastern Equatoria State.

The best performing boy is Lotara Charles Nyanzi from Magwi Secondary School followed by Kon Emmanuel Chol from St. Bakhita Secondary School.  The best overall girl nationwide is Victoria Aledi Akec from Loreto Girls Secondary School followed by Martha Akuch Majier from Dr. John Garang Memorial Secondary School, Juba County.

For the sake of policy makers and educational analyst in/on South Sudan, here are some prepared data on the 2011 SSCSE examination results:

Top 10 Best Candidates for the South Sudan Certificate of Secondary Education (SSCSE) Examinations, 2011

Candidate’s Name	Sex	State	County	School’s Name	Mean Score	Mean Grade	National Ranking
Lotara Charles Nyanzi	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Magwi Sec. School	11.17	A-	1
Kon Emmanuel Chol	M	E.E.S	Kapoeta East	St. Bakhita Sec. School	11.00	A-	2
Victoria Aledi Akec	F	Lakes	Rumbek Central	Loreto Girls Sec. School	10.83	A-	3
Amba Samuel Ceasar	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	10.67	A-	4
Okeny Paul	M	E.E.S	Torit	Torit Day Sec. School	10.67	A-	4
Okeny Morrish Ochan	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Magwi Sec. School	10.50	A-	6
Irra John Sabazio	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Loa Sec. School	10.33	B+	7
Abraham Marial Akec	M	Lakes	Rumbek East	Hope and Resurrection Sec. School	10.33	B+	7
Oyoo Dominic Albino	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Lobone Sec. School	10.33	B+	7
Martha Akuch Majier	F	C.E.S	Juba	Dr. John Garang Memorial Sec. School	10.17	B+	10
Amaju Joseph Ubur	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Lobone Sec. School	10.17	B+	10
Janda Samsom Lawrence	M	E.E.S	Kapoeta East	St. Bakhita Sec. School	10.17	B+	10

 Top 10 Best Boys for the South Sudan Certificate of Secondary Education (SSCSE) Examinations, 2011

Candidate’s Name	Sex	State	County	School’s Name	Mean Score	Mean Grade	National Ranking
Lotara Charles Nyanzi	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Magwi Sec. School	11.17	A-	1
Kon Emmanuel Chol	M	E.E.S	Kapoeta East	St. Bakhita Sec. School	11.00	A-	2
Amba Samuel Ceasar	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	10.67	A-	3
Okeny Paul	M	E.E.S	Torit	Torit Day Sec. School	10.67	A-	3
Okeny Morrish Ochan	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Magwi Sec. School	10.50	A-	5
Irra John Sabazio	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Loa Sec. School	10.33	B+	6
Abraham Marial Akec	M	Lakes	Rumbek East	Hope and Resurrection Sec. School	10.33	B+	6
Oyoo Dominic Albino	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Lobone Sec. School	10.33	B+	6
Amaju Joseph Ubur	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Lobone Sec. School	10.17	B+	9
Janda Samsom Lawrence	M	E.E.S	Kapoeta East	St. Bakhita Sec. School	10.17	B+	9

 Top 10 Best Girls for the South Sudan Certificate of Secondary Education (SSCSE) Examinations, 2011

Candidate’s Name	Sex	State	County	School’s Name	Mean Score	Mean Grade	National Ranking
Victoria Aledi Akec	F	Lakes	Rumbek Central	Loreto Girls Sec. School	10.83	A-	1
Martha Akuch Majier	F	C.E.S	Juba	Dr. John Garang Memorial Sec. School	10.17	B+	2
Jokudu Josephine	F	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Kajo-keji Sec. School	9.17	B	3
Veronicah Adut Achol	F	Lakes	Rumbek Central	Loreto Girls Sec. School	8.83	B	4
Mandera Hellen Faride	F	E.E.S	Magwi	Loa Sec. School	8.67	B	5
Mandera Grace Kajoki	F	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Pamoju Girls Sec. School	8.50	B	6
Rojo Rose Kwori	F	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Pamoju Girls Sec. School	8.50	B	6
Priscilla Ayen Dhiop	F	Lakes	Rumbek Central	Loreto Girls Sec. School	8.33	B-	8
Luba Paibe David	F	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Pamoju Girls Sec. School	8.33	B-	8
Aziku Cicily Opigo	F	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	8.17	B-	10
Deborah Nyabol Buol	F	E.E.S	Magwi	Nimule Model Sec. School	8.17	B-	10

National Ranking of Secondary Schools in South Sudan for the South Sudan Certificate of Secondary Education (SSCSE) Examinations, 2011

Name	State	County	Number of Candidates	Mean Score	Mean Grade	National Ranking
Fulla Sec. School	E.E.S	Magwi	72	7.6633	B-	1
Kajo-keji Sec. School	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	51	7.0561	C+	2
Loa Sec. School	E.E.S	Magwi	34	6.8918	C+	3
Chukudum Sec. School	E.E.S	Budi	27	6.6911	C+	4
Nile Progressive Sec. School	E.E.S	Magwi	27	6.5189	C+	5
Lire Sec. School	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	25	6.5012	C+	6
Magwi Sec. School	E.E.S	Magwi	55	6.4542	C	7
Pamoju Girls Sec. School	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	31	6.3535	C	8
St. Bakhita Sec. School	E.E.S	Kapoeta East	26	6.3342	C	9
Loreto Girls Sec. School	Lakes	Rumbek Central	8	6.2900	C	10
Lobone Sec. School	E.E.S	Magwi	28	6.2850	C	11
Chukudum Progressive Academy	E.E.S	Budi	20	5.9245	C	12
Jalimo Sec. School	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	14	5.9171	C	13
St. Augustine Sec. School	E.E.S	Ikwoto	30	5.7833	C	14
Hope and Resurrection Sec. School	Lakes	Rumbek East	16	5.6919	C	15
Agola Sec. School	E.E.S	Magwi	29	5.3445	C-	16
Nimule Model Sec. School	E.E.S	Magwi	20	5.2005	C-	17
Nyongwa Sec. School	E.E.S	Magwi	17	5.1276	C-	18
Dr. John Garang Memorial Sec. School	C.E.S	Juba	59	4.7968	C-	19
Alliance High School	Jonglei	Bor	12	4.6675	C-	20
Werkok Sec. School	Jonglei	Bor	11	4.6673	C-	21
Kiri Sec. School	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	28	4.6436	C-	22
Lui Girls National Sec. School	W.E.S	Mundri East	32	4.5831	C-	23
Panekar Sec. School	Lakes	Yirol West	12	4.2367	D+	24
Comboni Sec. School, Mapuordit	Lakes	Yirol West	24	4.1942	D+	25
Torit Day Sec. School	E.E.S	Torit	167	4.1893	D+	26
Borongole Sec. School	E.E.S	Magwi	5	3.9660	D+	27
MEAN SCORE FOR THE 2011 SSCSE EXAMINATION				5.6667	C

