South Sudan News Agency

By Eric Reeves

March 23, 2011 (SSNA) -- Though the possibility of a large-scale offensive military action by Khartoum remains dangerously high, the most recent intel from the Satellite Sentinel Project (March 23, 2011) suggests another disturbing possibility: a slow-moving military takeover of Abyei, pushing incrementally southward from present positions, some of which are revealed in today’s satellite imagery as new or newly expanded. At the same time, very substantial numbers of troops and arms remain in South Kordofan (for an excellent account of the regime’s ominously large military resources close to Abyei, see the March 2011 update from Small Arms Survey, “Armed Entities in South Kordofan”).

The title of the new report from SSP gives a sense of what has been most recently discovered: “Satellite Images Reveal Movement of More Forces Backed by Government of Sudan into Contested Abyei Region.” Near the village of Goli (also Golae) on the Abyei/Diffra road, there is a significant new military encampment, not previously seen. The previously identified military encampment at Bongo has been increased by 25 percent, perhaps sufficient to house a battalion-sized unit. Bongo is only 15 miles NNW of Abyei town. There are also new photographs of Khartoum’s military forces in Diffra. (For a scalable and highly detailed map of Abyei, see http://avidpdf.com/ebook/agany-pdf.html .)

Given the current extremely tense relations between the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party (NIF/NCP) regime in Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Juba, this is the worst moment to be heightening military tensions. Yet this is precisely what the NIF/NCP leadership has done:

“‘Satellite imagery confirms reports of the deployment of large numbers of northern forces as well as newly fortified encampments. This should be sounding alarms about the human security of all civilians in Abyei,’ said Dr. Charlie Clements, Director of Human Rights Documentation of the Satellite Sentinel Project, and Executive Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University's Kennedy School.”

We should be alarmed as well by the pretext for renewed war in Abyei that Khartoum put forward 10 days ago:

“Al-Dirdiri Mohammed Ahmed, the National Congress Party's chief negotiator on Abyei, warned of ‘a lot of skirmishes’ unless the southern army withdraws thousands of ‘irregular’ troops from the volatile district by Monday [March 14, 2011].” (Agence France-Presse, Radio Netherlands)

“‘If the SPLA is not going to withdraw the police ... the situation in Abyei might deteriorate, and could prove to be very serious within the coming few days,’ [Dirdiri] said.”

What we are seeing now are preparations for creating precisely the “serious” and “deteriorating” situation Dirdiri speaks of; and what he refers to as “a lot of skirmishes” will not be localized and confinable fighting but the inevitable prelude to relentless military encroachment by the regime’s forces and militia allies, perhaps leading to large-scale combat, with the likelihood of a resumption of war greatly increased.

The view from Abyei’s Ngok Dinka population confirms a slowly whelming offensive that will be irresistible, but perhaps accomplished incrementally rather than by large offensive maneuvers—though such are still a clear possibility if the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) decides to halt the continuing encroachment on territory defined by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (July 2009). Associated Press reports today:

“The top government official in the one region most likely to send north and south Sudan back toward conflict said Wednesday he believes the northern government is massing military forces outside Abyei in order to occupy the town and claim it permanently. [ ] ‘Of course the Misseriya are being instigated by the (north's) National Congress Party,’ said Deng Arop Kuol, the chief administrator in Abyei. ‘The military build up ... has no other explanation other than occupying Abyei.’” (dateline: Juba, March 23, 2011)

Compounding military tensions is the report of yet more Antonov bombing attacks on Southern territory, specifically Raja County in Western Bahr el-Ghazal. In the recent past, Khartoum has either dismissed such attacks as “accidents” or denied them altogether (even when confirmed by UN investigators and on-site journalists). On this occasion there can be no mistaking the regime’s intent: it is signaling that it has a substantial military air force that it is prepared to use, including:

Additional acquisitions have likely been made over the past year and a half. Khartoum is making clear that if the SPLA resists the slow move southward by the SAF and its militia forces, then it will set in motion conflict in which overwhelming force will be brought to bear, including all available military aircraft.

The simple truth, however, is that the SPLM will not and cannot allow Abyei to be usurped militarily. This should have been abundantly clear to US special envoy Scott Gration and President Obama’s clumsy intermediary Senator John Kerry (the latter dismissed concerns over a further divided Abyei as a trivial dispute over a “few hundred square miles”). Instead, Khartoum was given the signal that more could be extracted—on Abyei and other issues; and now the regime is acting on that signal, and the misplaced evenhandedness which blames Juba as much as Khartoum for this escalating crisis. A major escalation of violence in the region, which will likely precipitate much wider fighting—perhaps all-out war—would then be the final legacy of General Gration’s two-year tenure as President Obama’s special envoy for Sudan.

