South Sudan News Agency

Violence, including ethnically-targeted destruction, has accelerated in South Kordofan over the past few days. Aerial attacks are reported throughout South Kordofan, especially in the Nuba Mountains; one report is of bombing attacks against the major base of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Jau (Pariang County in oil-rich Unity State). A precipitous embargo on fuel and other goods moving from North to South Sudan is designed to create economic instability prior to the South's independence in one month (July 9, 2011). Those in South Kordofan believed loyal to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) or opposed to the Khartoum regime are being hunted down in retribution; the destruction of churches and the targeting of Christians in and around Kadugli give anominous sense of what is to come.

By Eric Reeves

Highlights of reports, as of 7pm June 9:

June 9, 2011 (SSNA) -- •As in Abyei, the military actions by Khartoum in South Kordofan were clearly premeditated. The potential for precisely the conflict we are seeing now has been repeatedly noted by several observers. And yet the international community has again been caught flat-footed, wholly reliant on the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS); this force has performed poorly, especially in Kadugli where it is widely perceived to have sided with Khartoum. Reports continue to stream in of more tanks moving south from el-Obeid, the main Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) military base outside Khartoum. Military air assets have been rapidly deployed in the conflict, for the Nuba Mountains---where the war will be concentrated---are within range of the jet fighter aircraft based in el-Obeid. Khartoum's most brutal leaders, including President Omar al-Bashir and his chief advisor Nafi'e Ali Nafi'e, have publicly declared that the SAF has been given a "freehand" throughout South Kordofan, and that any southern troops in the North after June 1 would be "legitimate targets"—this despite the fact that tens of thousands of these troops consider South Kordofan and southern Blue Nile their home. Reprisals against civilians thought to be sympathetic to the SPLM/A have been brutal.

Khartoum has explicitly declared its intention to "spread its forces throughout [South Kordofan] state after in gained military control in Kadugli" (Sudan News Agency [SUNA/Khartoum], June 8, 2011). Given the central location of the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan, this is a declaration of all-out war. UNMIS has already reported that the SAF is "shelling SPLA positions in the mountains of South Kordofan."UNMIS also reports (June 9) that "fighting was ongoing and had spread across the state."

•As was true following the invasion of Abyei, Khartoum's decision to resume war in South Kordofan has very quickly produced tens of thousands of displaced civilians, even as humanitarian organizations have halted operations or withdrawn. The humanitarian situation for the Nuba and non-Arab populations of South Kordofan has immediately become critical. The 10,000civilians who have sought security at the UNMIS base in Kadugli are desperately short of water and facing growing security risks. Many have already left Kadugli, and the town of Dilling to the north is reportedly deserted. One estimate from a Nuba source is that 75,000 people have already been displaced.

•On Sunday, June 5 senior leaders of the SPLM flew to Kadugli to arrange a cease-fire with Khartoum officials, and signed an agreement to this effect. In a signature move of bad faith, an hour after Yasir Arman (head of the SPLM in North Sudan) and Malik Agar (governor of Blue Nile and senior member of the SPLM) flew out of Kadugli, Khartoum's SAF began an assault on the home of Abdel Aziz el-Hilu, SPLM candidate for governor of South Kordofan during the rigged elections of May and a true son of the Nuba. El-Hilu is widely popular among the people of the Nuba and a superb military leader. If he had in fact been killed in the SAF attack, the consequences would have been enormous; as one Nuba put it, "If Aziz goes down the entire Nuba Mountains will erupt." El-Hilu is now reported to be “fully in military uniform." That Khartoum was willing to take this risk indicates that the regime has already determined on a course of war.

Here, the consequences of the Carter Center's poorly informed ratification of the South Kordofan gubernatorial election---in which indicted war criminal Ahmed Haroun defeated el-Hilu following a fraudulent vote count---continues to make themselves felt, and contribute to the climate of deep hostility and mistrust.

•The Sudan Tribune reports (June 9) that Antonov bombers attacked Jau in South Sudan (oil-rich Unity State); this attack on a major SPLA base of operations in the South represents a radical escalation in the war that is rapidly unfolding. Predictably, the long-range, high-altitude Antonovs (not "bombers,"but cargo planes from which crude barrel bombs are rolled without sighting mechanisms) dropped their bombs wide of the SPLA headquarters and hit civilian targets instead (see my report on Khartoum’s history of bombing civilian and humanitarian targets over the past twelve years: www.sudanbombing.org/). Three were reported killed, including a child.