Top 100 Best Candidates for the South Sudan Certificate of Secondary Education (SSCSE) Examinations, 2011

Candidate’s Name	Sex	State	County	School’s Name	Mean Score	Mean Grade	National Ranking
Lotara Charles Nyanzi	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Magwi Sec. School	11.17	A-	1
Kon Emmanuel Chol	M	E.E.S	Kapoeta East	St. Bakhita Sec. School	11.00	A-	2
Victoria Aledi Akec	F	Lakes	Rumbek Central	Loreto Girls Sec. School	10.83	A-	3
Amba Samuel Ceasar	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	10.67	A-	4
Okeny Paul	M	E.E.S	Torit	Torit Day Sec. School	10.67	A-	4
Okeny Morrish Ochan	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Magwi Sec. School	10.50	A-	6
Irra John Sabazio	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Loa Sec. School	10.33	B+	7
Abraham Marial Akec	M	Lakes	Rumbek East	Hope and Resurrection Sec. School	10.33	B+	7
Oyoo Dominic Albino	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Lobone Sec. School	10.33	B+	7
Martha Akuch Majier	F	C.E.S	Juba	Dr. John Garang Memorial Sec. School	10.17	B+	10
Amaju Joseph Ubur	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Lobone Sec. School	10.17	B+	10
Janda Samsom Lawrence	M	E.E.S	Kapoeta East	St. Bakhita Sec. School	10.17	B+	10
Ochola Bin Odol	M	E.E.S	Kapoeta East	St. Bakhita Sec. School	10.00	B+	13
Talib Paskwali Beshir	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	9.83	B+	14
Andruga Christopher	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Nile Progressive Sec. School	9.83	B+	14
Lemi Richard Augustine	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	9.67	B+	16
Modi Bilal Joseph	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Loa Sec. School	9.67	B+	16
Odera Charles Ogeno	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Lobone Sec. School	9.67	B+	16
Ochiti Richard Patrick	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Magwi Sec. School	9.67	B+	16
Cube Charles Francis	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	9.50	B+	20
Peter Ador Kuer	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	9.50	B+	20
Sebit Moses Drali	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	9.50	B+	20
Wani David Emilio	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	9.50	B+	20
Mangisto Simon Bilan	M	E.E.S	Budi	Chukudum Progressive Academy	9.50	B+	20
Keri Geofrey Koma	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Loa Sec. School	9.50	B+	20
Ongori Peter Akai	M	E.E.S	Ikwoto	St. Augustine Sec. School	9.50	B+	20
Lotiki A. Johnson	M	E.E.S	Budi	Chukudum Progressive Academy	9.33	B	21
William Lovito Arksen Gazebo	M	E.E.S	Budi	Chukudum Sec. School	9.33	B	21
Ijjo Simon Samuel	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	9.33	B	21
Wani Innocent Pitia	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	9.33	B	21
Nyika Emmanuel James	M	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Kajo-keji Sec. School	9.33	B	21
Sokiri Jackson	M	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Kajo-keji Sec. School	9.33	B	21
Garang Abraham Chol	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	9.17	B	27
Inyani Emmanuel John	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	9.17	B	27
Maliap Madit Mabior	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	9.17	B	27
Malou John Deng	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	9.17	B	27
Onoma John Omony	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	9.17	B	27
Jame Simon Nyombe	M	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Jalimo Sec. School	9.17	B	27
Jokudu Josephine	F	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Kajo-keji Sec. School	9.17	B	27
Loku Jimmy Dima	M	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Kajo-keji Sec. School	9.17	B	27
Onyango Morrish Richard	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Magwi Sec. School	9.17	B	27
Otim Robert Matata	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Magwi Sec. School	9.17	B	27
Taban Joseph Lino	M	C.E.S	Juba	Dr. John Garang Memorial Sec. School	9.00	B	37
Kenyi Michael Augustine	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	9.00	B	37
Odoch Peter Denis	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	9.00	B	37
Mono Isaac soma	M	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Kajo-keji Sec. School	9.00	B	37
Drichi Godwill Mogga	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	8.83	B	41
Drici Isaac Mark	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	8.83	B	41
Mono Emmanuel Geri	M	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Jalimo Sec. School	8.83	B	41
Jede Benet Gale	M	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Kajo-keji Sec. School	8.83	B	41
Kenyi Friday Ladu	M	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Kajo-keji Sec. School	8.83	B	41
Veronicah Adut Achol	F	Lakes	Rumbek Central	Loreto Girls Sec. School	8.83	B	41
Nyeko Bosco Taban	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Magwi Sec. School	8.83	B	41
Alue Tom Albert	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Nile Progressive Sec. School	8.83	B	41
Mawa Solomon Jackson	M	E.E.S	Ikwoto	St. Augustine Sec. School	8.83	B	41
Oler Johnstone Imalio	M	E.E.S	Kapoeta East	St. Bakhita Sec. School	8.83	B	41
Samuel Arite Mauro Lohitamoi	M	E.E.S	Budi	Chukudum Progressive Academy	8.67	B	51
Batal Jacob David	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	8.67	B	51
Lagu William Elizeo	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	8.67	B	51
Owor Peter Simon	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	8.67	B	51
Thon Philip Awuoi	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	8.67	B	51
Ocheng Mohammed Tabu	M	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Kajo-keji Sec. School	8.67	B	51
Muludyang Chaplain Wudu	M	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Kiri Sec. School	8.67	B	51
Mandera Hellen Faride	F	E.E.S	Magwi	Loa Sec. School	8.67	B	51
Oryem James Victor	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Lobone Sec. School	8.67	B	51
Oyom Charles Sam	M	E.E.S	Ikwoto	St. Augustine Sec. School	8.67	B	51
Onek James	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Agola Sec. School	8.50	B	61
William Lopeyok Natemo Limir	M	E.E.S	Budi	Chukudum Sec. School	8.50	B	61
Dhieu Jacob Ajak	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	8.50	B	61
Giet Alaak Bul	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	8.50	B	61
Lokeya Amos Lamuk	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	8.50	B	61
Murecu Samuel Amos	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	8.50	B	61
Wani Emmanuel Jacob	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	8.50	B	61
Poni Betty Bugga	M	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Kajo-keji Sec. School	8.50	B	61
Abucha Joseph Odego	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Loa Sec. School	8.50	B	61
Mandera Grace Kajoki	F	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Pamoju Girls Sec. School	8.50	B	61
Rojo Rose Kwori	F	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Pamoju Girls Sec. School	8.50	B	61
Abuni James Kassim	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	8.33	B-	72
Kur Peter Riem	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	8.33	B-	72
Stephen Loro Wani	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	8.33	B-	72
Yai Tong Deng	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	8.33	B-	72
Roba Michael Maika	M	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Kajo-keji Sec. School	8.33	B-	72
Unzi Michael	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Loa Sec. School	8.33	B-	72
Vuciri Richard John	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Loa Sec. School	8.33	B-	72
Priscilla Ayen Dhiop	F	Lakes	Rumbek Central	Loreto Girls Sec. School	8.33	B-	72
Luba Paibe David	F	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Pamoju Girls Sec. School	8.33	B-	72
Lodai Abraham Paul	M	E.E.S	Ikwoto	St. Augustine Sec. School	8.33	B-	72
Lokuju David Lino Chamuka	M	E.E.S	Budi	Chukudum Sec. School	8.33	B-	72
Daniel Mayen Nyariel	M	Lakes	Yirol West	Comboni Sec. School, Mapuordit	8.33	B-	72
SORO CHAPLAIN LUKANG	M	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Lire Sec. School	8.33	B-	72
Otim William Lam	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Magwi Sec. School	8.33	B-	72
Gabriel Wuor Monyluak	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Nimule Model Sec. School	8.33	B-	72
Wani Joseph Tombe	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Nimule Model Sec. School	8.33	B-	72
Loku Alex Simba	M	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Kajo-keji Sec. School	8.17	B-	88
Aziku Cicily Opigo	F	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	8.17	B-	88
Michael Okot Barnabas	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Lobone Sec. School	8.17	B-	88
Amoko Charles Ben	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Nile Progressive Sec. School	8.17	B-	88
Lopeche Peter Clement	M	E.E.S	Ikwoto	St. Augustine Sec. School	8.17	B-	88
Ali Abdulbagi Nurein	M	E.E.S	Kapoeta East	St. Bakhita Sec. School	8.17	B-	88
Santino Duang Maker	M	C.E.S	Juba	Dr. John Garang Memorial Sec. School	8.17	B-	88
YUGA BENSON MOGGA	M	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Lire Sec. School	8.17	B-	88
Olweny Thomas Alfred	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Magwi Sec. School	8.17	B-	88
Onek James William	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Magwi Sec. School	8.17	B-	88
Ongwen Peter Ojara	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Magwi Sec. School	8.17	B-	88
Deborah Nyabol Buol	F	E.E.S	Magwi	Nimule Model Sec. School	8.17	B-	88
Lokorio Hellen Naboi Akie	F	E.E.S	Budi	Chukudum Sec. School	8.00	B-	100
Sebit Ramadan Musa	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Fulla Sec. School	8.00	B-	100
Loduro Moses Elikana	M	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Kajo-keji Sec. School	8.00	B-	100
Tomor Fred Wani	M	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Kajo-keji Sec. School	8.00	B-	100
Kenyi Bosco Chau	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Loa Sec. School	8.00	B-	100
Kenyi Francis	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Loa Sec. School	8.00	B-	100
Oyira Joseph John	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Nile Progressive Sec. School	8.00	B-	100
Jaguru Stella	F	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Pamoju Girls Sec. School	8.00	B-	100
Juan Janet	F	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Pamoju Girls Sec. School	8.00	B-	100
Celerino Peter Ocele	M	E.E.S	Ikwoto	St. Augustine Sec. School	8.00	B-	100
Lotiira Joseph Lokwar	M	E.E.S	Kapoeta East	St. Bakhita Sec. School	8.00	B-	100
LOGURIYA-NG ALEX WANI	M	C.E.S	Kajo-keji	Lire Sec. School	8.00	B-	100
Okot James Peter	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Magwi Sec. School	8.00	B-	100
Drici James Marcelo	M	E.E.S	Magwi	Nyongwa Sec. School	8.00	B-	100