Eric Reeves has published extensively on Sudan, nationally and internationally, for more than a decade.  He is author of A Long Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide.

By Eric Reeves

March 15, 2011 (SSNA) -- The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) this past week formally suspended talks with the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party (NIF/NCP) regime in Khartoum. This creates a highly dangerous situation, and would not have occurred without extreme provocation. And in fact, the suspension was precipitated by ongoing regime-sponsored violence in the South, particularly Jonglei and Upper Nile States. The apparent tipping point was very recent violence on the part of renegade militia leader George Athor, who is responsible for a series of extremely brutal attacks in Jonglei, and an assault this past Saturday (March 12) on Malakal, capital of Upper Nile, by another renegade leader, Commander Olony. Further, the highly reliable Small Arms Survey (March 13) confirms SPLM claims that the guerilla leader Gabriel Tang Gatwich, known as Gabriel Tanginya (“Tang”), has moved from Northern Sudan to Jonglei, in the same general area of operations as Athor. The brutal Tang, who has been a Major General in the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), was twice sent to Malakal by Khartoum as a deliberate provocation (2006 and 2009), resulting in large-scale clashes and much loss of life (see Human Rights Watch report).

If there is a larger Southern hand behind these actions, especially those of the Shilluk Commander Olony, it is Lam Akol—a long-time paid supporter of Khartoum, and a fully discredited Southern politician, who continues to trade brazenly on his Shilluk tribal identity. One of the documents released today confirms the delivery of weapons and ammunition to “friendly forces” in the South, and specifically notes Athor and Akol. (For a detailed account of Akol’s role in the recent attack on Malakal, see Sudan Tribune, March 15, 2011.)

This documentary evidence—originating from within Khartoum’s Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) [1]—clearly reveals the regime’s continuing military support for such warlords and destructive political elements during the Interim Period following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005). The documents (in Arabic) were widely circulated today and may be readily obtained; all available evidence dictates that they must be regarded as authentic. Preeminent within this body of evidence is the extraordinary record of lies and dishonored agreements that define the regime’s relations with all Sudanese parties and with the international community. It is a record that now extends over more than twenty years.

During this time the South has been continually victimized by the regime’s use of proxy military forces. For despite Khartoum’s regular denials, the evidence of such actions in aggregate is overwhelming—despite the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and despite Khartoum’s professing that it has accepted the virtually unanimous Southern vote for secession and independence (February 2011). A number of examples of demonstrable mendacity are offered below; the list could be extended almost indefinitely. The SPLM leadership is now persuaded that the regime will not negotiate in good faith if it is both lying about its continuing support for renegade elements like Athor, as well as lying about its commitment to the Abyei Protocol and the ruling on Abyei by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (July 2009).

The world has too often responded to situations such as the present one with what amounts to a disingenuous agnosticism or moral equivalence—giving equal weight to the statements by Khartoum and by the SPLM, even when the past argues strongly against crediting any statement made by the regime in a matter of dispute. This habitual agnosticism has encouraged the long history of fully demonstrable mendacity by the regime, and leaves these brutal men to believe that they may dismiss the current SPLM documentary evidence as mere “forgeries.”

But such a claim makes no sense either on its own terms, or in the present negotiating context, or within the broader history of lies in which this dismissal takes its place. Logic alone should settle the matter: why would the SPLM negotiate with Khartoum by releasing forged documents, which both they and the regime would know to be forged? Such an act would make Khartoum less rather than more disposed to negotiate the outstanding North/South issues that matter most to the SPLM, and over which the leadership has shown deeply impressive restraint to date: border demarcation and delineation, external debt, citizenship for Southerners in the North, oil revenue-sharing, and above all, Abyei.

These are vital interests for the people of the South and the SPLM; they simply would not risk the consequences of attempting to use forged documents as a negotiating ploy with highly doubtful prospects for any sort of success. Nor would they risk being discovered as authors of forgeries: this would squander a reputation for honesty that, if not perfect, puts them in a position of enormous strength vis-à-vis the regime. A good example here is the commitment by the SPLM to abide by the “final and binding” ruling on Abyei by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (July 2009). Khartoum of course made the same commitment but is clearly violating the terms of that ruling, as well as those of the Abyei Protocol—pushing for yet more territory in northern Abyei. Their strategy has been to mobilize the Misseriya Arabs on the basis of lies about the future of their grazing rights in the region—rights consistently recognized and guaranteed by the SPLM. Even more dangerously, the regime is now poised to seize Abyei militarily as a basis for “re-negotiating” the region’s final status.