The threat of much greater military incursion into South Sudan has been dismissed by many observers, but this seems unwise. Indeed, a SPLA spokesman Philip Aguer notes today, "The borders have not been demarcated and SAF plans to take some of these areas now. We have said this is part of a plan by SAF." And indeed, any inspection of a map of the oil concession areas reveals just how much is concentrated along the 1956 North/South border. In a January 2011report for Pax Christi, researcher Julie Flint writes in "The Nuba Mountains: Central to Sudan’s Security":

"Today senior SPLA officers in Southern Kordofan claim that SAF is 'preparing for war all the way along the border.' They claim SAF divisions recast as brigades in2009 remain at division strength; four separate brigades that arrived in2008-09 constitute another, unacknowledged division; and 40-barrel Katyusha rocket launchers, B-10 anti-tank guns and 120 mm mortars have been moved to the border area. Deputy governor al-Hilu says that despite agreement that SAF would move into 15 assembly points, it now has 55,000 troops in more than 100garrisons---'more than needed to control Southern Kordofan; more even than at the height of the jihad.'"

•In South Kordofan SAF military aircraft and artillery reportedly attacked five villages south of Kadugli as well as Talodi, Heiban, Kauda, Abdel Aziz el-Hilu's compound on the outskirts of Kadugli, and many other towns. Civilians are reportedly fleeing from many locations: Kadugli, Talodi, Dilling, Umm Dore in (again, Dilling is reportedly nearly deserted). The SAF spokesman, al-Swarmi Kahled, has refused to take calls from journalists. One source on the ground reports that there have been100 casualties in Heiban (Nuba Mountains). Khartoum shows no interest in the SPLM offer [June 8] of an immediate cease-fire.

•Civilians who fled from Khartoum’s brutal military seizure of Abyei are struggling, as humanitarian organizations increasingly find themselves short of supplies, most critically fuel by which to maintain mobility. The outlook is increasingly grim, according to a news dispatch from Turelei, South Sudan. These Dinka Ngok people are struggling simply to survive. At the same time it is clear that the original UN report on the Abyei invasion found sufficient evidence to claim that Khartoum’s "'attack and occupation’ of the disputed town of Abyei 'is tantamount to ethnic cleansing.'" But in the final report—leaked to Associated Press on June 3---the language has been changed substantially by the UN bureaucracy: now the report claims only that "the 'occupation' of Abyei could lead to ethnic cleansing…." This revision was made with transparently political motives, as UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and senior UN officials sought to mollify Khartoum. The spineless Ban declared flatly that it is "far too early to claim that ethnic cleansing is taking place."

•The origin of the fighting will be disputed in the absence of any neutral reporting presence; in this sense, it is like the military invasion of Abyei, which was precipitated by the disputed events of May 19---events that nonetheless served as a casus belli for Khartoum. One highly informed source reports that the initial shooting occurred at Umm Dora in when Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) attempted to disarm SPLA troops at the border stations that delineated the military boundary between the two sides during the civil war; this has been confirmed by a Western official who closely follows regional events. But Khartoum was clearly planning for this war in the Nuba and many tanks quickly appeared in Kadugli, along with a rapid deployment of other offensive military resources.

•Civilian reprisals are increasing, and are like to accelerate rapidly going forward. A reliable source reports that Khartoum’s fearsome Military Intelligence forced its way into UNMIS headquarters in Kadugli and took many suspected SPLM sympathizers. This source also reports that a "disabled man in a wheelchair was found killed outside the UNMIS compound after he sought protection [there]." This has had an understandably chilling effect on those looking to UNMIS for protection, and many who had originally gathered at the UNMIS base are melting away. A number of those caught and labeled "SPLM sympathizers" have almost certainly been executed.