It is my sincere hope that this small effort of mine would help South Sudanese and others make sense of the 2011 South Sudan Certificate of Secondary Education (SSCSE) examination results released by the Ministry of Education from Juba on April 20, 2012.

PaanLuel Wël ( This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it ) is the Managing Editor of PaanLuel Wël: South Sudanese Bloggers. He can be reached through his Facebook page, Twitter account or on the blog: http://paanluelwel2011.wordpress.com/

By Eric Reeves

April 23, 2012 (SSNA) -- The stench of hypocrisy and expediency is in the air wherever one turns in assessing international responses to recent events in Sudan.  The deeply imbalanced reactions to the seizure of Heglig by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) give us our starkest picture to date of how selective and tendentious the world is prepared to be in creating a narrative for the present multiple crises that threaten war in Sudan and South Sudan.  And in their attempts to achieve a factitious "even-handedness," various actors---including the UN, the U.S., the AU, and the EU---have encouraged Khartoum to believe that it has somehow gained the diplomatic, even moral upper hand.  It is difficult to imagine a more dangerous response to have encouraged, and the currently ongoing offensive military actions against South Sudan by the regime's Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) stand as stark confirmation.

Notably, international reaction has worked to encourage the most vehemently bellicose language on the part of Field Marshal and President Omar al-Bashir, who has very recently declared that (northern) Sudan is now essentially at war with South Sudan, and that Khartoum's military ambition is to destroy the "insect" government in Juba.  We have heard such language of racial contempt many times from al-Bashir's regime; in this instance it is difficult not to recall the infamously ubiquitous calls in Rwanda in 1994 for the destruction of Tutsi "cockroaches."  