Another example is Khartoum’s denial of a bombing attack this past December on Southern military and civilian targets—an attack that was subsequently confirmed by UN observers and an Associated Press journalist (an earlier bombing was acknowledged only as a “mistake,” a highly dubious claim). An extraordinarily consequential action—aerial attack on civilian and military targets in the South during the run-up to the self-determination referendum—was denied, even as the denial was a demonstrable lie.

The contents of the documents as reported today comport all too well with what we know of Khartoum’s history: they are internal memoranda confirming the regime’s longstanding efforts to de-stabilize the South by proxy forces. A couple of examples are particularly telling:

[1] “One document dated August 2009 and signed by Defense Minister Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein said that because of leakage of the north’s alleged involvement with the militias, ‘the armament operations to be stopped for the time being, for the armament to resume later through intelligence.’ In response to that message, the head of the military intelligence sent a document to a military leader in Kosti asking for weapons and ammunition to be handed to friendly forces ‘in a secretive and obscure manner’ in Heglig in Southern Kordofan state and Daeen in South Darfur state.” (Bloomberg, March 15, 2011)

[2] “Athor first took up arms against the government after he lost a state election in April. These documents allegedly show the Sudanese government started arming Athor in May 2010, a month after he lost the state election. ‘Regarding Athor’s agent, the aforementioned was handed the second shipment of weapons and ammunition,’ reads another document dated May 2010, from the military in Kosti, the capital of White Nile, a northern state bordering the south.” (Bloomberg, March 15, 2011)

[3] “One of the documents appears to be a letter dated May 18, 2010, and signed by a military commander in the northern city of Kosti that reports that a delivery of weapons and ammunition had just been given to an Athor agent. Another, dated Sept. 22, 2010, is from the head of northern military intelligence requesting permission to arm Lam Akol, a senior opposition figure, and other ‘friendly forces.’ A corresponding reply the next day grants the request.” (McClatchy News [dateline: Khartoum], March 15, 2011)

[4] “The SPLM also claim that a letter dated November 14, 2009, shows that the NCP leadership instructed all telecommunication companies operating in the north to intercept all phone calls of some key SPLM figures. Their phones numbers were listed in the confidential letter. Another document, dated August 27, 2009 from the north’s defense ministry called for the establishment of a ‘security committee’ to oversee the NCP’s alleged plan to destabilize South Kordofan and Blue Nile, which are in north Sudan but are home to groups which fought with the SPLM during the civil war that ended in 2005.” (Sudan Tribune, March 15, 2011)

Evidence confirming the import of these documents comes from other sources as well. For example, last August the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) captured in Upper Nile State a Khartoum-bound helicopter containing a number of Athor’s men, including his third in command. The Sudan Tribune reported (August 10, 2010):

“South Sudan said it has impounded a Khartoum-destined cargo helicopter carrying men loyal to George Athor, the man behind a rebellion against the government of the semi-autonomous region. The ruling party in southern Sudan, SPLM, accused ‘quarters in northern Sudan of supporting the renegade general in order to destabilize the south.’”

The dispatch continues:

“Intelligence sources in Jonglei state, speaking on condition of anonymity to Sudan Tribune, said that ‘the former commissioner of Pigi county, James Yhor, and other senior Athor’s military men were the ones found in the helicopter.’ The sources further added that the detained rebels were wounded and heading for hospital in northern Sudan to receive medical treatment.”

Predictably, though the incident was also confirmed by U.S. government intelligence, Khartoum simply dismissed the incident (“false accusations”) in much the same way it dismissed the documents released today.

There is also earlier evidence of Khartoum’s moving weapons and ammunition to the South. For example, The Telegraph (UK) reported from Malakal (August 15, 2009):

“The claim of a ‘hidden [Northern] hand’ behind at least some of the killing is supported by independent evidence. A ship recently arrived in Malakal having travelled up the Nile from Khartoum. A 30-year-old man, who saw the vessel being searched, told the Sunday Telegraph that it contained Kalashnikov assault rifles and ammunition, hidden beneath a cargo of food. Another 20-year-old man said the national army had tried to recruit him for a monthly salary of £200. Those who sought to entice him said they had been ordered to sign up 400 southerners in Malakal alone.” (The Telegraph [dateline: Malakal], August 15, 2009)

The Khartoum regime for years denied that it supported the maniacal and brutally destructive Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) of Joseph Kony. But as the International Crisis Group reported in a January 11, 2006 briefing paper: “Khartoum now admits that the LRA was given sanctuary and logistical support as part of a destabilization strategy and scorched earth campaign against Sudanese civilians.”