Many within the SAF ranks are forced recruits from the South or the Nuba; many wish to join the SPLM and have started defecting. It is ironically appropriate that Khartoum yesterday [June 8] described the situation as a "mutiny":

"The National Congress Party [National Islamic Front] today declared that situation in South Kordofan is an 'armed mutiny' and a breach of the law by the SPLM supported by foreign powers and some internal opposition movements who are working to further ambitions of some SPLM figures."(Sudan Tribune translation of the Arabic)

This trend of defections from the SAF is likely to increase quickly, although for the moment it has created a highly dangerous situation in Kadugli. One report from the ground, confirmed by a US government source, puts the matter this way (lightly edited for clarity):

"There are many Nuba in the SAF and Kadugli police who are defecting to the SPLM/A, and at times unwittingly [complicating] the situation. For SAF troops and Popular Defense Forces have no qualms about killing and destroying the Nuba people or their homes and businesses, whereas the Nuba must show such restraint because it is their own people in the crossfire. This gives the SAF and PDF an advantage as well as 'plausible deniability' by deflecting responsibility to SPLA. In short, SAF soldiers may not only kill such 'traitors,' but easily accuse the SPLM/A of the attacks." (email received June 7, 2011)

•Economic warfare has begun in earnest, as Khartoum has virtually shut down the movement of all commercial and other goods to the South. This means that the South has run extremely short of fuel, and this is putting humanitarian organizations in a highly dangerous situation, one in which they have insufficient fuel to evacuate. Prices have skyrocketed, especially for fuel. Earlier this week Juba accused Khartoum of deliberately closing all commercial routes to the south. In the words of Stephen Dhieu Dau, minister of trade and industry in the Government of South Sudan:

"The government in Khartoum is not happy to see people of south Sudan living in peace. It says one thing and does another. It is not sleeping. It is working day and night to sabotage peace and development in the area. It has adopted detrimental policies."

UNIRIN today reported on the threats felt by Southerners living in the North following the secession of South Sudan in a month. They have good reason to fear, and this extends to the people of the Nuba:

"'If south Sudan secedes, we will change the constitution, and at that time there will be no time to speak of diversity of culture and ethnicity ... shari'a and Islam will be the main source for the constitution, Islam the official religion and Arabic the official language,'[al-Bashir said]." (The Guardian, January 8, 2011)

As one prescient military observer has put it,

"'The North will get away with horrors in Nuba again,' a western military observer warned in Tchalian'stime [Karen Tchalian was first UNMIS head of security in Kadugli]. 'The UN would probably be able to do little.”’ (http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=24931 )

This was many months ago, and very little has changed.

**************************

•The spirit of the Nuba: In January 2003, while traveling in the Nuba Mountains, I was able to dispatch these words from Kauda (one of the sites that UNMIS today reports has been attacked); my effort was to reveal both the extraordinary determination I found among the people of the Nuba, and their supremely clear understanding of their own history since independence in 1956,particularly in light of the Machakos Protocol that had been signed in July2002, guaranteeing the right of a self-determination referendum to the South. I concluded at the time, and can only emphasize again, that these people will not surrender, they will not again be forced into "peace camps," and they will fight ferociously, realizing that if they should succumb militarily, their lives are over.

"The Nuba Mountains Region: An Inescapable Issue at Machakos"

The Khartoum regime has delayed, and perhaps ultimately aborted its participation in the most recent round of the Machakos peace talks. It has done so because it refuses to accept a decision by the peace process mediators that geographical issues must have a place on the agenda if a true and just peace is to be realized. The Machakos mediators have rightly decided that there can be no meaningful agreement that ignores the historically marginalized areas of Abyei, Southern Blue Nile, and the Nuba Mountains. Twenty years of fighting cannot be ended by ignoring the fate of peoples who have allied themselves politically and militarily with South Sudan, and who feel themselves culturally at risk from the tyranny of Khartoum’s Islamicist project.

The Nuba people in particular have recently expressed their determination to be part of any peace agreement, and have designated the SPLM/A as their representatives at the Machakos talks (as have the people of Abyei and Southern Blue Nile). There should be no mistaking the passionate resolve of these people to live in dignity, to see their culture preserved, and to exercise the right of self-determination.