Certainly during the widespread ethnic slaughter in Kadugli (South Kordofan), beginning in June 2011, we repeatedly heard reports of similar racial contempt. "Yusef," a Nuba from Kadugli, told Agence France-Presse and The Independent (UK) that he had been informed by a member of the notorious Popular Defense Forces (PDF) that they had been provided with plenty of weapons and ammunition, and a standing order: "He said that they had clear instructions: 'just sweep away the rubbish. If you see a Nuba, just clean it up.' He told me he saw two trucks of people with their hands tied and blindfolded, driving out to where diggers were making holes for graves on the edge of town."

This racial contempt and hatred, combined with a jihadist rhetoric, has already proved a potent brew in Khartoum, where on Saturday (April 21) various news agencies have reported the destruction of the Presbyterian Evangelical Church.  Following an incendiary sermon by a nearby Muslim cleric during Friday evening prayers, hundreds of Muslims attacked and destroyed the church.  Reuters offers the most authoritative account:

"Hundreds of Muslims stormed a Christian church complex used by southerners in Khartoum at the weekend, witnesses said, raising fears that recent clashes between Sudan and South Sudan were stoking ethnic tensions in the city. The attackers ransacked buildings, knocked down walls and burned Bibles on Saturday, Youssef Matar, secretary general of the Presbyterian Evangelical Church told Reuters."

"The attack on the church came a day after South Sudan's army pulled out of the key Heglig oilfield, an area it seized from Sudan in the worst violence between the two countries since secession.  Sudan quickly declared victory over its former civil war foe, prompting widespread celebrations in Khartoum. A Muslim preacher known for fiery sermons took advantage of the excited climate to call for 'jihad' against Christians during Friday evening prayers, prompting hundreds to attack the church complex the next day, Matar said."

The attack represents a terrible precedent in Khartoum, especially given the ineffectual presence of security forces:

"'No one could believe it. Nothing like this has ever happened before,' Matar said. While Sudan is known for long and bitter conflicts fuelled by religious and ethnic animosity, communal violence in the capital is relatively rare. But communities also live separately for the most part and distrust between them often runs deep. Ethiopians, Eritreans and Indians, as well as Christians from Sudan and South Sudan, use the church, Matar said. A Reuters witness on Sunday saw smoke rising from some of the trees on the church compound, and security vehicles waiting nearby."  (Reuters [Khartoum], April 22, 2012) (emphasis added)

We should expect to hear very little about this terrible incident from the unctuous UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon or other feckless international actors, certainly no condemnation commensurate with this state-sanctioned attack on a place of worship. What we may sure of, given the details of this dispatch, is that this assault was tacitly sanctioned by the regime's security forces, who in turn have no difficulty discerning what they are to do in restraining, or allowing, racially and religiously motivated attacks on Southerners. 

In fact, the ethnic culling of Southerners has been looming for many months, and on April 8 became regime policy, stripping as many as 700,000 "Southerners" of their nationality solely on the basis of ethnicity. No internationally recognized standards for de-nationalizing citizens have been observed or even promulgated.  And yet again, there has been no urgent or appropriately forceful international condemnation of this ruthless policy of de-nationalizing those judged ethnically "Southern."

Sadly, our best guide to the world's responses to Khartoum's current multiple violations of international human rights and humanitarian law can be discerned in previous perfunctory responses to cross-border aerial assaults on South Sudan, going back to November 2010.  These attacks include multiple, deliberate bombings of civilian targets, including the refugee camp at Yida (Unity State) on November 10, 2011. International response has been equally indecisive in the face of Khartoum's campaign of ethnic annihilation by means of starvation in northern border states, a campaign that has been underway in the Nuba Mountains for over ten months and in Blue Nile for almost eight months.  Khartoum's campaign is a ghastly reprise of the genocidal assault on the Nuba in the 1990s, a fact that seems to inform almost none of the present desultory discussions about the future of these people, even as heavy and isolating seasonal rains are impending.

Of a piece with the this perverse diffidence is the refusal to credit fully the massive evidence of atrocity crimes committed by Khartoum's regular and militia forces in Kadugli, including definitive evidence of mass graves that may hold many thousands of Nuba---evidence that includes both substantial satellite photography and eyewitness accounts gathered by a wide range of sources, including the UN human rights team present in Kadugli in June 2011. Skepticism on this matter by the Obama administration, and special envoy Princeton Lyman in particular, has been a shameful episode in U.S. Sudan policy, which has been conspicuously misguided from the beginning of Obama's presidency.

There is a grimly revealing and familiar history leading to current international failures, one that may be readily traced.  Certainly at key moments in the build-up to Khartoum's military seizure of Abyei (May 20-21, 2011) the international community refused to condemn the clearly impending assault---or to respond subsequently with anything approaching the misguided fervor that has defined international reactions to SPLA actions following SAF military assaults originating in Heglig.  There has been, for example, no meaningful demand that Khartoum demilitarize Heglig, or allow deployment of a UN buffer force, as requested by Juba as the basic condition for its military withdrawal.  Instead, there has been merely rhetorical posturing; and again the Obama administration---and President Obama himself---have seemed especially culpable, particularly in light of earlier deeply misguided administration efforts to compel Juba to "compromise" further on the nearby Abyei region (fall 2010). 

At the time, such efforts---by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, special envoy Scott Gration, and part-time envoy and prevaricator Senator John Kerry---attempted to foist on Juba more "compromises" than were already embodied in the Abyei Protocol of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA, 2005) and the ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on Abyei's boundaries (July 2009).  Nor, we should recall, did the U.S. object meaningfully when the findings of the Abyei Boundaries Commission were peremptorily rejected by Khartoum (July 2005), or when Khartoum's regular and militia forces mounted a brutal assault on Abyei town and its surroundings (May 2008).  Failures of U.S. policy in Sudan have been thoroughly bipartisan, despite the critical U.S. role in securing the CPA.