There is very strong circumstantial evidence that Khartoum continues to assist the LRA.

IMPLICATIONS

If the international community will simply look honestly at the evidence in hand and at the record of pronouncements by the SPLM and the NIF/NCP regime, assessing the authenticity of the documents released today is hardly a strenuous exercise. The documents are clearly authentic; Khartoum’s claim that they are mere forgeries is yet another expedient lie in an extremely long line. Insofar as the international community—including the African Union, the UN, the EU, and the United States—wishes to aid in negotiations in bringing the present dangerously tense situation to resolution, it must accept that there are not two truths being told today—only one. To accept Khartoum’s lies as in any way plausible is the surest way to encourage the regime to believe it can continue without consequence its mendacity and its concerted and conspicuously well-funded efforts to de-stabilize the South.

Agnosticism about the source of these documents—given their enormous implications—is simply not a reasonable diplomatic posture. If adopted, it will make renewed war more likely, not less.

[1] A highly authoritative source familiar with the documents has indicated to me that the SAF officers who leaked this information to the Southern leadership were discovered and subsequently executed by Khartoum. This would account for the precipitous end to the documentation the SPLM has provided. (email received March 15, 2011)

Eric Reeves has published extensively on Sudan, nationally and internationally, for more than a decade.  He is author of A Long Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide.

By Eric Reeves

March 13, 2011 (SSNA) -- It has become increasingly clear in recent weeks that Khartoum’s Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) intend to seize the Abyei region by military force. Satellite imagery and intel from the ground have confirmed a range of developments—including SAF movement of equipment and men—that make sense only in the context of offensive military ambitions. Tanks, artillery, work on the Muglad air base, work on the road leading from Muglad to Abyei town, forward military posts inside Abyei have all been confirmed. In aggregate, the evidence strongly suggests that the offensive might begin as early as the morning of March 14.

Statements today (March 13) by a senior regime official with primary responsibility for Abyei are an explicit threat that the SAF and militia allies will begin action in the immediate near term (Agence France-Presse, Radio Netherlands):

“Al-Dirdiri Mohammed Ahmed, the National Congress Party's chief negotiator on Abyei, warned of ‘a lot of skirmishes’ unless the southern army withdraws thousands of ‘irregular’ troops from the volatile district by Monday [March 14, 2011].” (emphasis added)

“‘If the SPLA is not going to withdraw the police ... the situation in Abyei might deteriorate, and could prove to be very serious within the coming few days,’ [Dirdiri] said.”

What’s impending is not a series of “skirmishes” but major fighting; the goal will be to take control of as much of Abyei as possible, and use this military seizure as the basis for final negotiation of Abyei’s status. The “police” Dirdiri refers to are military elements from the south that are now protecting several locations that have been attacked by armed Misseriya militia from north of the Abyei area, possibly with the assistance of the Popular Defense Forces and regular SAF (the villages attacked include Todach, Tejalei, Maker Abior, and Noong). The UN mission in the region (UNMIS) is essentially paralyzed, and the so-called “Joint Integrated Units” (units of both the SPLA and SAF) are simply not functional. In short, the Ngok Dinka of Abyei are without protection other than from the SPLA.

The most forward SAF military outpost that has been detected is Bongo, only 25 kilometers NNW of Abyei town. Tanks have been photographed at el-Kharasana, on the road serving as the NNE/SSW axis between Abyei and Kadugli. Present evidence suggests that the primary attack will come along this axis, with a flanking attack coming along the NNW/SSE Muglad/Abyei axis. Other sites in northern Abyei with a significant military buildup include el-Kharasana, Nyama, Heglig, and Diffra (the site of the only oil production in Abyei as defined by the Permanent Court of Arbitration).