One reason that international optimism about Machakos has seemed excessive is that the difficulties of remaining issues, while recognized in general terms, have not been sufficiently appreciated in their particulars. Nowhere is this more the case than with the southern part of Blue Nile Province (Southern Blue Nile), as well as Abyei and the Nuba Mountains region of western and southern Kordofan Province. Though these areas have ended up in what was determined to be "northern Sudan" at the time of independence in 1956, this is little more than perverse historical accident, and fails utterly to take account of current political, ethnic, and cultural realities.

In the case of the Nuba Mountains, this history has been especially perverse. The people of the Nuba were not consulted during the process that led to Sudan's independence from British and Egyptian condominium rule, and have never felt themselves represented by any of the governments that have come and gone since 1956. Though the Nuba people have made various political efforts to secure just representation, they have seen no success in these efforts. In the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972, the people of the Nuba were again without meaningful representation, and that deeply flawed peace agreement offered them nothing. War resumed all to predictably in 1983, in part because of Jafer Nimeiri’s imposition of the infamous "September shari'a laws" throughout Sudan, including the Nuba region (where Muslims and non-Muslims have historically coexisted peacefully). The people of the Nuba long ago decided to resist militarily the tyranny of Khartoum, joining cause with the SPLA in 1985. This resistance has only increased since the current regime---the National Islamic Front---came to power by military coup in June 1989.

The recent "All Nuba Conference" (December 2002) marked a consensus decision by the people of the Nuba to be represented by the SPLM/A at the Machakos peace talks. This sends a clear signal, and must not be ignored by those who understand the suffering that has defined so much of their recent history. Before the Nuba Mountains cease-fire was secured by the international community last year, the people of the region had been living under brutal humanitarian embargo for over a decade, denied all food and medical assistance, even by the UN's Operation Lifeline Sudan. The most recent humanitarian assessment conducted before the cease-fire was negotiated revealed that Khartoum had brought many tens of thousands of people to the brink of starvation. This followed years of driving Nuba people from the fertile valleys to much more difficult and less productive mountainous areas.

Peace that excludes the voices of the people of the Nuba, and a recognition of their suffering at the hands of successive regimes in Khartoum, cannot be a just peace. It is thus difficult to imagine that the present Nuba Mountains cease-fire will survive in the wake of merely partial peace, one that leaves the essential geographical issues unresolved and ignores the voices of the Nuba. I recently had the privilege of hearing many of these voices during a lengthy discussion with regional leaders at Lwere, near Kauda. I was struck both by the passion and unanimity in what I heard---from Commander Ismail Khamis (acting governor of the SPLM/A-controlled region of the Nuba), Abais Ibrahim (Food Security Coordinator for the Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development Organization [NRRDO]), Mariam Yuhana (regional chair of the Nuba Women’s Association), Simon Kalo (regional director of education), Sodi Ibrahim(SPLM/A secretary for Rashad County), Mosa Abdualbagi (regional director of health care), Tia Tutu Tutu (assistant coordinator for NRRDO food security program), and Alamin DaHalla (secretary in the regional political office).

Again and again I heard the same words: to be consigned to a forced integration with Khartoum’s Islamicism and Arabism was death---and that resistance would continue if the international community attempted to foist such a resolution upon them. "Khartoum does not consider us to be human beings," was a steady refrain amidst the anger and bewilderment over what is felt to be an all too obviously intolerable state of affairs. No Nuba has forgotten the deliberate denial of humanitarian access by Khartoum for over a decade, or the steady denial of agricultural land---efforts that marked a destruction that has widely been described as genocidal.

"We have no way out," I was told. There is neither a political nor a geographical exit for the people of the Nuba unless it is achieved at Machakos. For as all those present in our discussion recognized, Machakos is a singular opportunity---as singular for them as for other parts of Sudan. If they area abandoned, or made part of an expedient compromise with Khartoum, they will have no recourse, no choice in their minds but to fight on for their own right to self-determination. They can no more concede this right than can the people of South Sudan.

"The 1956 boundaries have become irrelevant," Commander Ismail told me. The historical vagaries that left this distinctive region of southern Kordofan as part of "northern Sudan" have long since ceased to have any relevance, culturally or politically. The deep resentment of a viciously tyrannical Islamicism and Arabism was never far from the surface in our discussion. Notably, in a comment that suggested to me that there is finally no parochialism in the Nuba point of view, Commander Ismail (representing Abdul Aziz el-Hilu, Governor of the Nuba region) said, "people should not talk in terms of geography, but in terms of politics." By this he meant that it is not geography per se that is, or should be, the issue at Machakos; rather, the essential issue is the political and cultural realities of the people who are geographically located within the Nuba Mountains regions.

"The problem at Machakos is not the problem of Southern Sudan," or the problem of the Nuba or other marginalized areas---"the problem is Sudan," he continued. By which Commander Ismail meant that the essential problem is the National Islamic Front regime, which rules Sudan without support from any region of Sudan outside Khartoum. And of course there is resistance to the NIF's tyranny even in Khartoum, though it continues to be harshly repressed.

The case of the people of the Nuba Mountains may be special in a sense, but it all too aptly crystallizes the essential challenge of Machakos. Either Khartoum is confronted forcefully, consistently, and with the sharpest moral focus, or the regime will delay, obfuscate, promise and renege, and delay further---continuing negotiations only in bad faith, calculating merely what best serves their survivalist desires. And if military victory should seem within reach---if resistance in the Nuba Mountains, Southern Sudan and other marginalized areas comes to be regarded as militarily vulnerable---then Machakos may overnight become irrelevant. The massive redeployments of offensive military power that have marked Khartoum’s activities since the cease-fire was agreed to on October 15, 2002 are a clear sign of this possibility.

But whatever the chances that remain for Machakos, what is represented by the people of the Nuba Mountains cannot be forgotten. To lose sight of their suffering will be an ominous portent of a much greater moral blindness.

[Too little has change in the past eight years---June 9, 2011]

Eric Reeves is a professor at Smith College and author of A Long Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide (2007).

By Deng Riek Khoryoam, South Sudan

June 9, 2011 (SSNA) -- In less than a month time, this semi-autonomous region will formally be declared as “Republic of South Sudan (ROSS)”. The long awaited independence and hard-won freedom shall have been accomplished, and will have arrived at the doorstep of every Southerner who longed for this since Sudan became an independent country exactly half a century and few more years ago. Those who will be alive by then or on that day shall have seen the dream of our forefathers and heroes/heroines come true. We will have also realised that those who died in the cause of the struggle for free and independent South Sudan (not for disillusioned unity) did not die in vain. They died for a good cause, a cause worth dying for! This is the beauty of it all.

As the South gears up for the independence celebration and the euphoria surrounding it, its people should not just be prepared physically, as it’s the case now but more so, psychologically. We need to reflect on where we came from, where we are at now and most importantly, where we are going after the July 9th. This is the essence of the July 9th date, one would think, perhaps! Overall, we need to remember our heroes and heroines, whose blood sacrifices brought about this relative peace we enjoy today; therefore their names should be on our lips as well as on banners during that day.

For almost a month now, I decided to give myself a break from writing anything about any issues facing the nascent state. Then some (four) of my readers wondered as to why or what could have made me silence for long like this. One of them asked me if I was alright or not, and I told him that I have been fine – just took a little break. Three others did the same and I just jokingly told them that I went underground for a while and have just resurfaced from my hideout. Honestly speaking, it gives one a very high morale and good spirit because it means that our people, the Southerners recognise and appreciate someone who offers (at his/her peril) to speak or talk on their behalf. This is also something one must be cautious enough not to brag about.

But what is accountability and what does it entail? Good question. According to Wikipedia, accountability is the acknowledgment and assumption of responsibility for actions, products, decisions, and policies including the administration, governance, and implementation within the scope of the role or employment position and encompassing the obligation to report, explain and be answerable for the resulting consequences of such decisions and or policies thereof. This is the simplest and easiest definition within the context of this article. However, accountability could mean different things to different people at different times. Therefore, different people can define it differently, and in whatever context they want or deem fit for them.

In our context, South Sudan needs to improve her accountability on various aspects. I chose to leave it open because it’s a broad term, hence, I didn’t want to be specific about it or focus on one aspect of accountability or what type. I remember vividly predicting or saying in one of my articles of the past that “the events leading to July 9th are not going to be pretty” and true to this statement, the events have not been pretty over the past months and will not be for the next couple of weeks to the sacrosanct date. A lot of killings of innocent civilians happened and continue to happen day after day. A recent UN finding had it that close to 300 innocent civilians alone were killed by the SPLA in the Kaldak fighting which took place on 23rd of April, 2011. A huge number is still unaccounted for as dozens are still missing and could not still be alive by now. More than 100 civilians and more have been killed in Unity state according to the recent UN report; more than 70, 000 homes burned to ashes by the SPLA. For fairness’s sake, the rebels too are not clean either and could be blamed for a quarter of the damage.

Killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, rape and other ill-treatments punishable under national and or international law are common practices in South Sudan. All these things happened/happen in almost every corner of South Sudan. What does this tell us? It tells us that we need to improve our accountability measures and punish anyone who abuses human rights for whatever reason. At least we’ve got a system since the CPA was signed in 2005 to date, even though it’s not a perfect one – but at least we have one. All we need to do is to improve on it. We need to start valuing human life as being more important than any material gains/wealth. The government of the republic of South Sudan seriously needs to do something in order to improve its human rights record and restore the damaged image and reputation at the international level.

Some of these small things that we take for granted like the killings of innocent civilians in Greater Upper Nile and elsewhere in South Sudan could land some of us in The Hague, at the International criminal court (ICC) some days to come. The international human rights bodies are or have been taking note of what’s been happening since we established a system 6 years ago, a functioning government known as GOSS. The international community or international human rights (not human wrongs!) bodies are not oblivious of what has been taking place since and who is responsible for what. They are all aware of that. We have to be responsible for our actions, policies and decisions, and that’s what accountability entails. That was why I argued in one of my articles published in January this year that “what matters is not actually the name but whether the new country shall value and respect basic human rights or not”. We cannot struggle to establish a country of our own only to use it a flatform to killing the very people who are the solid foundation of this house in which some of us are just pinnacles!

In recap, when I talk of the need for South Sudan to improve its accountability, I don’t want to create an impression that it’s to do with money. Make no mistake Sister or brother, it’s not about money; but about human life and how it could be valued and handled with utmost care it deserves since it’s irreplaceable. It’s a necessity and they need to seriously think about improving it so that we are not branded by the international human rights bodies as ‘human rights abusers’. If we want to assume a position of power then we need to accept the responsibility that goes with that particular position of power. Let’s accept the plain truth that Kiir and Machar are all accountable or answerable to the people of South Sudan.

It’s the people of South Sudan which gave them the power and mandate to serve them (people); therefore they (Kiir & Machar) are the like employees, and the people of South Sudan are their employers. We all know if an employee doesn’t perform the task assigned to him/her to the expectation of the employer, that employee will definitely get sacked or fired because the employer can’t keep someone whose outputs aren’t seen or who is not productive. Let us improve our accountability so that we can all feel proud of this young country of ours in waiting. We have started on a wrong footing already but I believe it’s never too late to redress the mess here. There is still a room to do so, if there is goodwill; the window of opportunity to prove to the world community that we meant it when we fought for 3 decades of civil war and finally voted for independent South Sudan in January early this year.

The author lives in South Sudan, and could be reached for comments at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

By Paulino G. Kedok / Juba

June 8, 2011 (SSNA) -- Khartoum Junta clique has backed off to its 1990s war colours by eliminating its own army members through conundrum techniques and stratagems.

A cursing decade known as 1990s was one of the most disastrous eras, which was witnessing and experiencing a great deal of massacre within Sudan Armed Forces itself when and where Bashir and his criminal student Sham –el Sidine were crying wolf killing their own subjects in cold blood using SPLA guerrilla name as their atrocities cover.

Many SAF professional officers, NCOS and men were brutally murdered either by being dropped by an Antinov at the highest altitude or being soaked with gas and set ablaze using match stick before being poked into a pit without pity of burying human beings alive and kicking.

To make matter worse, the frequent disappearances of those victims either at night or in the air at the sheer day light was being attributed to the SPLA marauding results which only a fool and an insane could nod at it or satisfy with such game of a crocodile feeding on her own brood at the expense of others whereas SPLA in its holistic fight for freedom, equality and justice was renowned for fighting a just war as all prisoners of war (POWS) of SAF in all forms were being spared in the battlefield, being treated, nurtured and kept alive till peace and subsequently released to Khartoum without ransom witnessed by the international community at all levels.

Ironically, was a single prisoner of war belonged to SPLA released by Khartoum‘s inhumane system? I guess no is my assurance since Khartoum government was and is an evil government governed by evil self employed thugs believing in evil spiritualism whose motto is blood, power or else cemetery.

Those crooked practices were related to what happened in Abyei on Thursday 21st May, last month when the same hat of trade used to be being operated by Sham el sidine and his criminal school of thought mentor Bashir, has again been recycled and experimented in the same ideological business. This is what promptly compelled someone like me who was so familiar with those infidel tricks to ask in a very silly manner whether if Sham Elsidine has ever resurrected and forthwith embarked on his long served manoeuvres of killing his own men and pointed his dirty finger to SPLA dating back to those dark days of hiding and seeking play.

Common sense and with the help of an impeccable source has it logically that a sizeable force of intelligent cadres who have just undergone an anti-terrorism training in Asmara has been flown to Abyei and made to lay an ambush on its SAF while withdrawing unwillingly at the behest of UNMIS pressures.

As a pretext, the aforementioned criminally organised spy was advised to sing SPLA slogans whenever acting against their own likes as well as wearing different types of tattered uniforms to confuse the environmental sensibility and detection.

Prior to that SAF had already prepared for massive offensives at a stone‘s throw adjacent to Abyei territory aiming at Abyei area occupation and its vicinity. The only problem was how to begin it and thus they utilised this terrorist group’s availability which is not well known to their regular army and whose ideologies meant for accomplishments of political assassinations within or without.

The said notorious criminals were said to have been trained purposefully to eliminate all opposition parties’ leaders versus the NCP politically and militarily whether internally or externally.

Sooner than later their work is to strike on both ends biting with mouth and stinging with tail either in the Northern or Southern Sudan.

Therefore, if Khartoum junta revert to this al Qaeda network of classless killings to which it was accustomed to over the past decades, then Sudan regionally will dive in to a very serious cobweb of instability and statelessness in the Africa continent.

However, should Maj. Gen Sham el sidine resurrected, he has to know that the SPLA of today is neither an SPLA of yesterday nor one of 1990s and should not be defamed in the face of international community by somebody who is killing its essential actors mysteriously and later on would transfer his faults to others who should not kill like magic except through exchange of an audible fire.

Khartoum Junta is too deformed to be reformed and has got no keen sense of any art of possibility in spearheading its blood thirst applicability and must therefore be condemned for stepping onto shoes of Southern territory and must pay dearly for Abyei invasion.

Abyei etymologically known as (Bieh Deng Kuol) whose literal meaning was Deng Kuol‘s Highland or flat terrain a name derived from their Neighbour Nuer according to the plain history before it was soiled with coming of Arab history which came and twisted the terrestrial facts and figures.

It is to be noted that Dinka ethnic groups like prefixing letter A to all nouns of place and thus Bieh was prefixed Abieh until such a rotten Y is included.

However, even Prophet Mohammed knew and still knows that Abieh was not and will never be having an inch of its land annexed to the northern territory and the wrong guest called Miseryia must be shown its direction with which it crept without stuttering for occupation of their good Samaritan host‘s estate. if prophet Mohammed is not arrested by the Almighty Allah for these gross sins being committed by his believers against the humanity especially the animist Christians of African Descent of Nuba Mountains, Funj Kingdom and South Sudan for a century and beyond.

People of Abieh traditionally are very hospitable tribe versus other sections of Dinka communities and thus Miseryia tribe was or is just notorious for their shameless and thankless guesthood without fear of Godly punishment. Miseryia nomadic baseless groups is an eye broken guest who doesn’t recall how much they had suffered before given a sanctuary by Abieh Community and must be soon given a taste of their own medicine to go back to their roaming ages without grazing accommodation in any part of Southern Sudan.

What goes round comes round and Abyei people mustn’t regret their hospitality. This is an altruistic characteristics of humanity of which black people must be boasting for but fighting off the intruders using all means of diplomatic approaches whether for defence or offence.

The Author: could be reached for comments at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it