Given the tense history of the region, SAF military seizure of Abyei represented an extraordinary provocation, as did the consequent forced displacement of more than 100,000 Dinka Ngok into South Sudan. Juba did not respond militarily, and yet watched in deepest anger.  For the international community was in effect sanctioning the permanent displacement of these indigenous people; certainly in the significantly reduced area defined as "Abyei" by the PCA, the Dinka Ngok were unquestionably the only "residents" and thus the only ones guaranteed (by the CPA) the right to vote in the self-determination referendum scheduled for January 9, 2011. 

Encouraged by misguided U.S. policy expediency on Abyei, Khartoum all too predictably refused to allow the Abyei self-determination referendum to take place.  Unsurprising, given its previous diplomatic posture, the Obama administration largely ignored this abrogation of the Abyei Protocol, evidently in the interests of preserving at all costs the self-determination referendum in the South.  Southerners, for their part, may be forgiven for believing that the U.S. justified such acquiescence before Khartoum's unilateral decision on the basis of Juba's "refusal to compromise" yet further on Abyei in fall 2010.

With its unerring nose for hypocrisy, Khartoum watched this history of Abyei unfold over a period of six years and calculated---all too accurately---that there would be minimal consequences for a final abrogation of the Abyei Protocol.  And after its military seizure of Abyei, the regime also calculated that it could sign an agreement on June 20, 2011---committing it to withdraw its forces from Abyei with deployment of an Ethiopian peacekeeping brigade under UN auspices---and then simply renege on the agreement, also without consequences.  Yet again, this cynical calculation proved all too accurate.

If we turn from these obtuse and expedient responses to Khartoum's annexation of Abyei---and annexation is precisely what the international community has countenanced, despite various pro forma objections---and examine in this context the international response to the SPLA's retaliatory and defensive occupation of Heglig---from which it has now withdrawn---it is impossible not to be struck by the radical asymmetry.

Implications 

Certainly the leadership in Juba has taken stock of what has transpired over the past ten days, and is even now re-calibrating what it can and cannot count on from the international community.  The Southern leadership has seen its extraordinary military forbearance over the past eighteen months essentially dismissed, even as Khartoum continues to test that forbearance by means of ever more provocative actions (multiple sources report SAF attacks across a range of territory in Unity State today).  These re-calibrations by Juba will be tough-minded, fully prepared to encounter future international hypocrisy, and even more determined to protect the territorial integrity of South Sudan.  Certainly the international community will no longer have the influence it had even a month ago.

Khartoum of course is also recalibrating its military policies, and the largest conclusion the regime has drawn is that it may continue its longstanding military policy of aerial attacks on civilian and humanitarian targets in the sovereign territory of South Sudan without meaningful consequences, and that it can continue is campaigns of annihilation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.  The regime has been persuaded, on the basis of ample evidence, that even South Sudan's putative friends regard "sovereignty" as one thing for Khartoum and quite another for Juba.

It is hard to see a greater encouragement to war.

Eric Reeves is a Sudan researcher and analyst at Smith College, and author of A Long Day's Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide (Key Publications/Canada, 2007); he has published extensively on Sudan, nationally and internationally, for more than a decade.

By Eric Reeves

April 17, 2012 (SSNA) -- We now have side-by-side reports on Darfur---one from the present, politically hand-picked UN team and the other from three distinguished former members of the panel who felt obliged to resign because the UN would not allow them to do their job in appropriately professional fashion, with appropriately professional colleagues. Africa Confidential broke the story last week (April 13), and provides important insights into the larger implications of the marked contrasts in substance and authority between the two reports (links at the end of the AC dispatch).  Both are dated January 24, 2012---one month prior to the New York Times dismayingly misleading report from Nyuru, West Darfur.  And in the malfeasance, ineptitude, and sheer political manipulation that underlies the "official report," we begin to see just how tainted are the "sources" cited by the NYT in its dispatch. 

Following the Africa Confidential dispatch, I offer here the first part of a detailed account of the discrepancies between the two reports, and what these discrepancies suggest of UN performance in Darfur, particularly that of UNAMID.  It should be recalled that the senior UNAMID official for West Darfur, Dysane Dorani, figured prominently in the NYT dispatch, declaring rapturously: "It's amazing. The people are coming together. It reminds me of Lebanon after the civil war."  But on the basis of its reading of the two reports, Africa Confidential reaches a conclusion precisely the opposite of that offered by the NYT correspondent in Nyuru, who found in this one location "a sign that one of the world’s most infamous conflicts may have decisively cooled" (emphasis added):

"[The report] argues that the Darfur crisis, far from winding down as Khartoum and some press reports suggest, is worsening, with new incidents of ethnic cleansing, arms deliveries and aerial bombing."

Something is deeply wrong here, and we are compelled to choose between the meticulous, professional work of Darfur experts who spent a tremendous amount of time on the ground in gathering evidence on which to base their lengthy, fully documented report---and a quick in-an-out look during a single, UN-orchestrated visit to a particular location in West Darfur, with constant surveillance by Khartoum's Military Intelligence and NISS.  Choose we must, for there is no middle ground between the two accounts.

UN clash over Beijing bullets claim

UN experts' reports differ over Darfur arms violations
Africa Confidential 13th April 2012 (Vol 53 No 8)

http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/4417/UN_clash_over_Beijing_bullets_claim

A seismic diplomatic row is rumbling at United Nations headquarters in New York over the circulation of a damning report by former UN experts pointing to the supply of Chinese-made ammunition to the Sudan government for use against civilians in Darfur. The row exposes fresh divisions on Sudan at the UN Security Council and disarray in Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s office. It may also unpick Beijing’s careful diplomacy as it seeks to realign its relations between Sudan and South Sudan.

The report, which is circulating clandestinely at UN headquarters, was written by three of the original members of the UN's Panel of Experts, which monitors violations of the UN arms embargo in Darfur. It argues that the Darfur crisis, far from winding down as Khartoum and some press reports suggest, is worsening, with new incidents of ethnic cleansing, arms deliveries and aerial bombing. Africa Confidential has obtained two separate reports on Darfur (available to download at the end of this article), one commissioned by Ban’s Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe, which is highly conservative in its findings, and a more forthright, detailed unofficial version by the three specialists who resigned from Pascoe’s appointed Panel on Darfur in 2011.