Also of note are two towns in southern South Kordofan—Muglad and Kadugli (the latter the headquarters of the SAF 14th Division)—lying on roads that lead southward to Abyei; both have airbases that will be available to support an offensive in Abyei. [For a scalable and highly detailed map of Abyei, see http://avidpdf.com/ebook/agany-pdf.html ]

The primary military response of the southern Sudan People’s Liberation Army has been south of Abyei and seems to have anticipated precisely this design of attack. The SPLA tanks in the region of Agok (south of the Kiir/Bahr el-Arab River) are substantial in number. The SPLA is also reinforcing its positions in Tagelei and Tadoch, where recent militia attacks on these villages killed and displaced tens of thousands (current estimates of the number of Ngok Dinka civilians displaced run to 45,000). Heavy trucks have been observed moving south to north to these locations.

(Further military details are contained in the most recent (March 11) report by the Satellite Sentinel Project (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, UNITAR/UNOSAT, and the Enough Project):

Overview (March 11, 2011)

Following the recent destruction of three villages, there has been increased military activity in and around the contested Abyei region of Sudan during the past week. Actors aligned with both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) appear to have improved their defensive positions and mobilized additional offensive capacity, including, in one case, vehicles consistent with the transport of heavy armor.

Satellite Sentinel Project (SSP) has determined that in some parts of the Abyei region, elements believed to be aligned with the SAF and SPLA now lie within an approximately 20 to 40 kilometer range of each other. SSP also concludes that the SAF and SPLA appear to now have more units arrayed within 100 kilometers of each other in and around Abyei than at any time in the past two months of SSP's monitoring of the region.

This rapid spike in apparent military movements by armed actors represents a significant deterioration in the human security climate in the Abyei region. SSP has identified a fortified camp consistent with either a Misseriya militia or SAF installation inside the Abyei region at Bongo—approximately 15 kilometers from Maker Abior, one of the recently burned villages. The camp appears to have been built around the road there between February 12 and March 3. Heavy Equipment Transports (HETs) used to move heavy armored vehicles have appeared in the past 48 hours at a suspected SAF outpost near Nyama, due north of Abyei. Artillery is still present at that position along with evidence of activity involving light vehicles and heavy trucks. The burned villages of Todach and Tajalei have been very recently fortified with foxholes and other defensive emplacements. Trucks have been seen moving from the south to the north along roads in that area where SPLA and southern police units have been reportedly operating.

The close proximity of northern and southern Sudanese combat-ready units and recently built defensive emplacements to one another poses an urgent threat to the security of civilian populations on both sides of the border. Additionally, UN peacekeeping forces (UNMIS) on patrol have reportedly been denied full freedom of movement by SPLA and southern police personnel in areas affected by recent attacks. SAF-led Joint Integrated Units (JIU) reportedly failed to respond to the February 27 alleged attack by armed Misseriya militia on the Todach police post, which was apparently 400 meters from their position at the time of the assault. The absence of a fully operational and responsive peacekeeping force further heightens the imminent danger to civilians posed by SAF and SPLA units massing in such close range to each other.

Findings

--Vehicles consistent with HETs used to transport heavy armor were visible as of March 9 at Nyama, which is located approximately 95 km north of Abyei town. Artillery continues to be present at that camp along with a mix of light vehicles and heavy trucks. Internal fortifications appear to have been improved there over a 48-hour period.

--A camp capable of housing an at least company-sized unit was built around the road at Bongo between February 12 and March 3. Fortifications consistent with foxholes are visible in a horseshoe formation. The camp at Bongo is approximately 15 kilometers from the destroyed village of Maker Abior.

--A circle of fortifications consistent with foxholes is visible around a position in the burned village of Tajalei. Heavy trucks have been seen moving south to north near that position in recent days.

--Fortifications appear to have been built around a suspected southern police post in the burned village of Todach in recent days. Heavy trucks have been recently seen moving south to north near that encampment.

Conclusions

--Recent activity at the suspected SAF facility at Nyama suggests the potential recent movement of armor in the vicinity of that position.

--The camp at Bongo is consistent with a potential SAF or Misseriya militia encampment due to its location and the position of its fortifications. Its appearance approximately two weeks prior to the attacks on three villages near that location corroborates reports received by SSP claiming that alleged staging areas for those attacks were present in that area.

--The recent appearance of heavy trucks and new fortifications at Tajalei during a period when UNMIS patrols were denied access to that area suggests that SPLA forces and/or southern police were reinforcing their position at Tajalei.

--Recent reports that UNMIS patrols were blocked from accessing Todach by actors allegedly aligned with the SPLA are consistent with the time frame in which the fortifications there were apparently constructed.

[END]

Eric Reeves has published extensively on Sudan, nationally and internationally, for more than a decade.  He is author of A Long Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide.