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The South Sudan Army SPLA: a critical analysis of its performance and its ability to provide adequate security to civilians’ population in the Republic of South Sudan

By John Bith Aliap, Adelaide, South Australia

December 3, 2011 (SSNA) -- The South Sudan Army known as the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) won the trust and confidence amongst the South Sudanese citizens when it altruistically defended the South Sudan territories under Arab occupation throughout the past decades. The SPLA fought with the North for many years, which resulted in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and subsequently led to South Sudan’s independence. Although the SPLA previously won the trust and confidence amongst the South-Sudanese people, this highly held trust and confidence appears to be dissolving. Its recent efforts, especially in the states of Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile and Western Equatoria has called into question whether the SPLA is capable of fulfilling its constitutional responsibility to protect the citizens of South Sudan and the national sovereignty of its new nation. Despite its constitutional mandate to provide adequate security to civilians throughout the entire nation of South Sudan, the SPLA recent effort has been called to question by South Sudanese citizens.

This analysis provides an overview of the SPLA’s past and current performances in the states of Unity, Jonglei, Western Equatoria and Upper Nile. Furthermore, it highlights how the SPLA has inadequately protected the civilians in those states based on the evidence found in multiple sources. Subsequently, the analysis provides some immediate recommendations that could improve the ability of the SPLA to provide adequate security across the geographical areas of South Sudan.

The concept of civilian protection is frequently highlighted in international political discourse and debates due to the high toll amongst the civilian population where armed conflict is present. Through International Humanitarian Law (IHL) the international obligation exists for all states and governments to protect their civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. However, some states do not honour this international obligation in ensuring the adequate security of its civilian population. The example of these countries is the state of South Sudan which recently gained its independence in the 9^th of July 2011. More recently, the United Nations became increasingly concerned about civilian safety and created a resolution that obligates all states to be morally responsible in the protection of their citizens from any form of abuse, harm and crime.

According to the UN Security Council chapter 138, in which the Republic of South Sudan is a signatory, each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This article clearly affirms that the state holds the responsibility in the prevention of such crimes including through deterrent by appropriate and necessary means.

Through the United Nations mechanism of civilian protection, the Republic of South Sudan should not be considered an exception. Furthermore, the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan article 151 (4) also authorises the country’s army to protect its civilians. This article clearly specifies that the SPLA should defend the sovereignty of South Sudan, protect the people of South Sudan, secure the territorial integrity of South Sudan and defend South Sudan against external aggression. The translation of these international and national obligations of civilian security into practice has proven to be one of great complexity in South Sudan. The question remains whether the SPLA has the ability to observe its national and international obligation in the provision of adequate security to the citizens of South Sudan.

As has often been the experience of conflict between Sudan’s North-South, Khartoum’s military aggression has more recently become noticeable through the eyes of the international community, regional blocs and the South Sudanese population. Since the signing of the CPA, Khartoum has continuously aggressed and provoked South Sudan as though the republic of South Sudan has no army to defend its people and territories.

Despite Khartoum’s ongoing calculated military aggressions and provocations, the president of the republic of South Sudan Lt. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit consistently maintains that South Sudan ‘shall not go back to war’ with the North. This assertion from Kiir provides the Khartoum regime a free ride to bomb and assault the territories of South Sudan. Another implication of Kiir’s reluctance to address the possibility future warfare is that it can psychologically dishearten the South Sudanese citizens whom are known for their bravery while standing their ground for the last 21 years throughout the dark days of the North-South civil war.

Khartoum has a history of backing proxies such as the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) and other self centred rebel groups in South Sudan to serve as counter-insurgencies in order to weaken the social and political strength of the South Sudanese people. Despite this, the SPLA which retains a constitutional obligation to protect its civilians has done little in the face of these challenges to adequately protect civilians from rebels and the ongoing Khartoum regime’s military hostility.

It is widely known by the South Sudanese that Khartoum has supported a sizable number of regional and national militias groups that are opposed to the republic of South Sudan’s government. A notable example of this militia group is the LRA which has been fighting the Ugandan government for decades. Hoigilt et al. 2010 asserts that the ‘Khartoum regime has been providing continuous support to LRA in the form of military logistics, finance and safe haven bases in Dar Fur region’. The LRA activities in western Equatoria have also caused the massive and untold deaths and displacement of civilians. Although the responsibility to protect civilians in South Sudan rests on the SPLA, the SPLA response to LRA attacks in Western Equatoria have always been inadequate and ill planned.

According to the Enough Project (www.enoughproject.org) field research in Western Equatoria, many locals doubt the SPLA’s ability to counter-attack LRA attacks. A witness to the LRA attacks on the 5^th September 2009 in the village of Bomu in Western Equatoria conveyed to the Enough Project field research workers that the SPLA in Western Equatoria can not protect civilians from the LRA attack. Another witness in the same interview expressed the same doubt and claims that the SPLA was unwilling and sometimes refused outright to pursue the LRA after the village was attacked.

A religious worker provided a similar view regarding the SPLA’s inability to protect the civilian population in Western Equatoria. This worker expressed that the SPLA often deploys too late to provide meaningful protection to civilians, and in some cases, failed to act even when they were nearby. Another person who came from the same village of Birisi, just a small distance away from Yambio in Western Equatoria further claimed that in three separate LRA attacks in July and August 2009, SPLA soldiers did not deploy to confront the LRA despite being based in close proximity. According to the same person, SPLA soldiers told the local villagers in Birisi that they did not have the authority to fight LRA rebels (www.enoughproject.org/ interview with religious worker October 9^th 2009).

It is apparent that the South Sudan Army has often been very sluggish when it comes to emergency response. For example, after several attacks on the villages of Ukcuo, Bureangure and Sakure, Boma and Baikpara in August and September, it was alleged that the SPLA soldiers did not respond despite the loss of 16 people, the injury of scores and numerous abductions. A displaced person who was present during these attacks testified to the Enough Project field workers that SPLA soldiers arrived at the scene at least eight hours after the attacks (www.enoughproject.org/ interview with Anzara residents, October 9^th 2009).