Weapons experts Mike Lewis (Britain) and Claudio Gramizzi (Italy), and Darfur and Chad specialist Jérôme Tubiana (France) resigned, Africa Confidential has learned, after Pascoe’s department declined to take seriously their complaints about the standards of competence and neutrality on the Panel. The trio have now sent their own report - with lengthy annexes - to the Security Council. This unofficial report details Sudan army ammunition found in Darfur that appeared to be Chinese-made. Some may have been made in the Sudan Technical Centre, a Sudanese military company in Khartoum. The findings upset China, which says the report is not an official document and should not be given a hearing. Diplomats from the United States and Britain are nonetheless backing the report in private.

Targeting Zaghawa

The report also documents the role of the government’s officials and Popular Defence Force militia in recruiting non-Arab militia for a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Zaghawa tribe. The leader of one wing of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, Minni Arkou Minnawi, is Zaghawa. He angered Khartoum by recently withdrawing from the Darfur Peace Agreement, which he had signed in Nigeria in 2006. Deploying non-Arab militia is a new tactic for Khartoum, which has long used Arab Janjaweed to kill. The report says that up to 70,000 civilians have fled their homes in Darfur since recent attacks in 2011, the highest number since the conflict peaked in 2003-06.

It also describes in detail the presence in Darfur of suspect Antonov aircraft from Ukraine. The former Experts obtained photographic evidence of at least one such aircraft parked next to aerial bombs. At least two such aircraft have been serviced in Ukraine and have flown through European airspace in 2009 and 2010. Lewis, Tubiana and Gramizzi also reported aerial bombing of civilians in the Zaghawa strongholds of Shangal Tobay in early 2011; the use of an Armenian-registered Ilyushin to ship cargo between Khartoum and Darfur for the army; and also five Sukhoi ground attack fighters, which the Belarus government confirmed were part of a consignment of 25 bought in 2008-10. A Sudan People's Liberation Movement official told AC this suggested Khartoum had long planned to attack South Sudan.

These revelations come as the main Darfur insurgent groups consolidate their military and political cooperation with the SPLM/Army-North in the Sudan Revolutionary Front. This new alliance poses problems for UN policy-makers in New York who have to coordinate a global Sudan strategy through two separate peacekeeping operations, the AU-dominated UN-African Union hybrid Mission in Darfur and the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Neither addresses the growing crisis in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states and the Nuba Mountains. Khartoum banned UNMISS's predecessor, the UN Mission in Sudan, after South Sudan’s Independence last July.

In stark contrast, the official UN report was submitted to the UNSC in February by a new Panel appointed by Pascoe and led by Debi Prasad Dash of India. It has just four paragraphs on attacks against civilians in Darfur and was unable to confirm Khartoum's role in targeting the Zaghawa. It also contains little on current arms embargo violations. Although it sometimes criticises Khartoum piecemeal, it lacks analysis of political or military policy. It often appears to take Khartoum's assurances at face value, for example, that the Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicle, which rebels shot down in Darfur in 2008 and which the UN examined, was there to monitor locusts (AC Vol 49 No 18, The drones club & AC Vol 53 No 6, Opposition turns up the heat). Russia has blocked its publication at the UNSC because it mentions Khartoum's use of Russian incendiary bombs in Darfur in 2009.

The new panellists are Issa Maraut, a French diplomat once based in Khartoum; Brian Johnson-Thomas, a British arms expert; Mohammed Moufid, a retired Moroccan aviation official; and Rania el Rajji, a Lebanese human rights consultant, formerly with Amnesty International.

[full texts of both reports at end of AC dispatch on-line: http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/4417/UN_clash_over_Beijing_bullets_claim]

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There are any number of extremely serious questions that emerge from any side-by-side comparison of the two reports, and I highlight here only a first set of some of the most egregious contrasts:

[1]  The Tabarat massacre of September 2010, the single most violent event in 2011 - 2012.  It continues to be the case that this attack has not been investigated by the UN, by UNAMID, or by the "official" UN Panel of Experts on Darfur, despite its brutal savagery; instead the UN Panel chose as its terminus a quo October 2010, which conveniently excluded September.  This is more than peculiar: it smacks of a cover-up by deliberate omission.  To be sure, the previous Panel had submitted its report in October 2010, and the report of the current "official" Panel covered the period October 2010 - January 2012.  But the report of the previous Panel, as the new Panel was well aware, reflected findings only through August 2010.  We must conclude that the decision not to accept investigative responsibility for the widely reported September 2010 Tabarat massacre was at best an act of cowardly avoidance, at worst part of a larger conspiracy of silence with UNAMID, which had a base very near by, but deferred to Khartoum's demand that they not approach Tabarat.

In contrast to this feckless subservience, Reuters offered an account (September 17, 2010) that demanded a meaningful investigation:

"Darfuri men were shot dead at point blank range during a surprise Arab militia raid on a busy market this month in which at least 39 people were killed and almost 50 injured, eyewitnesses said on Friday. The attack on civilians was reminiscent of the early years of the counter-insurgency operation in Sudan’s west, which took up arms against the government in 2003, complaining that the region had been neglected by Khartoum The International Criminal Court in The Hague has since issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir for genocide and war crimes in Darfur, charges he denies."

"Details of the September 2 attack on the market in the village of Tabarat have not previously come to light. The government prevented peacekeepers from visiting the site until days later. But five survivors of the attack told Reuters that heavily armed Arab militia had targeted male victims and shot many at point blank range. One diplomat said the militia were likely from among those armed and mobilized by the government to quell the rebels. Those militia, known as Janjaweed, were responsible for mass rape, murder and looting. Many of the tribal militia still support the government but Khartoum has lost control over some."

"In Tabarat, men were rounded up by militia wearing military uniforms who rode into the market on horses and camels pretending to be buying goods before spraying the shops with gunfire. Then vehicles mounted with machine guns and carrying militia fighters appeared and rounded up some of the men, survivors said. 'They laid them down and they came up close and shot them in their heads," Abakr Abdelkarim, 45, told Reuters by telephone from the town of Tawilla, where many of the victims had sought refuge and medical help. '(Those killed) were all men and one woman - some men were tied with rope behind the cars and dragged until they died.'"

The fact that the Tabarat massacre was never investigated, by any UN Panel of Experts on Darfur, must have weighed heavily in the decision by the three former Experts to resign.  For failure to investigate the Tabarat massacre is a permanent stain on UN peacekeeping, and those with the political responsibility to see that mass atrocity crimes are investigated.

[2]  The "official" Panel of Experts offered only a very superficial account of events in eastern Darfur, especially in the Shangal Tobay region, where violence flared viciously in the wake of Minni Minawi's defection from the Khartoum regime in late 2010.  But the Panel Experts who resigned investigated much more fully, spent much more time on the ground in the region, and interviewed a much greater range and number of witnesses.  On the basis of this extensive research, they concluded that the attacks on Zaghawa civilians were deliberate (Minawi is the Zaghawa leader of the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi) and that the evidence was sufficiently compelling to characterize the violence as "ethnic cleansing" by the Khartoum regime and militia proxies.

[3]  The "official" Panel of Experts offers only a few weak conclusions (and even less research) about violations of the UN arms embargo on Darfur (monitoring this embargo and the ban on offensive military flights are the primary mandates for the UN Panel of Experts on Darfur, per UN Security Council Resolution 1591, March 2005).  For its part, on the basis of wide and impressively deep research, the "unofficial" Panel of Experts finds overwhelming evidence that weapons and ammunition manufactured after 2005 in Russia and China continue to make their way to Khartoum and then onto Darfur. Unsurprisingly, resistance to discussion of the "unofficial" Report comes primarily from these two veto-wielding members of the Security Council.

[4]  Nowhere is the contrast between the two reports greater than in the broader generalizations drawn about insecurity on Darfur.  Again, it must be stressed that in field research, depth of analysis, annexes, footnotes, and time on the ground, there is simply no comparison between the two reports. Indeed, the official report of the UN Panel of Experts has five factitious and skimpy annexes.  The fifth is simply make-work---a "Summary of the Outgoing Communications Sent by the Panel of Experts" (e.g., we learn that on "February 18 Ethiopia [was contacted] for visa assistance"). 

By contrast the report of the Experts who resigned has twenty-eight key annexes.  It also has more than 150 detailed footnotes for references.  For its part, the "official" Panel of Experts typically provides trivial and often meaningless sourcing, a large majority of them baldly citing UNAMID (e.g., Footnote 50, on the important subject of carjackings over the past four years has simply, in toto, "UNAMID source"; Footnote 46 "Figures provided by UNAMID"). Indeed, the entire report by the "official" Panel of Experts reads like an uninspired, uninformed, and dismayingly listless political exercise, allowing the UN to check off a box on the "to do list."

The conclusions drawn about human security are correspondingly, and unsurprisingly, at odds in the two reports.  On the basis of what is finally paltry evidence from the ground, the "official" Report concludes that:

"there has been a clear and relatively positive change compared to the [security] situation in the previous years. Significant and tangible changes have taken place in the political and security situation. The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) has set in motion a peace process that has been garnering support from the Darfur population at large."

The latter conclusion is simply preposterous: all reporting by Darfuri leaders in the camps suggests that the Doha agreement is a dead letter, a blue-print for nothing other than the perpetuation of the status quo.  This is purely expedient UN posturing in the face of a situation in which it has made no progress either diplomatically or in providing security.  Here the example of Tabarat---both the failure of UNAMID to respond and the failure of the UN to investigate---is all too revealing.  The "official" Report simply does not present the evidence that could possibly justify this global generalization about human security.

By contrast, the report from the Experts who resigned notes:

"Nonetheless, from their [the authors'] experience and direct observation elsewhere in Darfur, and from information and testimonies gathered from sources in Darfur, Khartoum and countries neighboring the Republic of Sudan, the Members of the Panel consider that some elements emerging from the Shangal Tobay case-study represent a reliable illustration of more generic trends of the recent evolution of the conflict in neighboring areas of the same region [i.e., the area of Shangal Tobay, between el-Fasher and Nyala and east], straddling the border between North and South Darfur.  Members of the Panel also found that the most intense violence in Darfur during their mandate happened in those areas of eastern Darfur, and in particular Shangal Tobay area." [ ]

"Members of the Panel found that government officials and forces under the control of the Government of Sudan had a primary role in the violence in Shangal Tobay" [though, they note, some officials also tried to stop the violence].

One way to account for the disparity between the two reports is that the "official" Report simply takes UNAMID at its word---as does the NYT from West Darfur.  For its part, the report of the Experts who felt compelled to resign found:

"that events they themselves witnessed alongside UNAMID personnel were not fully reported in UNAMID Patrol Reports or Situation Reports."

Perhaps most shockingly in the wake of the Tabarat massacre, the "unofficial" Report of the Experts on Darfur found:

"UNAMID forces have not been able to protect Zaghawa or other civilians, including those already living in IDP camps, from attacks, harassment, and displacements, some of which took place just in front of Shangal Tobay UNAMID team site."

These Experts also note that the failure to understand sufficiently the "chain of violence" in Shangal Tobay was due to "under-reporting or deliberately omitting to report some incidents."

This comparison of the two reports will be continued.  But as a concluding note for the present: the "unofficial" report of the Panel of Experts estimates, from the ground, that approximately 70,000 people were newly displaced from the greater Shangal Tobay/Khor Abeche region:

"This cycle of violence provoked one of the most significant displacements that Darfur has experienced since the height of the conflict between 2003-2005, with the reported registration of around 70,000 new IDPs ….  Most of those new displaced persons belong to the Zaghawa group."

They do not speculate about displacement elsewhere in Darfur.  But for the New York Times correspondent in Nyuru, West Darfur to take at face value UN and UNAMID accounts of returns of "over 100,000," while ignoring the realities of late 2010 to early 2012, is but one more sign of journalistic corruption.

Eric Reeves, a professor at Smith College, has published extensively on Sudan, nationally and internationally, for more than a decade. He is author of A Long Day's Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide.

International confusion and ignorance in answering this question about Sudanese geography has become one of the greatest threats to peace, and the negotiations required for peace to be sustained

By Eric Reeves

April 14, 2012 (SSNA) -- The rapid escalation of military violence between Khartoum's Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and South Sudan's Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) is now sustained in large measure by widespread international confusion about where "Heglig" is. Hasty or disingenuous assignments of "Heglig" to (northern) Sudan have emboldened Khartoum to characterize SPLA military actions as "South Sudan's blatant invasion of Heglig."  Given Khartoum's own military seizure of Abyei in May 2011, this seems remarkable (if unsurprising) hypocrisy; but so far it is working at the UN, with the U.S. State Department, with the AU, and among EU members.  This vastly increases the chances of all-out war.  Given the brutally indiscriminate ways in which Khartoum has previously chosen to wage war on the people of the South---as well as of Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan---we should expect huge civilian casualties, massive human displacement, and intolerable assaults on civilians in the North who are "ethnically Southern."

The location of "Heglig" (which Southerners have long referred to as Panthou) has yet to be negotiated vis-à-vis the "1 January 1956 border," the determining point of reference in establishing whether a wide range of locations lie in the South or the North.  Although the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) repeatedly and explicitly stipulates the "1 January 1956 border," the precise location was to have been to be a matter that required extensive research and negotiation by the Technical Boundary Committee (TBC). 

Indeed, some twenty percent of this border remains undelineated, and a much greater percentage remains undemarcated.  The reason is simple: Khartoum has consistently refused to negotiate these areas of the border either within the TBC or through high-level political engagement.  Over more than seven years, it has repeatedly refused to convene or participate in good faith in the TBC, to accept the findings of the Abyei Boundaries Commission stipulated by the Abyei Protocol of the CPA, or to accept the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (July 2009).

It is this last decision that appears to have caused the most confusion in shallow international minds.  The PCA (in The Hague) defined Abyei in a way that moved both the Heglig (and Bamboo) oil sites to the east of Abyei's eastern boundary.  But with respect to Heglig, this is all it did.  It did not place Heglig in northern Sudan or South Sudan; it simply said that Heglig lies to the east of Abyei:

"The eastern boundary of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905 runs in a straight line along longitude 29° 00' 00'' E, from latitude 10° 10' 00'' N south to the Kordofan - Upper Nile boundary as it was defined on 1 January 1956."

This ruling did nothing to settle where the "1 January 1956 border" actually lies.  It had no mandate to make such a determination, and did not attempt to do so.  This elemental fact has escaped virtually all international actors, in large part because Heglig has been robustly controlled militarily by Khartoum for many years, especially since oil was discovered in the area in the 1970s.

In short, the location of Heglig remains to be negotiated, even as Khartoum refuses to negotiate---and the regime is distinctly less likely to do so now that its pre-emptive geographic claim of the region has been ratified by a series of statements by international actors of consequence.  Given Juba's determination that Heglig will not be allowed to become a future staging ground for additional assaults on Southern territory, and the strong belief by many Southerners that Heglig is south of the "1 January 1956 boundary," either the geographic status of Heglig is negotiated, or there will be no peace.

The same international actors who have explicitly or implicitly declared that Heglig lies in (northern) Sudan also profess to support the CPA and its implementation. But how does this square with the acquiescence before Khartoum's seizure of Abyei, in violation of not only the Abyei Protocol of the CPA but the ruling by the PCA?  Nothing has changed in the eleven months since Abyei was seized, except for the deployment of an Ethiopian brigade that operates without a human rights mandate, no Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Khartoum.  Most significantly, it cannot provide the security necessary for the return of more than 100,000 Dinka Ngok displaced to the South during the seizure of Abyei, especially given Khartoum's refusal to withdraw its SAF or militia forces, as it agreed to do on June 20, 2011. 

And more to the immediate point, how do these international actors square their commitment to CPA implementation even as negotiation of the "1 January 1956 boundary" is a central feature of the Agreement.  The North/South boundary was to have been delineated and demarcated within six months of the signing of the CPA. And yet as the International Crisis Group reported in September 2010, these efforts "had been tied up for far too long in the Technical Border Committee," where Khartoum was engaged in delaying tactics.  It was clear to ICG, and should have been clear to the international community, that this was not a matter that could be resolved without political commitment from Juba and Khartoum to address outstanding border issues.  Juba was willing; Khartoum was not.

Thus the repeated declaration in the CPA that "the January 1, 1956 line between north and south will be inviolate" became meaningless.  Without both delineation and demarcation, this was a motto not a principle---and more conspicuously so following the military seizure of Abyei, given the CPA declaration that, "The parties shall refrain from any form of unilateral revocation or abrogation of the Peace Agreement" (CPA, Machakos Protocol 2.4).  There could be no more conspicuous "abrogation" of the CPA than the May 20-21, 2011 seizure of Abyei.

But this has not prevented a chorus of condemnations of Juba's "invasion" of (northern) Sudan:

•"The AU notes with alarm, the occupation of the Heglig by the forces of (South Sudan) ...."

•The U.S State Department "strongly condemns the military offensive, incursion to Southern Kordofan state, Sudan, by the SPLA today [April 12, 2012]."

•"The move by the South Sudanese armed forces to occupy Heglig in Sudan is completely unacceptable," declared the UK's Minister for Africa, Henry Bellingham.

•The European Union, through EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton asserted that "the move by the South Sudanese armed forces to occupy Heglig is completely unacceptable." 

None of these statements acknowledges what becomes clearer by the day: Juba was responding to a second round of military aggression, launched by the SAF from Heglig.  This aggression is what prompted the SPLA to act.  But until wiser or more informed voices are heard from these important quarters, Khartoum will only grow more emboldened.  And South Sudan, feeling increasingly abandoned, is likely to accelerate military moves that it regards at once as defensive as well as preserving of historical claims to the lands around Heglig. 

Notably, President Salva Kiir has promised that the SPLA is prepared to withdraw from Heglig if a UN force guarantees that it will not again become a launching point for military assaults deeper in Southern territory.  At precisely the moment in which such a UN commitment is most needed, ignorance and expediency seem most likely to prevent that commitment.  All-out war is increasingly inevitable.

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See also the wonderfully acute piece by Jacob K. Akol, editor at Gurtong Website: "Heglig? This Tent Does Not Belong To The Camel!"

"It is definitely unfair of the international community to expect Juba to just sit and watch Khartoum carry out daylight robbery of her property without responding."

http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/6799/Heglig-This-Tent-Does-Not-Belong-To-The-Camel.aspx

Eric Reeves is a Sudan researcher and analyst at Smith College, and author of A Long Day's Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide (Key Publications/Canada, 2007); he has published extensively on Sudan, nationally and internationally, for more than a decade.