It becomes clear based on the numerous testimonies of South Sudanese residents that the SPLA has been ethically and morally unwilling to fight the LRA fighters despite the threat they pose to the civilian population in Western Equatoria. The Enough Project interview with a local pastor in Yambio also revealed the shocking weakness of the South Sudan Army’s inability to deal with and address external and internal threats.

A local pastor in Yambio revealed that when the SPLA was provided with the positions of the LRA, it often failed to seize the initiative in the protection of civilians. Additionally, people driven from the village of Karika told the Enough Project that after the LRA attacked their village in August 2009, they informed the SPLA base nearby and the SPLA did nothing to avert the ongoing LRA attack. These people further claimed that the SPLA commander in charge of those forces told the villagers to pursue the LRA fighters and inform him of their whereabouts. The village of Kirka was attacked for the second time by the LRA even though the exact location of the LRA fighters was purportedly disclosed to SPLA forces (www.enoughproject/interview with local pastor in Yambio, October 8^th 2009).

Following the national election in 2010, the people of South Sudan have witnessed the worse insurgencies from the North in its history since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Whilst it is the duty of the intelligence community in South Sudan to encounter internal and external insurgencies, the SPLA intelligence has undisputedly failed to closely monitored the rebellious tendencies of David Yauyau, Bapiny Monytuel, Gatluak Gai, Thomas Mabor Dhol, Olieny, Gordon Koang, Peter Gadet, George Author and Gabriel Tanginye before the greater loss of lives could arise amidst combatants and civilians alike. These renegade groups have caused and continue to cause untold human suffering throughout the territories of South Sudan, although the SPLA has neutralized few of these insurgencies.

One of the most notable SPLA failures can be identified in its lack of protection to the civilians in Fangak from sub-human and blood sucker George Athor’s rebel forces. In fact, there were some indicators of Athor’s disloyalty and his intent; however the SPLA failed to address the probability of imminent human loss. As reported at (www.globalpost.com/fangak), the rebel forces of George Athor Deng who dropped out of the governorship race in Jongulei, attacked unarmed innocent civilians in Fangak, resulting in 200 fatalities and over 100 casualties. It was reported that the majority of civilians lost during the eve of this attack drowned in the river. A witness who recalls fleeing the scene of fighting blamed the SPLA for failing to rescue them from the carnage of Athor’s rebels. This witness claimed that the SPLA forces arrived almost 6 hours after the attack and were unable to rescue the civilians.

Similarly, the SPLA failed to protect the civilians in Kaldak from Tanginye’s rebel forces despite the clarity of their location. These rebels used reintegration as a method of organising themselves to implement devil acts in Jongulei state, while the SPLA intelligence which is supposed to dig out intelligence information about the raising insurgencies failed to do so. The South Sudan Advocacy Group report highlighted that the attack which took place at Kaldak in Jongulei state resulted in the death of 254 civilians and unknown numbers of casualties and unaccounted for in this evil attack (www.southsudanadvocates.org/kaldak).

In most cases of insecurity, tribal feuds have often been a notable security threat in South Sudan and the SPLA has often overlooked this issue. For example, the recent catastrophe between Murle and Lou Nuer could have been avoided had the SPLA deployed some of its forces to create a buffer zone between the communities of these two tribes. In fact, the recent Lou Nuer-Murle tribal feud had been ignored by both the South Sudan Government and the army. The Murle offensive against Lou Nuer on the 19^th August 2011 resulted in 640 fatalities, 861 casualties, 208 children kidnapped, 38,000 head of cattle stolen and approximately 3431 houses burned down to ashes (www.cnn.com/news). This is a heart breaking tragedy that no true citizen of South Sudan would want to glimpse or be party to.

The SPLA was unsuccessful in restraining Peter Gadet’s insurgency when the SPLA administration in Juba itself granted him sick leave to Nairobi without clearly verifying the agenda of his travel to Nairobi given his track record of disruptive loyalty. The confrontation between Peter Gadet’s forces and the SPLA caused untold human suffering and property damage at extreme levels in Mayom County which was used as a battlefield. The insurgencies of Peter Gadet and George Athor in particular have posed a greater challenge both to the Juba government and the SPLA. Gadet’s assault on Mankien could be regarded as one of the greatest tragedies in South Sudan. A UN report on the incident of Mankien has detailed that 250 people were killed and more than 20,000 displaced as a direct result of Gadet’s assault on Mayom County, mainly during the April and May clashes (Internal Document Provided by a UN Source, Juba, August 2011).

Abeyi which has historically been an undisputable region of Southern Sudan was promised a referendum under the 2005 peace deal between the North and South Sudans, however the Khartoum regime has continued to regard military force as the solution to its problems took a unilateral decision to invade Abeyi. On January 11^th 2011, the Sudan Armed Forces invaded Abeyi and took control over it territorially and administratively (www.sudantribune.com/abeyi). This invasion displaced 120,000 Dinka Ngok according to the (United Nations Report, 2011). Yet the South Sudan Army did not manage militarily to uphold its constitutional obligation to protect the civilians in Abeyi region as clearly specified in the South Sudan constitution.

Despite the restraint that the South Sudan government and its people have exercised in the past years and presently, the ongoing provocations and aggressions from the Khartoum regime continue to be observed in the areas of Western Bahr el Ghazal, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile and Unity states respectively. On December 8^th 2010, the Sudan Armed Forces dropped 18 bombs between Timsa and Raja counties in Western Bahr el Ghazal state. As a response to this direct attack, the spokesman of the South Sudan Army had not suggested any military response, and in another way appealed to the international community to stop Khartoum from bombing the Southern territories (www.sudantribune.com). The frequent appeal to the international community has not always yielded any substantial result to forestall the civilian casualties in the Republic of South.

The Sudan Armed Forces have also carried out the aerial bombardment in some areas of Northern Bahr el Ghazal and the SPLA Army has failed miserably to bring down any aircraft that carried out the attack. On the November 24^th 210, Sudan Armed Forces carried out a broad day light aerial bombardment in Kirr Adem in Northern Bahr el Ghazal state (www.gurtong.com). Following the attack in discussion with the media, the SPLA spokesman Kuol Diim Kuol appealed to the United Nations to investigate and prove that the incident had surely took place, and yet the Southern Sudan Army provided no military response or labelled any military threats against Khartoum’s systematic provocations and aggressions.

On the 18^th of November 2011, the Sudan Armed Forces bombed Yabus in Upper Nile state, and this bombing resulted in a significant number of civilian causalities. Following the incident, Simon Kun Puoch, Upper Nile state governor, avoided requesting military action against SAF, but called upon the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNIMISS) and the international community to take immediate action against Khartoum’s regime (www.sudatribune.com).

However, the Upper Nile’s governor failed to distinguish that the United Nations Mission in South Sudan is a ‘toothless tiger’, an international peace keeping force that can not take military action to save and protect the lives of civilians as is their mandate, but rather behaves as a mourner and an investigative team after tragedy. According to SPLA spokesman Philip Aguer Panyang, there was also a cross border attack launched at Kuek on the same day, at a SPLA army base in Upper Nile by the Sudan Armed Forces infantry units although they were lastly rolled back by SPLA forces. This incident left 18 fatalities and 73 casualties from both sides (www.thecitizens.com).

Recently, the Sudan Armed Forces bombed the Yida refugee camp which provides asylum for thousands of displaced Nubian refugees from the most recent conflict in South Kordufan between the SPLM-N and Sudan Armed Forces military confrontations. This attack resulted in a high number of civilians casualties, especially amongst women and children. The Sudan Armed Forces also carried out an air strike in Guffa locality also in Upper Nile state resulting in 12 fatalities and 20 casualties according to local officials in the area (www.bbc.co.uk/news).

The Khartoum government’s aggression against the Republic of South Sudan is an ongoing phenomenon, and if the government of South Sudan and its army fail to take concrete steps to address this issue, it will likely become a thorn in the foundation of South Sudan. Up to now, Khartoum’s warplanes continue to fly in the Republic of South Sudan air space. Philip Aguer Panyang, the SPLA spokesman confirmed (www.gurtong.com) on the 26^th November 2011 that border tension between the North-South is building up due to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) deployment at Abukedma, Karasana and Heglig.

Aguer has further claimed that Khartoum warplanes are continuously performing airspace surveillance over the border. This seemingly confirms that the possibility of military confrontation between the North and the South seems to be inevitable. This is also suggestive that the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) will likely continue its customary violation of South Sudan territorial sovereignty as they have deployed their troops in close proximity to the South Sudan border.

Despite the most recent failures of the SPLA in its civilian protection, the SPLA remains deserving of credit for its past achievements during the North-South civil war. It must also be acknowledged that army failure is not limited to the SPLA. Throughout history there have been instances of military failure in protection of civilians, both regionally and internationally. The government of South Sudan is increasingly now required to organise the SPLA army to adequately discharge its constitutional responsibility. In doing so, the Government of the Republic of South Sudan can do the following to improve its army’s potential:

(1) Improve ground and air transport

Many parts of South Sudan are inaccessible and have vastly difficult terrains, especially during the rainy season, and this potentially hampers the aversion of risk in those areas. It is important that the government of the Republic of South Sudan considers investment in transport helicopters to improve SPLA’s provision of security to civilians and their property. As noted in this analysis, there have been many cases where the SPLA forces arrival was hours after an attack, and this may be partly attributed to poor and inadequate modes of transport.

(2) Increase soldier’s salaries

The government of the Republic of South Sudan needs to consider increasing the reimbursement of soldiers as a means of boosting their morale. The current salaries that soldiers receive are not equivalent to the role and responsibility they fulfil in fighting with militia groups and also with the enemies in the North. There have been some cases in the past and perhaps up to the present where salaries are delayed or sometimes omitted. This can serve as declining the morale amongst soldiers and soldiers may be unwilling to honour their duties and responsibilities.

(3) Sign security pacts with other countries

Given the challenges the country is facing, the South Sudan army (SPLA) cannot adequately manage the continuous conflicts on its own. Signing security pacts, especially with immediate neighbours provides the possibility of improving the SPLA’s defence capacity in the areas of training, discipline, logistics, command and control, management and administration. Many of the SPLA failures have resulted from these areas, and are often ignored by or remain unaddressed by the SPLA administration.

(4) Improve the capabilities of SPLA intelligence

Intelligence in some other advanced countries serves as the judgment of the nation, but in the Republic of South Sudan where ignorance has seemed to have become the norm, this concept is dissimilar. The recent rise of insurgencies within the South Sudan territories has put to the test the ability of SPLA’s intelligence to uncover what is taking place within the country and on its borders. The South Sudanese people are seemingly surprised by events that they never dreamt about taking place, and this is observed in the lack of answerability within the intelligence community. There needs to be accountability in South Sudan’s intelligence. This is a reality as there has in fact not been any intelligence officer or network held responsible for the string of intelligence failures that have taken place in South Sudan, especially since the national election of 2010 that was marked by a number of insurgencies. The government of South Sudan needs to revisit and check the structure of the intelligence given their past inability to detect insurgencies such as George Athor and Peter Gadet and the rest of insurgencies.

The SPLA intelligence needs to widen and create a relationship of trust with the local communities across South Sudan, and advance these communities to dissect and watch everything that may go wrong within their own respective communities. This may be a cooperative method the SPLA intelligence can access helpful information, and also develop clear knowledge about issues that are unfolding across the communities in South Sudan. Currently, the SPLA intelligence in its nature is merely reactive and not proactive, as it only react to the state of affairs like the recent insurgencies in Jongulei, Unity and Upper Nile.

In conclusion, given the unpleasant examples explored in this analysis, it can be reinstated that although failures are part of military operations, the SPLA which is constitutionally tasked to protect the national integrity and citizens of South Sudan must seriously reconsider its efforts to avoid future failures.

In this analysis, it has become clear that most of the SPLA’s failures have resulted from the lack of air and ground transport, its intelligence, lack of decent payment of its soldiers and a lack of regional and international support given the background of the SPLA being in its transformational epoch to the modern and conventional army. Given the importance of South Sudan’s national integrity, safety and the welfare of all South-Sudanese, it should be considered that future failures from the SPLA’s engagement are undesirable, and that the SPLA must make it imperative that adequate measures are in place to reduce the occurrence of future catastrophes in all territories of the Republic of South Sudan.

Due to the current state of affairs that exist in South Sudan, the government of South Sudan needs to walk an extra mile to reduce the multiple internal fronts created by insurgencies through popular, realistic, meaningful and symbolic reconciliation with insurgent groups who are currently battling the government with the agenda of overthrowing Juba’s government as they often depict.

In the case of Khartoum’s frequent provocations and aggressions, the government of South Sudan does not necessitate to response military to Khartoum’s aggression and provocation now before it unifies its internal front with insurgencies groups, as these groups would punch holds on South Sudan if spacious magnitude war is to occur between the South and the North. The president of the Republic of South Sudan Lt. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit needs to alter his usual rhetoric of ‘no return to war’ to ‘there is a possibility of wide scale war’ should Khartoum persist to contravene the sovereignty of South Sudan. In this way, Khartoum would act with caution fearing should it continue with further aggression and provocation, South Sudan can formulate appropriate military action.

This analysis has also found that tribal feuds are a major basis of uncertainties in South Sudan. As the government has already launched the disarmament process in some states, this disarmament process should not occur as a one off process, rather as an ongoing process until all the fire arms possessed by civilians are collected. This process of disarmament should also be accompanied by figurative reconciliation; in light of the fact that reconciliation is a paramount tool that a responsible government can use to bring its people together for the common good of nation.

The author of this work is a concerned South Sudanese citizen and can be corresponded at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

South SudanParadox: Joyful Independence, Sorry Leadership!

By Dr. James Okuk

July 11, 2011 (SSNA) -- As the people of South Sudan and their friends celebrate with joy the long-awaited independence of their beloved Motherland, yet they are also seriously troubled by lack of good leadership in the new country. The old Sudan has gone, the new South Sudan is born but the values of liberty, and justice and prosperity are still to be practically seen soon in both the former biggest country in Africa (Sudan) and in the newest declared state in Africa with a guaranteed lucky given United Nations membership within a shorter time in mid July 2011.

With the good news of the declaration of the independence of the Republic of South Sudan kicking off on 9th July 2011, yet bad news of bad leadership from the SPLM and its military wing (the SPLA) remains the greatest concern locally, nationally, regionally and internationally. The SPLM/A regime is not feeling ashamed at all to behave like the NCP/NIF regime in the past even worst in South Sudan. History of regime creation with absolute powers for intimidations that used to dominate the old Sudan seems to be repeating itself in South Sudan since 1956.

For Example, the first President of the Republic has demanded absolute powers from the lawmakers in the form of South Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA), and these powers were given to him in midst of threats and intimidations of the opposing views. What a shame and wrong start for the new Republic of South Sudan! We know that some countries were tremendously by leaders with absolute powers, but will the first President of South Sudan who is now given absolute powers do the same? If he couldn’t do his best with the little power and wealth put under his custody in the last six years what will change his abilities this time to effect a u-turn at the last days of his lifespan in power? Only God knows?

Another example of the bad eve of the independent South Sudan is the case of Leader of the Opposition in the SSLA Hon. Mr. Onyoti Adigo who just lost his strong tooth on 7th July 2011 as a result of torture from the SPLA Military Intelligence (MIs) watchdogs in Juba. The SPLA MIs beat and tortured him, his bodyguards and other SPLM-DC at their new Secretariat Headquarters in Juba. The reason given for this evil act is that the Hon. Onyoti and other SPLM-DCers did not request permission from the SPLM and the GoSS to celebrate the independence of South Sudan and distribute posters in Juba to express congratulations for the big occasion made by Southerners in unity.

But does any Southerner need to obtain a permission to express the joy and congratulations for the independence of the Motherland? And is it civilized at all to beat up a Member of Parliament (MP) endowed with constitutional immunities, especially at the eve of independence where all foreign dignitaries and international journalist are assembling for the rare occasion in the world? Absolutely not, and this shows how South Sudan is overwhelmed by the de facto sorry leadership of the so-called liberation fighters who turned out to have been fighting for selfish reward and not for a just cause of the people.

No wonder, the U.S. President Barack Obama and other genuine democratic world leaders are justified to decline responding positively to the GoSS and SPLM’s invitation for independence celebrations. Right now a lot of questions are ringing in the minds of many Southerners and those concerned about the common good of South Sudan: Why did SPLM/A fight against marginalization in order to practice marginalization by shift of guards? Why did SPLM/A fight for liberty in order to practice oppression? Why did SPLM/A struggled against injustice in order to deny justice in South Sudan? Why did SPLM/A accepted to negotiate and reach a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in order to create conflicts inter and intra South Sudanese communities and/or the neighboring communities? Why, Why, Why and list of the pessimistic concerns and paradoxes continues.

Yes, the independence of South Sudan is the best but does it deserve bad leadership? Does it make sense for a leader of the new country to say from time to time that he does not know that many communities and individuals in South Sudan are being subjected to all kinds of ill-treatment by the very SPLA/M commanders and comrades? Why is the SPLM/A top leader unable to lead and discipline his juniors who are executing very harmful acts against the good of South Sudanese and the credibility of his leadership itself? What kind of a leader doesn’t know how to lead his people on the right path without discrimination?

For sure, and with shameful acts being executed in South Sudan, so many repeated failures to bring good news to the new country will push some communities, groups or individuals to choose living in Diaspora and exile or in the best rebellion bushes of South Sudan until genuine change is effected. But of course this shall increase the level of bad news in the new country like what happened in the eve and dawn of the declaration of the independence of the old Sudan in 1950s.

The South Sudan President and the few people benefiting from his leadership will attempt to crash those trying to oppose his leadership but with no success as he would wish. Also the South Sudan rebels and the opposition leaders shall try to work hard to see to it that the new President takes good care of values of good leadership or else he must go to his home or to the grave. But in the course of this conflict over the use of power, the people of South Sudan shall be the very one who shall bear the greatest consequence of the conflict from above. God have mercy on the poor people of South Sudan since their leaders are failing to protect them from harms!!!

Notwithstanding, the suffering people of South Sudan will remain as unshakeable force for change and wise use of power. Their voice will remain the voice of God and whoever does not fear them (be it the government of the day or the rebel or the opposition) should not pretend to fear God. God shall hear their prayers in the form of the South Sudan National Anthem.

Building a new country is not a joke. Having absolute powers for leadership comes with greatest responsibilities too. It is not about hiring and firing subjects at will only; it is far more demanding than this short-look.

Long Lived the Independence South Sudan but Short-lived whoever will try to mislead the freedom to a wrong direction of non-prosperity, injustices and dictatorship.

Congratulations and Viva to the Republic of South Sudan. I love this historic Day that I am witnessing in my life as an opportunity missed by many other Southerners, including the top CPA hero, Dr.John Garang de Mabior.

Dr. James Okuk is a PhD holder from the University of Nairobi. He can be reached at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it .

The Root Causes of Conflicts in South Sudan

Dear Comrades and friends,

May 14, 2011 (SSNA) -- I wish to inform all of you that the root causes of internal conflicts among Southern Sudanese from the past governments to this present government of Southern Sudan are based on an unfair allocation of positions (question of power) and resources on geographical and ethnical basis. One single tribe has always maintained a dominant role over other tribes. South Sudan; as it’s known locally and internationally, is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society with more than sixty (68) ethnic groups. If the majority do not consider the importance (or role) of minority groups, then problems or tribal conflicts shall always be on the rise until this question of power and or resources is addressed accordingly, and in a pragmatic manner.

The infamous word “Kokora” is derived from Bari local language, which literally means ‘separation’. First, it was pronounced loudly by most of the Equatoria intellectuals who felt Dinka domination in the Regional Government which was established in 1973 following the Addis Ababa Accord, which granted the people of Southern Sudan an autonomous status within the framework of a united Sudan. A war that started on 18^th August 1955, some four months before, Sudan obtained its independence from Great Britain on 1^st January 1956.

The root causes of Kokora could be traced back from the time of the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, when Mr. Abel Alier Kuai out-maneuvered his erstwhile enemy, General Joseph Lagu Yanga - the founder of Anya-Nya Movement and the principal signatory to the Addis Ababa Accord. Instead of General Lagu to take charge of the affairs of Southern Sudan as it was stipulated in the agreement, President Jaafar Mohamed Nimeiri hastily handed over the Regional Government to his longtime puppet Mr. Abel Alier who negotiated and signed the agreement on behalf of Sudan Government. Unfortunately, President Nimeiri abruptly appointed and commissioned General Joseph Lagu to head the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) sprinkled all over Southern Region with his Headquarters in Juba, while Mr. Abel Alier to head the High Executive Council in Juba. The two gentlemen were under specific roles, supervisions and directives of President Nimeiri in Khartoum – playing the game of Tom & Jerry against each other. This kind of appointment remained a bone of contention between the two Southern leaders to date.

During Abel Alier’s reign as from 1973 – 1978, and again from 1980 – 1982, he entrenched himself by placing his own tribesmen (Dinka) in all the strategic and powerful positions. They controlled finance, public service, judiciary, education, administration, prison service, wildlife service, police service, legal affairs, regional assembly etc. The non-Dinkas found themselves deprived from the regional government and eventually advocated for division of Southern Region in Juba to be divided up into three sub-regions of Equatoria, Bahr El Gazal and Upper Nile. In June 1983, President Nimeiri issued a Presidential Decree dividing the Southern Region into three fragile regions of Equatoria under Governor James Joseph Tombura, Bahr El Gazal under Lawrence Wol Wol and Upper Nile under Daniel Koat Mattews.

At the same time, the war broke-out once again in the South which resulted to the birth of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A) under leadership of Dr. John Garang de Mabior. The same political domination was also applied again in the movement where out of five so-called Permanent Members of Politico-Military High Command (PMHC), four were from Dinka; including Col. John Garang as a Chairman & C-in-C, Lt. Col. Kerubino Kuanyin Bol as Deputy, Capt. Salva Kiir Mayardit Deputy Chief of Staff for Security & Operations and Major Arok Thon Arok as Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics & Administration. Lt. Col. William Nyuon Bany, who hailed from Nuer, was the only non-Dinka in the SPLM/A leadership’s hierarchy to get the position of Chief of Staff.

The minority tribes who joined the SPLA in their thousands found themselves left out in the movement’s leadership and participated only as canon porters and nothing else. That was why many Equatorians in the initial stage had hesitated, or perhaps were reluctant to join the SPLA/M. They perceived it as a Dinka movement and the bulk of Nuer sided with Anya-Nya II respectively voicing the same concerns. However, it took Col. John Garang and his henchmen nearly three years to create fictitious titles like the one known as “Alternate Members” of Politico Military High Command to accommodate few non-Dinka like Galario Ornyang, James Wani Igga, Dr. Lam Akol, Yusuf Kowa and Dr. Riek Machar in the SPLA leadership’s hierarchy. The same kind of political dominion is currently replicating itself in the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), which is repeating the same mistakes of the past without any shame.

The rampant corruption and nepotism, which is the making of the so-called “land grabbing”, money laundering, denial of job opportunities and the selective promotion of SPLA officers and other security organs are based on this kind of setup where checks and balances are not relevant at all levels of GOSS. One may wonder why Southern Sudanese are still fighting themselves while they have already got what they have been fighting for. Alas! The truth is that we are lacking a visionary leader who can accommodate our diverse community’s interests fairly.

The political Bureau (PB), which is the highest political organ of the ruling SPLM is actually a rubber stamp used by one ethnic group (Dinka) to dominate others by using their numbers to impose decisions on others. There is no fairness in it. Serious decisions are made behind the back door. Even the so-called ‘deputies’ used to wonder when decisions are passed and announced publicly. This is also applied to the Council of Ministers which is being chaired by H.E President Salva Kiir himself.

Some GOSS Institutions like Ministries of Finance, Internal Security, Public Service, Education, SPLA Affairs (Defence), Bank of South Sudan, Regional Cooperation (Foreign Affairs) and all the security organs are dominated by one ethnic group – the Dinka. This makes it difficult for other ethnic groups to voice their concerns publicly. 90% of minority groups do not reflex themselves in the political mirror of Salva Kiir’s government. During the Regional Government which ruled the South for 10 years as from 1973 – 1983, most of the minority tribes used to be represented by their community leaders. For example: Oliver Batali Albino came from the smallest tribe in the South – the Makaraka. But he was made a minister by Abel Alier. The same with Mr. Mr. Simon Mori Dedimo and Dr. Pasisco Ladu Lolik who headed the ministries of Information & Culture and that of health respectively under General Joseph Lagu in 1978. Now, such tribes like Taposa, Anyuak, Lokoi, Didinga, Lokoro, Acholi, Murle, Balanda, Mondu, Nyangwara, Baka, Abakaya, Makaraka, Jurbel, Maban, Boya etc.. are not represented at any level of government from GOSS ministers, Independent commissions or GOSS under-secretaries and yet they possessed most qualified personalities capable to manage such institutions. While during the war each community mentioned above participated actively in defending the Southern’s cause against the successive regimes in Khartoum.

President Salva Kiir must learn how to share the nation’s cake equally with all Southern Sudanese communities. Not everything to be Dinka! That is why there is a need for change within South Sudan leadership where minority tribes should be represented.

The author’s name is withheld for security reasons.

Attached bellow is the lists of SPLM Political Bureau members, GOSS Presidential Advisors, GOSS Ministers, Independent Commission Chairpersons, Under-secretaries and other security organs. The list of South Sudanese in the Government of National Unity is not included, where Dinka are still dominating all key strategic positions there.

SPLM Political Bureau Members

No.	Name	Position	State	Tribe
1.	Cde. Salva Kiir Mayardit	Chairman	Warrap	Dinka
2.	Dr. Riek Machar Teny	1^st Vice Chairman	Unity	Nuer
3.	Cde. James Wani Igga	2^nd Vice Chairman	Central Equatoria	Bari
4.	Cde. Malik Agar	3^rd Vice Chairman	Blue Nile	Funj
5.	Cde. Pagan Amum Ukec	Secretary General	Upper Nile	Shilluk
6.	Dr. Ann Itto	Deputy Secretary General for Southern Sector	Eastern Equatoria	Madi
7.	Cde. Yasir Saed Arman	Deputy Secretary General for Northern Sector	Northerner	Khartoum
8.	Cde. Daniel Awet Akot	Member	Lakes	Dinka
9.	Cde. Kuol Manyang Juuk	Member	Jonglei	Dinka
10.	Cde. Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior	Member	Jonglei	Dinka
11.	Cde. John Luk Jok	Member	Jonglei	Nuer
12.	Cde. Jamie Nunu Komba	Member	W. Equatoria	Zande
13.	Cde. Mark Nyipuoc Obong	Member	W. Bahr El Gazal	Jurchol
14.	Cde. Clement Wani Konga	Member	C. Equatoria	Mundari
15.	Cde. Alisio Emore Ojatuk	Member	E. Equatoria	Lotuka
16.	Cde. Taban Deng Gai	Member	Unity	Nuer
17.	Cde, Paul Mayom Akec	Member	Lakes	Dinka
18.	Cde. Awut Deng Acuil	Member	Warrap	Dinka
19.	Cde. Akol Paul	Member	Warrap	Dinka
20.	Cde. Deng Alor Kuol	Member	Abyei	Dinka
21.	Cde. Nhial Deng Nhial	Member	Warrap	Dinka
22.	Cde. (Late) Samson Kwaji	Member	C. Equatoria	Pajulu
23.	Cde. Paul Malong Awan	Member	N. Bahr El-Gazal	Dinka
24.	Cde. Lual Diing Wol	Member	N. Bahr El- Gazal	Dinka
25.	Cde. Abdul Aziz Adam El Allawe	Member	Nuba Mountains	Nuba

GOSS Presidential Advisors:

S/No.	Name	Position	State	Region	Tribe
1.	Fr. Pio Kuac	Religious Affairs	Upper Nile	G. Equatoria	Shilluk
2.	Mr. John Kong Nyuon	Security Affairs	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Nuer
3.	Dr. Joseph Nguen M.	Social Service	Unity	G. Upper Nile	Nuer
4.	Mr. Kennedy Kayin	Peace and Reconciliation	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Murle
5.	Mr. Kong Kong Bol	Border Conflicts Resolution	Unity	G. Upper Nile	Nuer
6.	Mr. Alfred Lado Gore	Diplomacy	C. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Bari
7.	Mr. Tor Deng Mawien	Decentralization & Inter-Governmental Linkage	Warrap	G. Bahr El- Gazal	Dinka
8.	Madam Rebecca Nyandeng de-Mabior	Gender& Human Rights	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Dinka
9.	Mr. Lual Diing Wol	Political Affairs	N. Bhar El-Ghazal	G. Bhar El-Ghazal	Dinka
10.	Mr. Joseph Lagu Yanga	Special Advisor	E. Quatoria	G. Equatoria	Madi
11.	Mr. Telar Ring Deng	Legal Advisor	Lakes	G. Bahr El-Gazal	Dinka
12.	Lt. Gen. Salva Mathok Geng	Advisor on SPLA Affairs	Warrap	G. Bhar El-Gazal	Dinka
13.	Steven Madut Bak	Regional Cooperation Affairs	Warrap	G. Bahr El-Gazal	Dinka
14.	Cornillo Befo	Monitoring and Integrity in Governance	C. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Bari

GOSS Ministers:

S/No.	Name	Ministry	State	Region	Tribe
1.	Mr. Kosti Manibi	Cabinet Affairs	Western Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Moru
2.	Dr. Cirino Hiteng	Presidential Affairs	Eastern Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Lotuka
3.	Mr. Nhial Deng Nhial	SPLA & Veteran Affairs	Warrap	G. Bhar El-Ghazal	Dinka
4.	Mr. Gier Chuang Aluong	Internal Affairs	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Dinka
5.	Mr. David Deng Athorbei	Finance & Economic Planning	Lakes	G. Bhar El-Ghazal	Dinka
6.	Dr. Barnaba Marial Benjamin	Information	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Nuer
7.	Mr. Michael Makuei Lueth	Parliamentary Affairs	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Dinka
8.	Mr. Madut Biar Yiel	Telecommunication and Postal Services	N. Bahr El-Gazal	G. Bahr El-Gazal	Dinka
9.	Mrs. Nyanlok Tiong Garluak	Animal Recourses and Fishers	Unity	G. Equatoria	Nuer
10.	Mrs. Awut Deng Achuil	Labour, and Public Service.	Warrap	G. Bhar El-Ghazal	Dinka
11.	Mr. Lino Makana	Transports and Road	W. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Zande
12.	Mrs Jamie Nunu Komba	Housing & Physical Planning	W. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Zande
13.	Dr. Ann Ito	Agriculture & Forestry	E. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Madi
14.	Mr. John Luk Jok	Legal Affairs & Constitutional Development	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Nuer
15.	Dr. Luka Manoja	Health	C. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Bari
16.	Ms. Agnes Losuba	Gender, Social Welfare& Religious Affairs	Central E. State	G. Equatoria	Kakwa
17.	Mr. Stephen Dhieu	Commerce & Industry	Upper Nile	G. Upper Nile	Dinka
18.	Mr. Deng Alor Kuol	Regional Cooperation	Abyei	Abyei	Dinka
19.	Mr. Garang Diing Akuong	Energy & Mining	N. Bhar El Gazal	G. Bhar El Gazal	Dinka
20.	Jemmy Lemi Milla (late)	Cooperatives & Rural Develop.	C. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Pajulu
21.	Dr. Michael Mille Hussien	Education	W. Bahr El-Gazal	G. Bahr El-Gazal	Fertit
22.	Mr. Gabriel Changson Chang	Culture & Heritage	Upper Nile	G. Upper Nile	Nuer
23.	Lt. Gen. Oyay Deng Ajak	Investment	Upper Nile	G. Upper Nile	Shilluk
24.	Mr. Abdallah Albert	Wildelife Conservation & Tourism	E. Equatoria	G; Equatoria	Abakaya
25.		Environment
26.	Mr. Joseph Ukel	Higher Education, Science & Technology	W. Bahr El-Gazel	G. Bahr El-Gazal	Jurchol
27.	Mr. Makuach Teny Yok	Youth, Sports & Recreation	Unity	G. Upper Nile	Nuer
28.	Mr. James Kok Ruai	Humanitarian Affairs & Disaster Management	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Nuer
29.	Mr. Paul Mayom Akec	Water Resources & Irrigation	Lakes	G. Bahr El-Gazal	Dinka
30.	Mr. Pagan Amum Ukac	Peace & CPA Affairs	Upper Nile	G. Upper Nile	Shilluk
31.	Mary Jervas Yak	Human Resource Development	Warrap	G. Bahr El-Gazal	Dinka

Plus two ministers without portfolios! That totaled to 33 ministries all in all. GOSS Independent Commissions and Chambers:

S/No.	Name	Commission	State	Region	Tribe
1.	Dr. Pauline Riak	Anti-corruption	Lakes	G. Bhar El-Ghazal	Dinka
2.	Dr. Deng Dongring	Public Grievances Chamber	Warrap	G. Bhar El-Ghazal	Dinka
3.	Mr. Steven Wondu	Auditor Chamber	C. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Kuku
4.	Rev. William Chan	Relief & Rehabilitation	Warrap	G. Bahr El Gazal	Dinka
5.	Mr. Jarkuc Barac	De-mining Authority	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Dinka
6.	Mr. Peter Guang Akiech	Peace & Reconciliation	Upper Nile	G. Upper Nile	Shilluk
7.	Mr. William Deng Deng	Demobilization, Disarmament Reintegration	Warrap	G. Bhar El-Ghazal	Dinka
8.	Dr. Bellario Ahoy Ngong	HIV/AIDS	N. Bhar El-Ghazal	G. Bhar El-Ghazal	Dinka
10.	Mr. Isaiah Chol Aruai	Census, Statistic and Evaluation	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Dinka
11.	Mr Lawrence Korbandy	Human Rights	W. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Moru
12.	Alakaya Aligo Samson	Reconstruction and Development Fund	C. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Kakwa
13.	Mrs Philister Baya Lawiri	Civil service	E. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Lokoro
14.	Mr. Robert Lado Loki	Land Commission	Central Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Kakwa
15.	Mr. Dhiou Mathok	Employees Justice Chamber	N. Bahr El-Gazal	G. Bhar El -Gazal	Dinka
16.	Mr. Ben Robin Oduho	War disable, Widow & Orphans	E. Equatoria	G. Equatoria	Lotuka
17.	Prof. Ajuoi Magot Chol	Southern Electricity Corporation	Jonglei	G. Upper Nile	Dinka
18.	Mr. Gabriel Mathiang Rok	Southern Sudan Fiscal, Financial Allocation & Monitoring	Lakes	G. Bahr El-Gazal	Dinka
19.	Mr. Kawach Makuei	War Veterans	N. Bahr El-Gazal	G. Bahr El-Gazal	Dinka
20.	Mr. Daniel Deng Lual	Bureau for Community on Small Arms Control	Warrap	G. Bahr El-Gazal	Dinka
21.	Mr. Koak Guok	Local Government Board	Upper Nile	G. Upper Nile	Nuer

GOSS Under-secretaries:

S/No.	Name	Ministry	State	Tribe
1.	Selvatoria Garang Mabior	Finance and Economic Planning ( Finance)	Warrap	Dinka
2.	Aggri Tesi Saboni	Finance and Economic Planning ( Planning)	C. Equatoria	Kuku
3.	Elisabeth Manou Majok	Commerce & Industry	Jonglei	Dinka
4.	William Ater Machiek	Energy and Mining	Lakes	Dinka
5.	Juma Stephen Luga	Telecommunications & Postal Services	Central Equatoria	Bari
6.	Martin Mou Mou	Education , Science& Technology	Warrap	Dinka
7.	Dr.Olivia G. Lomoru	Health	C. Equatoria	Bari
8.	Eng. Reymond Pitya	Roads & Transport	Central Equatoria	Bari
9.	Ochan John Bongomin	Electricity Corporation	E. Equatoria	Acholi
10.	Dr. Daniel Wani	Wildlife Conservation & Tourism	Central Equatria	Bari
11.	Crispin Abugo Paul	Urban Water Corporation	W. Bhar El-Ghazal
12.	Eng. Isaac Liabwel C. Yol	Water Resource & Irrigation	Lakes	Dinka
13.	Jaden Emilio	Agriculture and Forestry( Forestry )	Central Equatoria	Pajulu
14.		Agriculture and Forestry ( Agriculture)	Warrap	Dinka
15.	Dr. Mokuei Malual	Animal Resources and Fisheries	Warrap	Dinka
16.	Bortel Mori Nyomble	Co-operatives &Rural Development	W.Equatoria	Bari
17.	Mrs Salwa Jebril	President’s Office	Warrap	Dinka
18.	Abdon Agaw	Cabinet Affairs	Jonglei	Dinka
19.	Mark Nyikang Yomon	Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly	Upper Nile	Shilluk
20.	Mrs Rebecca Jashua	Labour, Public service &HRD	Upper Nile	Shilluk
21.	Dr. Julia Aker Duany	Parliamentary Affairs	Jonglei	Nuer
22.	Mr. Majok Guandong	Regional Co-operation	Jonglei	Nuer
23.	Gordon Soro Yisaya	Local Government Board	Central Equatoria	Bari
28.	Justice. Reuben Madol	Judiciary of Southern Sudan	Warrap	Dinka
29.	Jeremiah Sawaka	Legal Affairs& Constitutional Development	C. Equatoria	Bari
30.	Mrs. Margret Matthew Mathiang	Gender, Social Welfare& Religious Affairs	Unity	Nuer
31.	Peter Baptist Abaker	Culture & Heritage	W. Bhar El-Ghazal	Balanda
32.	Justice John Wuol Makec	President, Judiciary S. Sudan	Warrap	Dinka
33.	Justice Chan Rech Madut	Vice President, Judiciary SS	Warrap	Dinka
34.	Mr. Elijah Malok Deng	President, Bank of S. Sudan	Jonglei	Dinka
35	Mr. Cornelio Koryom	Vice President, BOSS	Warrap	Dinka
36.	Mr. Jok Madut Jok	Youth & Sport		Dinka
37.	Mr. Michael George Garang	Information	Jonglei	Dinka
38.	Mr. Ambassador Moh Ajang	Humanitarian Affairs	Upper Nile	Dinka
39.	Mrs Beatrice	Peace & CPA Implementation	C. Equatoria	Kakwa
40.	Mr. Akuei	Investment	Jonglei	Dinka

SPLA, Internal security and other security organs:

No.	Name	Position	State	Tribe
1.	1^st Lt. Gen. James Hoth Mai	Chief of General Staff SPLA	Upper Nile	Nuer
2.	Lt. Gen. Ping Deng Majok	Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration & Finance	Abyei	Dinka
3.	Lt. General Deng Wek	Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations	Jonglei	Dinka
4.	Lt. General Biar Atem	Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics	Jonglei	Dinka
5.	Lt. General Mabuto Mamur	Deputy Chief of Staff for Moral & Political Orientations	Eastern Equatoria	Lotuka
6.	Lt. General Majak Agot	South Sudan National Security Service (Special Branch)	Jonglei	Dinka
7.	1st Lt. Gen. Achuil Tito	Inspector General Police	Warrap	Dinka
8.	1st Lt. Gen. Agasio A. Tong	Inspector Gen. Prison Service	Warrap	Dinka
9.	1st Lt. Gen. Aru Maan Chot	Inspector Gen. Fire Brigade	Jonglei	Dinka
10.	Major General John Lat	Military Intelligence	Lakes	Dinka
11.	Major General Marial Nuor	Public Security	Lakes	Dinka

South Sudan unveils plans for future cities

August 18, 2010 (Juba) -- The semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) on Wednesday unveiled a $10.1 billion ambitious plan for future Southern Sudan cities; the new plan which has already been drawn up bears animal-shaped cities.

In the plan, Juba, the current capital city of Southern Sudan will be relocated to an undisclosed location and will be designed in the shape of a rhinoceros. The new city will be called "Rhino City".

The plan comes in less than five months before ahead of a scheduled January referendum on independence.

"It's very innovative. That's our thinking. It's unique. It's the Ministry of Housing thinking you have to be unique to attract the people," Daniel Wani, undersecretary of Southern Sudan's Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning was quoted by AP as saying.

It is rumoured that all Southern Sudan State capitals will differ in shapes.

The speculation is that Yambio, the capital city of Western Equatoria State will be shaped like a pineapple and Wau, the capital city of Western Bahr el-Ghazal State, will be shaped like giraffe.

It is not yet known where the vastly under-developed region will get the funding from. But Southern leaders are reported to be in talk with some global investors for the possibility of securing the funding.

One regional Observer who asked not to be named said that this new development is a reconfirmation of that Southern Sudan will split from the North one way or another.

"This new development from Juba proves that Khartoum doesn’t have full control over Southern Sudan. This is a smack on the faces of those who are against South Sudan secession, Omar al-Bashir must get use to it, there is no way around it”, he explained.

Detailed architectural drawings of Rhino City show that Central Equatoria's police headquarters would be situated at the rhino's mouth, an amusement park at the ear, an industrial area along the back and residential housing throughout the four legs, according to the Associated Press (AP).

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which was signed in 2005 ended the bloody civil war between North and the South. The CPA allows the people of South Sudan to decide in next January whether or not they want to remain part of the united Sudan or form their own independent State.